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ABSTRACT

The discipline of bioethics is insufficient and ineffective in addressing the
persistent issues of racism and racial inequalities in healthcare. A minority of bioethicists
are indeed attentive to issues such as implicit bias, structural racism, power inequalities,
and the social determinants of health. Yet, these efforts do not consider the colonial-racial
discourse—that racism is an instrument of eurochristian colonialism, and bioethics is a
product of that same colonial worldview. Exposing mainstream bioethicists to the work
of anti-colonial scholars and activists would provide bioethicists a framework through
which they would be better equipped to address issues of race through: 1) a deeper
understanding of their complicity with colonialism, and 2) the importance of anti-colonial
methods and approaches to ethical decision-making in healthcare.
Three contemporary bioethics cases involving issues of race are examined
including Jahi McMath and the diagnosis of brain death, the Havasupai diabetes research
protocol, and the treatment of Latinx undocumented immigrants with end-stage renal
disease. These cases serve as the focal point for 1) the extrication of eurochristian
colonial themes within three foundational bioethics texts, and 2) the application of the
knowledge and praxis of three anti-colonial scholars toward racially responsive case
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analyses and outcomes. I conclude that the combination of a robust self-examination of
the discipline’s eurochristian worldview and the prioritization of a range of anti-colonial
perspectives would serve bioethics more fully in the imagining of a racially conscious
bioethics practice, scholarship, and policy that aims to reject colonial constructs and
normalize difference.
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CHAPTER 1: BEHIND THE MASK OF MORALITY: (e)UROCHRISTIAN
BIOETHICS AND THE COLONIAL-RACIAL DISCOURSE
A health care ethics conference was held in Denver, Colorado in 2018 focusing
on marginalized patients and communities called “Expanding the Frame of Bioethics.”
When evaluating participant feedback after the conference, several comments stood out.
In response to a particular talk about Latinx ethics, one participant wrote “As a person of
color I felt he was speaking my truth. I feel his presentation was necessary.” Another
participant wrote “I was quite offended for myself and other ‘white’ medical
professionals.” How does one make sense of such disparate reactions? In the face of real
racial disparities and discriminatory treatment in health care, why are bioethicists and
health care professionals, of all people, insulted by the naming of racial issues? Many
bioethicists and health care providers consider the Tuskegee syphilis research trials as the
signature bioethics race case. Yes, the trials were grotesque, a past case of extreme
abhorrence. Unfortunately, the current disparities that are affecting real flesh and blood
and are a continuation of the same paradigm that allowed Tuskegee to happen. We are
not post-racial.
Do ethics committees truly stand as representations of the diverse communities
within the U.S.? Is race adequately accounted for in the analysis of all ethics discourses,
whether about physician-assisted suicide, withdrawal of life support, genetics, access to
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health care, or expensive life-saving technologies? Is the bioethics of difference of
multiple divergent (and often marginalized) communities given priority along with the
bioethics of technology? Do eurochristian scholars risk belonging in a professional (or
personal) peer group to stand with racial and ethnic “others” in the face of overt racism or
subtle discrimination? Do ethics students read and learn from scholars of color with equal
weight to their white counterparts? Do ethics students represent a variety of social
locations? Robin Kimmerer, a Native American ecologist and author, writes “The stories
we choose to shape our behaviors have adaptive consequences2.” In looking at underlying
worldviews and how they shape our world, she notes that Indigenous people see
strawberries as a gift from the earth, as entities belonging only to themselves, and with
which humans are in symbiotic relationship. She contrasts this to the non-Indigenous
approach of viewing strawberries as a commodity to be manipulated and sold, with no
underlying relationship of gratitude or reciprocity. The values we hold have
consequences on our environment, our attitudes, and our communities. The stories that
shape our worlds run deep, often go unquestioned, and have myriad and interconnected
consequences. The goal of this dissertation is to illuminate the underlying eurochristian
narrative based on eurochristian “stories” that shapes bioethics and its values, the same
story that also sells chemically treated strawberries to produce profit. The aim is not to
admonish all aspects of eurochristian thought, nor to romanticize alternative worldviews.
But whether Christian or secular, liberal or conservative, bioethicists are often unaware of

2

Robin Wall Kimmerer, Braiding Sweetgrass, First paperback edition. ed. (Minneapolis, Minnesota:
Milkweed Editions, 2013), 30.
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their entrenchment in a worldview that continues to have harmful implications for people
of color. Louis Althusser asks, how many teachers,
“(the majority), do not even begin to suspect the “work” the system
(which is bigger than them and crushes them) forces them to do, or
worse, put all their heart and ingenuity into performing it with the
most advanced awareness (the famous new methods!). So little do
they suspect it that their own devotion contributes to the
maintenance and nourishment of this ideological representation of
the School, which makes the School today as “natural,”
indispensable-useful and even beneficial for our contemporaries as
the Church was natural, indispensable, and generous for our
ancestors a few centuries ago.”3
Like Althusser’s teachers, bioethicists in practice, research, and education are similarly
embedded in the eurochristian worldview and the history of colonialism.
In 2007 in an article written by Olivette Burton called “Why Bioethics cannot
figure out what to do with race,” she wrote, “Bioethics cannot figure out what to do with
race until it understands the historical, cultural, and religious basis for current race
relations.” This is where my argument lies…of the involvement of modern bioethics in
the continued inequalities of people and communities of color in the United States. Using
race-oriented frameworks are not enough. Anti-colonial studies are, as I will argue,
required to frame the “why” of racism, and to provide a framework through which we, as
bioethicists, can understand more profoundly their complicity with colonialism and begin
to grasp the importance of anti-colonial methods and approaches to morality in health
care. Bioethics is a diverse discipline of practitioners, scopes, and methods. Yet, the
discipline of bioethics shares the same origins and draws from (even while critiquing) the
3

Louis Althusser, Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes Towards an Investigation) (2006),
98.
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foundational bioethics theories. Some bioethicists are indeed attentive to issues such as
implicit bias, structural racism, power inequalities, and the social determinants of health.
Yet, part of the argument set forth here is that bioethics as a discipline is not sufficiently
familiar with the complexity of colonialism, with race as only one, albeit critical,
dimension. An anti-colonial lens can reframe the way bioethicists understand issues of
human dignity and equality. But some of the resolutions inherent in anti-colonial methods
may not feel satisfactory or fulfilling to the bioethicist, as this approach demands the
recognition that often no place exists for the eurochristian at the anti-colonial table. As
illustrated by Native American ecologist in the earlier quote, if bioethics continues to tell
its story through a eurochristian lens, it will continue to bear colonial-racial fruit. Put
succinctly, racial disparity is an instrument of eurochristian colonialism, and bioethics is
a product of that same colonial worldview.
In this dissertation I will argue that the discipline of bioethics’ relative
ineffectiveness in addressing race stems from its own blind complicity with eurochristian
worldview. My contribution to the discourse is overall to provide an argument for an
anti-colonial approach to bioethics by engaging students and practitioners in this same
kind of critical analysis for the purpose of addressing issues of race through: 1) the
rendering of an anti-colonial analysis using the categories of ontological assumptions,
moral epistemology, and socioeconomic factors on three influential texts by eurochristian
bioethics scholars Tristram Engelhardt, Peter Singer, Tom Beauchamp, and James
Childress; and 2) an anti-colonial account of three bioethics cases by engaging in the
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works of anti-colonial scholars such as Miguel De La Torre, Sylvia Wynter, and Leanne
Betasamosake Simpson.
Theory and Methodology
The methodology for this dissertation is not only anti-colonial, but posteurochristian. In other words, while largely deconstructive and critical, it will offer up
alternative ontologies and epistemologies that rival eurochristian worldview, entertaining
the possibilities of novel futures. In the identification of elements of the colonial-racial
discourse this project aims to refocus on marginalized worldviews while “reducing to
size” universalized Western fictions.4 Anti-colonialism as defined by Dei and Lordan is a
“resistance to white supremacy and Eurocentric cultural organization…” that “looks for
possibilities of resisting and transforming cultural systems of oppression and domination,
or imposed ways of knowing, being, and living.”5 For this dissertation an anti-colonial
methodology can be represented in two parts:
1)

a radical resistance to oppressive eurochristian epistemologies including not only
the dominant epistemological and ontological concerns of postcolonialism, but also
the political and economic imperialism of capitalism, democracy, politics of
recognition, and state security.

2)

a centering of those who have been marginalized by eurochristian colonial
oppression. The views of anti-colonial scholars and marginalized communities are

4

As Mignolo and Walsh point out, “Western thought and Western civilization are in most/all of us, but this
does not mean a blind acceptance, nor does it mean a surrendering to North Atlantic fictions.” ibid., 2.
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George J. Sefa Dei and Meredith Lordan, Anti-Colonial Theory and Decolonial Praxis (New York: Peter
Lang, 2016), 20.
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central for holding a mirror up to the dominant “center”, as well as to provide
powerful counter-narratives and alternative praxes. Patients and scholars of color
are the subjects, not the objects, of moral and ethical discourse.
An anti-colonial methodology situates eurochristian institutions such as
bioethics within a larger historical, social, and political context, and contests many of the
current eurochristian methodologies of bioethics, particularly those underlying
mainstream theological, philosophical, legal, and qualitative methods common to the
discipline. This anti-colonial methodology is applied in chapters four through six. The
task of each of these chapters is to: 1) define one bioethicist’s thinking using three
categories: ontological assumptions, moral epistemology, and sociopolitical factors; 2)
define one anti-colonial scholar’s thinking similarly; and 3) reflect on a particular
bioethics case involving issues of race from both the bioethicist’s and anti-colonial
scholar’s perspective. This analysis brings into view the relative position of a
eurochristian worldview amid several competing perspectives, at once calling into
question its universal nature. Through anti-colonial analysis this project demonstrates the
continued harms of the eurochristian worldview held by bioethicists for racialized
persons, while providing anti-colonial paradigms that would better address issues of
racism and oppression in the cases discussed. What is uncovered is the multiplicity of
anti-colonial viewpoints from scholars from various social locations, not a “new”
universal framework for bioethics. Anti-colonial scholars are similar in the sharing of
oppression, struggle, and survival with their communities, but have all experienced
racism and colonialism/neo-colonialism differently. In this way, no replacement for

6

eurochristian ethics is sought; rather, various anti-colonial views are illustrated. The anticolonial scholar chosen for each chapter is not meant to represent an entire race or group
of people. Each scholar is positioned in their own habitus and amid a multitude of
varying factors. For instance, Miguel De La Torre, a Cuban-American Baptist who grew
up practicing both Santeria and Catholicism will have a different Latinx perspective than
Gloria Anzaldua, who was a queer Chicana poet, writer, and feminist theorist who grew
up in Texas and started life as a field worker.6 In the critiques of this dissertation I have
chosen one scholar for each chapter to provide an anti-colonial analysis of bioethics
based on the time and space limits of writing a dissertation. The purpose of choosing one
scholar is to illustrate one anti-colonial approach, not “the” anti-colonial approach.
This is not a philosophical argument of the type often used in bioethics, and will
not engage in the merits and weaknesses in the opposition’s arguments within the
mainstream dialogue of bioethics. The arguments herein do not intend to sweepingly
invalidate the particular usefulness and aspirational qualities of the examined approaches
within bioethics discourse. Instead, this paper situates bioethics in a much more
expansive context and aims to unearth the implications of several bioethics approaches
specifically on issues of race. The focus solely on race is narrow and leaves out the
dynamics of intersectionality, which is a limitation to the depth of the analysis.

6

The Gloria E. Anzaldua Foundation. “About Gloria”. https://geanzaldua.weebly.com/about-gloria.html.
(accessed April 22, 2019).
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Three Frames: Structural, Political, Experiential Discourse
The methodology of this dissertation is interdisciplinary, with discourse on
three levels: structural, praxis-oriented, and experiential. First, it subjects the discipline of
bioethics to Foucauldian concepts of knowledge and power in order to illuminate the
contextual positionality of bioethics. Second, it proposes anti-colonial praxis for
addressing the issues of race in bioethics practice and education through the critique of
bioethics and the centering of scholars of color. And finally, it prioritizes the experiential
knowledge of persons of color who have been marginalized by bioethics through case
studies.
First, I apply to the truths, rules, and rituals performed by bioethicists the
Foucauldian idea that truth is socially constructed and is a product of power.7 I provide a
broader Foucauldian genealogy of bioethics which, “when viewed from the right distance
and with the right vision, there is a profound visibility to everything.”8 This is the 500year long-view of colonialism. The knowledges contained within the discipline of
bioethics are, from a Foucauldian lens, simply interpretations, one truth among many
possibilities. The social sciences, for Foucault, are dubious in their standing as a true
“science”. Cultural practices, “determine what will count as an object of serious
investigation,” and thereby constructs a certain reality.9 From a constructivist view, the

7

This deconstruction, like for Foucault, is not an end in itself and is not nihilistic, but seeks to undermine
only the social constructions that pose danger within the systems within which bioethics operates.
8

Hubert L. Dreyfus, Michel Foucault Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, ed. Paul Rabinow, Michel
Foucault (Hoboken: Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2014), 107.
9

Ibid., 116.
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stories we learn and live by shape our worldviews. Constructivism as used in this
dissertation does not require a non-existence of universally shared truths. But it shifts the
focus away from the search for universal truths and focuses on ways bioethics might
engage irreconcilable differences that lead to racism and oppression. In tracing the
history of bioethics and race, the pattern of eurochristian colonial thinking is pervasive in
the works of philosophers and theologians from which bioethics has arisen. Using a
Foucauldian genealogy, a continuity is identified from these 17th-19th century thinkers to
three contemporary bioethicists. This “history of the present” of race and bioethics
represents a discernable trend.
Second, the critique of bioethics leads to the invocation of a radical framework
for the practice and scholarship of bioethics that transcends the cultural wars between the
dominant liberal Christian, secular, and the Christian conservative camps of bioethics.
The proposed framework is anti-colonialism, which is a “resistance to white supremacy
and Eurocentric cultural organization…” that “looks for possibilities of resisting and
transforming cultural systems of oppression and domination, or imposed ways of
knowing, being, and living.”10 Anti-colonialism is a political praxis, adept at responding
to the material consequences of the continued colonialism and global imperialism, and an
approach that makes whiteness visible. True to anti-colonial praxis, it is a centering of
non-eurochristian communities, and a decentering of whiteness. Hence, the anti-colonial
approach of this dissertation is the centering of scholars of color in the bioethics
discourse. If there is a place for the “dominant/colonizer/oppressor in the anti-colonial
10

Dei and Lordan, Anti-Colonial Theory and Decolonial Praxis, 20. ibid.
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struggle,” which some argue there is not, it is because “it provides [them] with an avenue
for asking and insisting upon accountability and addressing responsibilities.”11
And third, the case studies in this dissertation focus on the reclaiming of
traditions, stories, histories, knowledge, and experiences of the racialized and oppressed.
This methodology comes from an amalgam of several concepts: liberation theology’s
“preferential option of the poor”, feminist standpoint theory’s epistemological privileging
of knowledge and experiences of the marginalized, and the decentering of
whiteness/centering of persons of color discourses from critical race theory.12 For this
dissertation, the point of view of the marginalized, the three case studies, are pieced
together from various sources such as news reports, interviews, legal reports, and
scholarly accounts. Ideally the case studies would also include engagement with those
who were directly affected by the actions of bioethics and the healthcare system, which
was not practical within the scope this dissertation.
Context: Pragmatic Heuristic or Critical Anti-Colonialism
Two frameworks for approaching issues of race, poverty, and marginalization
are the pragmatic heuristic and the critical anti-colonial analysis. The position I take in
this project prioritizes the anti-colonial analysis. Many scholars and activists work within
and from the standpoint of the heuristic of liberalism and modernity. This standpoint

11

Marlon Simmons and George Dei, “Reframing Anti-Colonial Theory for the Diasporic Context,”
Postcolonial directions in education 1, no. 1 (2012).

12

For more on these concepts see: GutieÌrrez, Gustavo. A theology of liberation: History, politics, and
salvation. Orbis Books, 1973; Harding, Sandra G., ed. The feminist standpoint theory reader: Intellectual
and political controversies. Psychology Press, 2004; and Wiegman, Robyn. The Political Consciouness:
Whiteness Studies and the Paradox of Particularity in Object lessons. Duke University Press, 2012.
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provides solutions to inequality and race that are intended to alleviate immediate
suffering and provide basic material needs. This pragmatic heuristic often falls under the
names of justice, charity, and the social determinants of health. Urgent needs such as
housing, safe neighborhoods, access to healthy foods, and good medical care are such
examples, and are helpful to a point. But these are solutions to problems that maintain the
boundaries of the system as a whole. Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang’s work identifies
these pragmatic approaches as “settler moves to innocence”, evasions of
incommensurable differences while attempting to “reconcile settler guilt and complicity,
and rescue settler futurity”.13 They continue,
“the absorption of decolonization by settler social justice
frameworks [a pragmatic heuristic] is one way the settler, disturbed
by her own settler status, tries to escape or contain the unbearable
searchlight of complicity, of having harmed others just by being
one’s self.”14
What these pragmatic solutions fail to address is the liberation of persons from the master
discourse of colonialism, within which lies the root causes of inequalities and suffering.
A deeper radical anti-colonial analysis is required for the liberation of persons and
communities who suffer under the weight of centuries of racism, exploitation, and
oppression. The pragmatic approach continues to uphold oppressive structures while
ignoring the complicity of the practitioners of economic, political, and epistemological
imperialism.

13

Eve and Yang Tuck, K. Wayne, “Decolonization Is Not a Metaphor,” Decolonization: Indigeneity,
Education & Society 1, no. 1 (2012): 1.

14

Ibid., 9.
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In contrast to a pragmatic heuristic approach, critical anti-colonialism is a
radical resistance to anything that continues to feed white supremacy, even those things
of modernity such as ideas of social justice, social determinants of health, and cultural
humility that, on the face of it, appear well-intentioned. To return to Tuck and Yang, they
identify the process of decolonization of the settler-state as nothing short of giving back
all of the land that was stolen from the Indigenous nations.15 Anything short of this “turns
decolonization into an empty signifier to be filled by any track towards liberation.”16
Decolonizing “is not converting Indigenous politics to a Western doctrine of liberation; it
is not a philanthropic process of ‘helping the at-risk and alleviating suffering; it is not a
generic term for the struggle against oppressive conditions and outcomes.”17 In other
words, decolonization is not social justice.
Yet, those who choose to work only within a pure anti-colonial approach might
be accused of over-romanticizing certain ethnic groups and past lifeways and discounting
the breadth within which both beneficial and destructive epistemological, economic, and
political arrangements are shared. Many people, including people of color, use the
pragmatic heuristic; in effect they have become part-eurochristian. How does one
perceive the tension between the assaults of colonialism with what has now transformed
the globe with nations and peoples who continue to modernize, want access to helpful

15

Tuck and Yang use decolonization as their framework, while I am arguing for an anti-colonial bioethics.
The differences between decolonial and anti-colonial work are described more in detail in a future chapter.
But for these purposes, they share a critical approach to Western liberal heuristics.

16

Tuck, “Decolonization Is Not a Metaphor,” 7.

17

Ibid., 21.
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medicines, invest on the global market, and privatize their countries’ economies? Robin
Kimmerer, in addressing the problems of the 21st century asks, “How do we recognize
what we should reclaim and what is dangerous refuse? What is truly medicine for the
living earth and what is a drug of deception?” Anti-colonialism is not atavistic. Aimé
Césaire negated the claim that anyone can return to an unadulterated pristine cultural
past. Instead, “the great historical tragedy of Africa has been not so much that it was too
late in making contact with the rest of the world, as the manner in which that contact was
brought about…”18 For Miguel de Unamuno “the choice was not between
Europeanization or barbarism, technology or ignorance, modernity or the medievalism.”19
Leanne Betasamosake Simpson writes that “Indigenous peoples…can choose to use the
conventions of the academy to critique the system of settler colonialism and advance
Indigenous liberation,” and I believe this is valuable work. We can also choose to
continue to produce knowledge and theory in opposition to the academy as resistance,
resurgence, and sustenance through our own systems of knowledge, and I believe this is
also vital work.20 So, while a tension exists between the goods and evils of modernity,
this is not a project about saving the modern. My focus is on the critical anti-colonial
analysis over and above the pragmatic heuristic. This project leans heavily towards
radical liberation from structural oppression, while not discounting the need for the
18

Aimé Césaire, Discourse on Colonialism, ed. Robin D. G. Kelley, Poetics of Anticolonialism (New
York: New York: Monthly Review Press, 2000), 45.
19

De La Torre, M. Ajiaco Christianity: Toward an exilic Cuban ethic of reconciliation. ProQuest
Dissertations Publishing, 1999, 243.

20

Leanne Betasamosake Simpson, As We Have Always Done: Indigenous Freedom through Radical
Resistance (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2017), 31.
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pragmatic work of alleviating the immediate pain and suffering of bodies and minds
while moving ever-toward an anti-colonial resistance and centering of non-eurochristian
people. This dissertation is not a “how-to” guide for bioethicists, but a deep questioning
of the epistemologies we take for granted in bioethics that affect people and communities
of color. For bioethicists, the anti-colonial analysis will appear radical to mainstream
practices. An anti-colonial approach to bioethics will take time, imagination, and a
radical shift in perspective. There is a need to override the grand narratives of bioethics
with a multiplicity of subaltern narratives in order to understand historical dynamics and
relationships, and to think about how the subaltern narratives are woven together.21
Reflecting on David Scott, the way forward might be in “fidelity to the present”, in
“imagining new futures of the uncertain presents we live in…”22
A Few Methodological Concerns
The first methodological clarification concerns the nature of both bioethics and
racial categories as homogeneous entities. Bioethics is an expanding discipline. The
methods of the discipline are diverse, and include empirical, historical, philosophical,
theological, legal, casuistic, ethnographic, and economic approaches.23 While primarily
functioning in educational and consultant roles in hospital settings and in educating
health care practitioners, bioethicists also have a role in informing and writing public
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policy, and more recently in consulting and educating on issues in population health.
Bioethicists also theorize from multiple frames, including more contemporary approaches
such as virtue ethics, common morality, feminist, and relational schemes. The scope of
this project is focused on several foundational texts in bioethics whose origins rest
squarely within a eurochristian framework and continue to saturate the intellectual
discipline. So, while the implication is that the discipline is growing and evolving, the
term “bioethics” will be used throughout this project to indicate the essential, pervasive,
and shared foundations of the discipline.
Essentializing racial categories presents a second methodological issue. This
issue will be addressed borrowing from Glenn Coulthard’s “essentialism challenge” in
Red Skins, White Masks.24 When speaking about Native Americans, African Americans,
and Latinx, the essentialist problem suggests these categories can be used to ascribe
certain (often undesirable) traits as fixed and immutable to quite diverse populations. The
concept of “cultural pluralism” also naively maintains “cultural straightjackets” of
categories of otherwise diverse groups of people who may or may not share similar
values.25 Yet, as Coulthard explains, an anti-essentialist stance, one that places culture
under the auspices of social construction, postmodernism, and hybridity, can also work
against persons of color. In contrast, anti-essentialism, especially in the context of a
democracy, can disallow groups to claim a collective identity for political expediency. As
Coulthard summarizes, what is most important is whether the essentializing “naturalizes
24
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resistance” or “naturalizes oppression.” Therefore, in using the categories Native
American, African American, and Latinx, these groupings intend to be useful only in
highlighting the colonial-racial oppressions associated with these categories, and not to
stereotype diverse communities and individuals.
At the same time, essentialism is used as a stand-in for authenticity. The danger
in essentializing is that it can bring about judgements regarding who truly belongs to a
group; who can claim to be “pure”. Linda Tuhiwai Smith reminds us that
“at the heart of such a view of authenticity is a belief that
Indigenous cultures cannot change, cannot recreate themselves and
still claim to be Indigenous. Nor can they be complicated,
internally diverse or contradictory. Only the West has that
privilege.”26
Essentialism, used by Western academics, is a political word referring often to liberation
and human rights. Yet, as Smith argues, essentialism within an Indigenous worldview is
something altogether different; it is the sharing of life with everything in the universe, an
“essence” of being of the world and the universe.27 The use of the terms Latinx, Black,
and Indigenous in this dissertation is used always with the understanding that these terms
identify a shared resistance of white supremacy despite the vast differences within such
groups.
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My Positionality
This dissertation is in part an excavation of the discipline of bioethics, and
concomitantly a challenge to this author’s own assumptions, biases, and worldviews. A
commitment to the process of decolonizing one’s mind is a lifelong pursuit and is never
complete—there is no “arriving” at some utopian decolonized state. The positionality of
this author in this dissertation involves risk, both as a white person talking with and about
persons of color, and for critiquing one’s own discipline of study and practice, bioethics.
Where I critique bioethics, I am also critiquing myself. My goal is to center and prioritize
anti-colonial authors and their works, as well as those patients, families, and loved ones
who have been marginalized by bioethics and the healthcare system. The work that I
cannot do that is fundamental to both anti-colonial and decolonizing projects is the
ongoing work of resurgence, re-existence, reimagining, and transcending required for
those who own inherited non-colonial knowledges and worldviews. Decolonization is a
form survival, resistance, and refusal by those who have been colonized. So, while I have
experienced colonization from a gendered perspective, I have no experience with the
deeper intersectional oppression that both people of color and non-heteronormative
people have experienced. Instead, I prioritize the works of those continuously emerging
decolonial discourses and employ them to displace and dialogue with eurochristiandominant discourses, particularly in the discipline of bioethics. This interdisciplinary
labor intends to disturb the discipline of bioethics from its eurochristian slumber so that
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morality is reimagined through what Sylvia Wynter calls cognitive openings toward
homo humanitas, the Human that comes after Man.28
Chapter Summaries
Chapter Two, Bioethics, Race, and Colonialism: A Genealogy lays out the
structural position of race and bioethics from a Foucauldian perspective of knowledge as
power. The genealogy begins with the problem of racism and racial inequality in
healthcare, and the deficiency of bioethics in addressing these issues. A scholarly review
describes the current state of the literature in bioethics and race, and bioethics and
colonialism. Following the literature review, a short history defines bioethics as having
roots in philosophy and theology. In this vein, I examine moral philosophers Immanuel
Kant and John Stuart Mill, and Christian social ethicists Walter Rauschenbusch, Reinhold
Niebuhr, and Joseph Fletcher to identify early trends in eurochristian colonial-racial
thinking. These scholars were chosen for their influence in their respective disciplines,
and as predecessors of bioethics. We can look back now and clearly see racism, Western
exceptionalism, imperial conquest, and moral proselytizing underlying some of the most
influential theologians and philosophers of their time, those who imparted the ideas of
human dignity, preference utility, conscience, charity, and social order. These
incongruities preface the kind of scrutiny under which bioethics should continue to locate
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itself, and which this dissertation will explore in regards to three foundational bioethicists
and their influential texts.
In Chapter Three, The eurochristian Colonial Discourse: Religion,
Enlightenment, and Race, first I define the eurochristian worldview, colonialism, and
imperialism in both Christian and secular forms. Second, I give attention to the colonialracial discourse which contextualizes the fundamental and deeply entrenched relationship
between colonialism and race. These first two sections provide an historical backdrop and
serve to contextualize the basis for an anti-colonial methodology, to expand the reader’s
understanding of the colonial trajectory and its violence. Third, I describe why I chose an
anti-colonial, over postcolonial and decolonizing, frameworks. And finally, I outline the
categories of analysis through which I will examine each case in the following three
chapters. These elements of critique are three: ontological assumptions, moral
epistemology, and socio-political factors. In comparing these categories between
eurochristian and anti-colonial scholars, the depth of the differences stand out in relief.
Chapter Four, A White God versus a Latinx Jesus, begins with the case of 6,500
undocumented immigrants in the United States, the majority who are Latinx, who are
suffering with end-stage renal disease but denied the standard of care in U.S. healthcare
system. The Orthodox Christian bioethicist H. Tristram Engelhardt’s widely read books
The Foundations of Bioethics and The Foundations of Christian Bioethics are
categorically analyzed from an anti-colonial perspective and contrasted with Miguel De
La Torre’s liberative anti-colonial approach. From this analysis it becomes clear that the
ontological, epistemological, and socio-political elements of Engelhardt’s metaphysical,
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theological, and philosophical positions continue the eurochristian colonial agenda and
leave Latinx immigrants on the margins to choose between suffering or receiving charity
within a white evangelical system. De La Torre’s Latinx ethics, on the other hand, meets
these patients at the bedside, prioritizes their experiences and worldviews, and transfers
the blame of their “undocumented” status onto the last centuries of U.S. political and
economic domination of those south of the imaginary border.
Chapter Five, Two Expressions of Life, Death, and Humanity, considers the
case of Jahi McMath, a 13-year-old African American teenager who was diagnosed as
brain dead after exsanguinating and sustaining a cardiac arrest post-tonsillectomy. The
liberal preference utilitarian Peter Singer’s text Practical Ethics, with reference to his
book Rethinking Life and Death frame the dynamics of the McMath case which revolved
around definitions of death, humanness, and personhood. The works of Peter Singer
reject the Christian ideas of human dignity for a humanist and secular approach, which
are shared by many in healthcare. Singer can be extreme in how far the takes his analysis,
but the underlying sentiments reflect the broader secular scientific medical culture. The
works of anti-colonial scholar Sylvia Wynter challenges the narrative of progress, of
defining humanity from a central position, and the idea of death as only biological, as
opposed to a social death. The context she provides around McMath and her family’s
experiences identify the secular liberal bioethical relegation of McMath to near death
both biologically and socially without fully considering the humanity and ontological
sovereignty of McMath’s family.
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In Chapter Six, The Protection of Human Research Subjects is Still Colonial, I
explore the 2010 court case surrounding the Havasupai Nation’s involvement in an
Arizona State University research protocol, the Diabetes Project. While the multiple
ethical breaches and the harms caused by the research protocol and its handling were
condemned by bioethics experts as a whole, I argue bioethics research regulations do not
go far enough for those on the margins. One of the most widely cited bioethics textbooks,
Principles of Bioethics, by Tom Beauchamp and James Childress, mentions this case
under the subtitle “group harm”. This is not untrue, but from the anti-colonial perspective
of Leanne Betasamosake Simpson, the standpoints of Beauchamp and Childress are still
engrossed in the projects of universals, of liberal multiculturalism and inclusivity, in
Western economic and state subjectivities, and in the continued development of white
bioethics scholarly narratives. Simpson will prove to shine a light on the incompatibility
of Indigenous thinking with even the most well-meaning eurochristians.
The conclusion, Chapter Seven, Bioethics Interrupted summarizes the main
points of each chapter, reviews the contributions of this work, provides recommendations
for bioethics, and proposes future areas of research.
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CHAPTER 2: BIOETHICS, RACE, AND COLONIALISM: A GENEALOGY
This genealogy of race and bioethics is a Foucauldian one, a history of the
present, which asks “how did we get here?” This chapter first defines the problem of race
and bioethics based on relevant literature. Second, it identifies the Foucauldian rituals of
power within bioethics and reviews the literature relevant to race and colonialism. And
finally, it outlines the 50 to 60-year history of bioethics and its congruency with
eurochristian ways of knowing synonymous with particular kinds of power. I use
Foucault here because his concept of genealogy is helpful, but I use his work with
caution. While Foucault challenges systems of power in the West, and in particular in
France, he is not anti-colonial. Alexander Weheliye is helpful in demonstrating this point
in his book Habeas Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black Feminist
Theories of the Human.29 According to Weheliye, Foucault centers racism within the
European center by “monumentalizing” the Nazi Holocaust as the “full reach of
biopower” while ignoring the colonies and any forms of racism “ailleurs” (elsewhere).30
This approach fails to acknowledge the Holocaust as just another enactment of
colonialism and genocide alongside those enacted on Indigenous, African, and other
racialized bodies outside Europe. In doing so, Foucault fails to understand the history and
29
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meaning of concepts such as colonialism and race for his characterization of biopower,
using the words uncritically.31 According to Weheliye, Foucault’s idea of racism is the
“inevitable clash of unacquainted civilizations” after a period of an “internally cohesive”
France based on those arriving from “elsewhere”—the alien races of ethnic racism,
somehow separate from biopolitical racism.32 Race, for Foucault, is a “fixed category
rather than as the biopolitical apparatus it actually is.”33 So while Foucault is helpful in
this paper for outlining a genealogy of bioethics, his works cannot speak to the colonialracial discourse within bioethics, the foremost goal of this dissertation.
Elements of a Foucauldian Genealogy
Before settling into a genealogy of bioethics, it is crucial to define the purpose
of a genealogy. First, genealogy is the analysis of power and knowledge. For both
Foucault and Frederich Nietzsche, history is the “endless repeated play for
dominations”.34 The dominant structures at a point-in-time discharges its power through
what Foucault calls “meticulous rituals of power”, which are rules inscribed in law and
moral code which seek to preserve the dominant power structure.35 And rules can be bent
for any purpose. History is “knowledge is thoroughly enmeshed in the petty malice of the
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clash of dominations.”36 Truth, for Nietzsche, is the “ceaseless and nasty clashing of
wills.”37 While Nietzsche attributed the takeover of dominant forces as perpetuated by
human will, Foucault saw the play for dominance as lying in some interstitial space
within social structures. Whether dominant discourses are primarily willed by persons, or
wholly operate in the interstices in technologies of power, is a matter of philosophical
debate. Perhaps it is a combination of both individual and structural forms that contribute
to the continuing clash of dominations.38 In any case, it is the dominant power that
dictates what counts as knowledge and truth. According to Foucault,
“…truth isn’t outside power, or lacking of power… each society
has its regime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth; that is, the
types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the
mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true
from false statements, the means by which is sanctioned; the
techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of
truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts
as true...”39
In other words, for Foucault, what we take for the truth - our knowledge base,
moral precepts, and professional expertise - are all a formation of power; knowledge is
power. Knowledge is not truth – it is interpretation. For Foucault, the adage “speak truth
to power” would be absurd, because power defines truth in order to maintain domination.
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Whether a universal truth exists outside of power is a problem that will continue to be
debated into the future; and I will not take a formal side. But this dissertation assumes
that at least some “truths” are relative and driven by the ontologies and epistemologies of
a dominant power.
Second, a Foucauldian style genealogy “writes the history of the present”. In
other words, it identifies a modern problem, historically traces central components of the
cause of the problem, and asks “How did we get here?”40 Genealogy is not the discovery
of a past parallel of a present concept, nor finding that the past necessarily led to the
present condition. To the contrary, genealogy is an archeology of historical moments, of
shifts in discourse, and the evolution of ideas, which serve to illustrate the randomness
and banality in how history unfolds. Yet, when discourses and histories are viewed from a
distance, patterns can be discerned and alternate ways of understanding modern
problems are revealed. When one is able to take a bird’s-eye view of a moment in time in
the context of history, the patterns of eurochristian thought can be seen to follow certain
trends; but not trends that are moving human kind toward some great progress. For
Foucault, genealogy seeks to dispel the linear trajectory of the evolution of a thing
through history, which possesses neither some “pristine” origin, nor salvation or a great
descent. There is no telos or purpose; there is no deep dark meaning or truth underlying
human life. For Foucault, “the task of the genealogist is to destroy the primacy of origins,

40

Dreyfus and Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics.

25

of unchanging truths”, and of the ideas of development and progress.41 Meaning and truth
are all a matter of interpretation, which make philosophy irrelevant.42
Third, these dominating technologies of power, how power is grasped and
maintained, is not merely conceptual or theoretical, but has actual effects on the bodies
and minds of people. Bodies are caught up in the structures and actions of power, and
alternately, power is localized in the body. As can be seen in many of Foucault’s works,
it is through technologies of power that social institutions function to imprint their
influence onto the bodies of the prisoner, the mentally ill, the sick patient, and the
homosexual. Later in this dissertation, this inscription of bioethics on the bodies of
people will be laid out more explicitly. What is left out of histories written by the
“winners” is the history of and violence enacted upon the oppressed. And once a new
power is in place, despite the intent, violence continues to be enacted upon the oppressed
through meticulous rituals of power. For Nietzsche, “guilt, conscience, and duty had their
threshold emergence in the right to secure obligations; and their inception, like that of
any major event on earth, was saturated in blood.”43 The violence to bodies of color has
historically accompanied eurochristian dominance and continues to do so today.
As in Foucauldian genealogical form, a problem will be identified in bioethics,
eurochristian bioethical rituals of power will be identified, and the discourse between
bioethics and race will be traced to help elucidate “how we got here.”
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What is the Problem?
The primary problem with which this dissertation is concerned is the continued
poor health, early death, and unequal treatment of non-whites in health care in the United
States.44 The problem can be expanded through several commonly asked modern
questions: Why do inequalities still exist in medicine? Why do racialized groups such as
Native Americans and African Americans statistically have higher rates of diabetes, heart
disease, traumatic injury and alcoholism?45 Why, if we as bioethicists and healthcare
providers adamantly deny any racist tendencies, do people of color consistently report
discrimination and are empirically treated differently than their white peers?46 And
especially, why, if bioethics and the medical professions espouse the ethical language of
equality, human dignity, and conscience, are these bodily and psychological violences not
thoroughly addressed? This is clearly a complex issue that has a multitude of proximal
and distal causes. Yet, this genealogy will begin to explore the potential implications of
one of those causes, the eurochristian colonial worldview of Western bioethics. In
problematizing bioethics through an analysis of power and knowledge, this chapter aims
44
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to reveal that bioethics’ moral and ethical discourse continues to allow violence, in spite
of itself.
Medicine and Race
The history of racism and inequality in healthcare is no secret. In the 18th and
19th centuries, many physicians served as a cog in the wheel of colonization, complicit in
the perpetuation of the concept of race. Morality and medicine were closely linked, as
missionaries were expected to be trained as physicians, especially with “the advent of
germ theory and antiseptics, anesthesia, and early vaccines.”47 Christian missionaries
filled the roles of saving souls and sanitizing bodies. Imperial hygiene, the early public
health approach, targeted the “uncivilized and unclean” practices of non-white subjects
within colonized boundaries who were believed to threaten the health of settlers and the
colonial military. Hubert Lyautey, a French colonial administrator, wrote in 1933 that
“the physician, if he understands his role, is the most effective of our agents of
penetration and pacification.”48
During this same period in the United States, Marion Sims, the founder of
modern gynecology, performed painful vaginal surgeries on enslaved black females
without pain control. He also performed experiments on black infants by “cutting open
enslaved children’s scalps and [attempting] to pry their skull bones into new positions
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using a cobbler’s tool” to try to find a cure for tetany. 49 Most of the children died. In the
infamous Tuskegee Study in Macon County, Alabama, from 1932 to 1972 approximately
400 black men with syphilis were observed by physicians and staff of the US Public
Health Service while the disease ravaged their bodies and minds, all the while
misleadingly being told they were receiving treatment.50 At various times throughout the
20th century and as late as the 1970s, hundreds of thousands of African American, Puerto
Rican, Native American, and Latina-American women were exploited in the testing of
various forms of birth control and were sterilized against their will.51 And most recently,
the Henrietta Lacks story accounted for a poor black woman who was treated for cancer
in the 1950s. Researchers and physicians have established a multi-billion-dollar industry
with the tumor cells removed from her body, while neither Lacks or her family ever
received any financial compensation. These are the benchmark stories bioethics tells
when race is addressed by the discipline. Otherwise, a general disregard exists within
bioethics on issues of race, often relegating racism to “rare” and ghastly human atrocities
that mostly occurred in the past.
Yet, this trajectory of racism and inequality in healthcare continues today. In
2002, the Institute of Medicine’s Committee on Understanding and Eliminating Racial
and Ethnic Disparities in Healthcare published their findings. Racial and ethnic
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disparities at both the individual and systems levels “were found across a wide range of
disease areas and clinical services….and in virtually all clinical settings” including
preventative services, pain relief,
“cardiac care, cancer screening and treatment, diabetes
management, end stage renal disease, treatment of HIV infection,
pediatric care, maternal and child health, mental health,
rehabilitative and nursing home services, and many surgical
procedures.”52
In 2013, an article by Joe Feagin and Zinobia Bennefield examined systemic racism
within the U.S. from historical and contemporary perspectives, citing through an
extensive literature search the differential treatments of racialized persons, the implicit
bias of individual practitioners, and the extensive racial framing of the healthcare
system.53
In 2018, the University of Wisconsin’s County Health Rankings and Roadmaps
reported continued and growing gaps in health outcomes based on factors such as
unemployment, lower high school graduation rates, and fewer transportation options.
These gaps “disproportionately affect people of color – especially children and youth.”
Their findings suggest a “clear connection between place, race, and health.” In the state
of Colorado, for example, the County Health Rankings report indicated that American
Indians/Alaskan Natives are less healthy than those living in the bottom ranked county,
and blacks are most similar in health to those living in the least healthy quartile of
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counties, while Hispanics and whites are most similar in health to those living in the
middle 50% of counties.
Some of the most severe inequalities can be found in the health of Native
Americans. Life expectancies of Native Americans in South Dakota and Montana are 1012 years shorter than their white counterparts.54 The rates of diabetes, lack of prenatal
care, adolescent female suicide, traumatic accidents, chronic liver disease, death from
Hepatitis B and C are all roughly three times the rate of Caucasian counterparts in the
U.S.55 It is also a fact that Indigenous people globally suffer the worst poverty and health.
According to The Indigenous World 2006 International Working Group on Indigenous
Affairs, “Indigenous peoples remain on the margins of society: they are poorer, less
educated, die at a younger age, are much more likely to commit suicide, and are generally
in worse health than the rest of the population.” For instance, according to the World
Health Organization, infant mortality
“among Indigenous children in Panama is over three times higher
than that of the overall population. In Rwandan Twa households,
the prevalence of poor sanitation and lack of safe, potable water
were respectively seven-times and two-times higher than for the
national population.”56
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Bioethics and Race: In the Literature
The secondary problem, and the one addressed by this dissertation is the
theoretical and methodological inadequacy of bioethics in addressing racism and racial
disparity in healthcare. In 2016 John Hoberman published an article in the Hastings
Center Report called “Why Bioethics has a Race Problem.” In this article, Hoberman
quotes Gregory Kaebnick, who wrote in a 2001 Hastings Center Report article,
“Bioethics” should turn its attention to “easily overlooked, relatively little-talked-about
societal topics” such as race.57 According to a literature search done by Hoberman, he
found that following the Kaebnick plea, only eight pieces were published in the Hastings
Center Report on African-Americans over the next 15 years. In the American Journal of
Bioethics only six articles on race were written; in Literature and Medicine two articles;
and in the Journal of the Medical Humanities, only two on African American health, and
two on nursing in Africa.58 In Hoberman’s article he also quotes Howard Brody who
observed in 2009, “I am aware of little bioethics literature on the topic of health
disparities,” and that bioethicists were likely to find the ethical issues relevant to health
disparities “shallow and uninteresting” and “better left to others to discuss”.59 It is not
that voices from within the discipline of bioethics have not made calls for social justice.
Bioethics scholars Carol Levine, Lisa Parker, Francoise Baylis, Laurie Zoloth, Leigh
Turner, and Catherine Myser propose approaching issues of justice and equality in the
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form of historical critique, activism, feminism, Levinasian hospitality, global health, and
white normativity.60 The problem is that the bioethics scholars who deal directly with the
subject of racial disparities are a minority within the discipline; and a review of the scant
literature on bioethics and racism uncovers an undeveloped and ambivalent narrative
among bioethics scholars as to whether and how bioethics should address racial
inequality.
The American Society of Bioethics and Humanities, the most prominent
national bioethics professional organization, distributed its second edition of “Improving
Competencies in Clinical Ethics Consultation: An Education Guide” in 2015. The
readings for the section “Recognition of Context and Negotiation of Differences” is the
closest ASBH comes to examining issues of race. The anonymous author of the one-page
introduction points out the us/them dichotomy and the fact that “we” are also part of an
“imagined norm”, one that is “White, English-speaking, middle-class, healthy.”61 The
author mentions the need for cultural self-reflection, the recognition of unequal access to
healthcare, and the need to “build trust between socially disadvantaged or marginalized
patients and the healthcare system.”62 The reading materials for educating oneself center
the conversation around the concept of culture, and were published between 1970-1999.
Key phrases include “engaging cross-cultural variation,” “cross-cultural dialogue,”
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“culture and religion”, “transcultural diversity”, “cultural diversity and the search for
ethical universals”, and so on. The dialogue here is mainly around the
universalism/relativism debate, but does not effectively address the socio-political issues
of race in the United States as a basis for prejudice, discrimination, and oppression. The
concept of culture softens and downplays the gross inequalities of racialized members of
society.
In 2016 The American Journal of Bioethics dedicated a volume to race. The
leading article was by Marion Danis, Yolonda Wilson, Amina White: “Bioethics and
Race: Bioethicists Can and Should Contribute to Addressing Racism.”63 In the article the
authors helpfully lay out a list of ways bioethicists can combat racism: in scholarship,
consultation, teaching, policy, research, outreach, and training. Responses came from
Kayhan Parsi, Lisa Fuller, John Stone, and Anita Ho among others covering issues such
as whiteness, power, implicit bias, and structural racism. Camisha Russell also published
an article in 2016 titled “Questions of Race in Bioethics: Deceit, Disregard, Disparity,
and the Work of Decentering” in which she argues through feminist standpoint theory64
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for social justice through structural competency and cultural humility.65 In 2018 Yolanda
Wilson wrote a piece titled “Jahi McMath, Race, and Bioethics” in which she highlights
the racial implications of this benchmark case of brain death.66 And in 2018 Denise
Dudzinski wrote a blog entry on bioethics.net titled “White Privilege and Playing It
Safe”, calling for white bioethicists to engage more robustly with systemic racism.67
What are the Rituals of Power?
Rituals of Power, the “rules inscribed in law and moral code,” are the rituals of
the day-to-day practices and influences of bioethicists that are embedded in plays for
domination. I argue that the eurochristian colonial discourse contains the rules that
maintain racism in medicine. Bioethics is caught up in both the historical disputes
between secularism and Christendom in society, as well as the internal polemics between
philosophical and theological, liberal and conservative.68 Bioethics is positioned at the
site of a culture war. The dominant approach to bioethics is liberal and secular and
considers itself to be “objective” and inclusive, although criticized by conservative
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Christians for being exclusive and wrapped in its own moral and political agendas.
Alternatively, neoconservative Christian bioethicists are, as Alto Charo writes,
“suspicious of technological advance, opposed to moral relativism and moral pluralism,
determined to identify moral absolutes” to convert into public policy to the exclusion of
other views.69 Secular and Christian liberals alike critique conservative Christianity for its
history of genocide and oppression (including the Inquisition, Crusades, Doctrine of
Discovery, and Manifest Destiny), while liberals are blamed for genocides in the name of
anti-Christianity and pro-workers (including the French Revolution, Socialist prison
camps, and the Cambodian genocide). Amid the biopolitical culture wars, both sides
continue to assert their own versions of morality in a dominant eurochristian world. Fear
exists on both sides...one of science and technology; the other of oppressive and
overreaching government; and both are implicated in the continued oppression of people
of color.70 Bioethics commonly deals with questions such as science vs. God, universality
vs. relativity, autonomy vs. beneficence, is vs. ought. These binaries represent old
eurochristian struggles for dominance within a modern medical context. As a bioethicist,
I am less concerned with resolving these questions as I am in recognizing that these
discourses all lie within the same realm of power over colonized and racialized others,
whose bodies and lives hold the history of oppression through “the nervous system,
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nutrition, digestion, and energies”71 The body is “molded by a great many distinct
regimes; it is broken down by the rhythms of work, rest, and holidays; it is poisoned by
food or values, through eating habits or moral laws; it constructs resistances.”72 The deep
philosophical question of whether morality is about relativity or universality is
inconsequential for those suffering of body and mind and requiring immediate relief.
Neither Christian nor rational moral persuasion will change power and
privilege. All combinations of liberal and conservative, secular and Christian have more
in common than they think, when viewed from an anti-colonial perspective. Despite their
polarities, all are partners in the ongoing colonial projects of capitalism, progress,
salvation, and the racialization and marginalization of people of color. Despite these
seeming divergences internal to bioethics, these plays for domination continue to
maintain the power of the eurochristian discourse as a whole. What is not within view in
these disputes are the millions of people of color, of non-Christian religions, and of
varying ethnicities who are marginalized no matter which side is in control. To
complicate things, bioethics has become an international enterprise. A second
globalization of eurochristian morality is happening with little attention to the colonial
aspects of the dominant narrative.
What are these “invisible” rituals of power in bioethics? Some of the rules are
formal, legal, and procedural such as diagnosing brain death, performing decisionmaking capacity assessments, following research protocols, and being obliged to treat
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and stabilize any life or limb-threatening injuries. Other rules are informal such as
deciding whether to treat an undocumented immigrant, refusing to prescribe birth control,
participating in physician-assisted death, accepting Medicaid or indigent patients into
one’s medical practice, and engaging in expensive research when many communities lack
basic requisites such as housing and nutrition for good health. The heavy reliance on
reason in bioethics comes at the expense of emotion, community, and ambiguity.73 An
ethical theory must have flawless internal consistency, and patients must be rational in
order to make decisions. Biotechnology is also a rule. Bioethicists are enamored with
expensive high-profile technologies, those things that are inaccessible to a large number
of people in the United States (and globally). The sexy sci-fi quality of popular topics
include the ethics of human cloning, face transplants, robot personhood, and CRISPR
gene editing. Not only are these the subjects with which many philosophical bioethicists
are preoccupied, these are the subjects of interest to medical institutions and bioethics
centers because of increased funding from biotechnology companies and increased grants
to researchers.74 These technologies often promise to serve a few members of the
population at great cost. And they further increase the gap between elite members of
society and the marginalized. While many bioethicists would argue they are addressing
the problems inherent in the use of specific biotechnologies, the fact remains that the
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discipline is growing more dependent on the existence and growth of these technologies
for their salaries, and the futuristic, but possible, technological advances that will likely
not affect the majority of the population positively, such as genetic therapies,
neuroenhancement, human cloning, and military biotechnology. And overall, the idea of
“ethical management” has dominated the greater ideal of a broader social critique in
bioethics.75
Both formal and informal rules in bioethics are bound up within eurochristian
discourse, and contain inherent oppressive knowledge and power, despite the seemingly
normative and rational assumptions that naturally follow a certain worldview. In addition,
bioethics, like medicine in general, is entrenched in a late-capitalist economic paradigm
which further exacerbates the gaps in health and access to health in society, often along
color lines, and always at the expense of the oppressed. Rituals are often formed at the
philosophical, legal, and political levels, are informed by elites in society, and eventually
trickle down to bedside bioethicists and community health spaces in the form of policies,
procedures, and oft unquestioned truths. How can the culture and language we share as
white eurochristian bioethicists be examined and radically revised? One of the arguments
made in this dissertation is that eurochristian colonial discourse is the underlying etiology
of racism, and similarly that viewing bioethics from the vantage point of colonialism
provides a framework for uncovering the rituals of power that are invisible to the holders
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of bioethical “knowledge” and painfully obvious to those marginalized by these same
rituals of power.
Bioethics and Colonialism
A literature search in bioethics and colonialism turns up the sporadic article,
and nothing that directly and deeply examines the discipline of bioethics in terms of the
colonial discourse in the United States. Indeed, an anti-colonial discourse does not exist
in bioethics in the U.S. Articles particular to both bioethics and colonialism are four, and
generally address ethics from a non-U.S. perspective. Michael Weingarten, in his work
with Yemenite and Ethiopian immigrants in Israel, challenges the “colonial moral
hegemony of the Principlism approach” to bioethics by turning to a relational approach.
Pablo Rodriguez del Pozo and José Smith describe the diverse disciplinary approaches of
bioethics in Latin America as it struggles to move beyond the Spanish Catholic and
human rights discourses.76 Ademola Fayemi and Macaulay Adeyelure explore a
decolonizing trajectory for bioethics in sub-Saharan Africa based on existential needs
rather than solely on “African” identity.77 And Catherine Myser, a U.S. scholar whose
work focuses primarily on global bioethics, discusses the “normativity of whiteness” and
suggests bioethicists decolonize their minds, but does not engage the complexity of
decolonization.78
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Several articles in the literature apply postcolonial theory to healthcare
internationally, but not to bioethics, including the health of Indigenous populations in
Brazil, medicalization of life in Pakistan, and HIV trials in Cambodia. 79 Several
Canadian scholars have written articles on postcolonialism and the inequities of the
health of Aboriginal people from a population perspective, with Cathy MacDonald and
Audrey Steenbeek using a postcolonial feminist approach to uncover the historical root
causes of health inequities in Canadian Aboriginal people’s lives, and Allana Beavis et.
al. proposing a postcolonial approach to health care student education.80 K. McPhail-Bell
et al. cite Australia’s colonialism as a need for “systematic ethical reflection to redress
health promotion's general failure to reduce health inequalities experienced by
Indigenous Australians”.81 In a 2008 publication, Christy Rentmeester employs
postcolonial theory to the racial and ethnic equalities in mental health in the U.S.,
specifically drawing attention to the psychological effects of epistemic violence,
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infiltrated consciousness, and historical and transgenerational trauma.82 And both Selina
Mohammed and Tula Brannelly address colonialism in relation to health research.83
And last, a few scholars have applied an historical approach to bioethics.
Duncan Wilson argues that historians should collaborate with bioethics to contextualize
the ahistorical analytical approaches of bioethics, as well as to
“shift bioethics away from its focus on new and emerging
technologies, which may not impact the day-to-day lives of
patients, to a broader consideration of the role politics plays in
shaping medical services.”84
Robert Baker critiques bioethics for its historically heavy reliance on the Roman Catholic
approach to moral decision-making.85 And Roger Cooter, in a clever and critical review
of the 876-page Cambridge World History of Medical Ethics, cites the opportunistic
nature of a gold-embossed volume of unreflective “history” dedicated to a discipline that
is the pinnacle of epistemological colonizing.86
In sum, although contemporary critiques of the discipline of bioethics
encompass certain components of a colonial-racial discourse such as race, whiteness, and
history, this dissertation will be the first robust anti-colonial analysis of bioethics using a
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eurochristian worldview to frame the underlying colonial-racial discourse connecting
present with past. This dissertation proposes an anti-colonial framework to agitate and
extend the current approaches to the analysis of bioethics themes involving racial
disparities. An anti-colonial approach to bioethics joins an emerging awareness that
Western bioethics is no longer one universal voice, thereby continuing the shift of
bioethics from a positivist to a constructionist frame, and opens the door to imagining a
different future.
The History of the Present: How Did We Get Here?
A Short History of Bioethics
Bioethics is defined as “the systematic study of the moral dimensions—
including moral vision, decisions, conduct and policies—of the life sciences and health
care, employing a variety of ethical methodologies in an interdisciplinary setting.”87 The
subset of bioethics, health care ethics,88 is a discipline of practice that arose in response to
medical paternalism, technological innovations in medicine, egregiously harmful research
protocols, and in the context of the civil rights movements. In current practice, the roles
and authority of bioethics has become contested but generally aim at clarifying and
guiding moral decision-making in health care, particularly decisions around issues such
as reproduction, life-sustaining technology, genetic science, end-of-life, research, and
access to healthcare in both health and policy arenas nationally and globally. Bioethicists
87
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work in hospitals doing consultations at the bedside and with hospital administration
where values conflicts and moral distress arise. They review research protocols on
academic institutional review boards in order to safeguard human subjects. Bioethicists
work in public health and public policy, examining social issues such as population
health, gun control, medical participation in torture and the death penalty, and the broader
implications of biotechnology for society. Some bioethicists are called to the public
square as educators and activists. And increasingly, bioethicists are being hired by
biotech industries.
The discipline of bioethics did not exist during many of the atrocities occurring
in the 18th through the mid-20th century, including the syphilis research studies at
Tuskegee, the gynecological experiments of Marion Sims on black women, and the
medical experimentation in Nazi concentration camps (not that a robust research ethics
would have interrupted the latter). Ethical practice was driven by the virtues extolled and
oaths taken by individual physicians and their professional organizations.89 In tracing the
discourse of bioethics, there is no exact origin or endpoint. The term “bioethics” was
coined roughly in 1971, purportedly simultaneously by Mr. R. Sargent Shriver and Dr.
André Hellegers at Georgetown University, and Dr. Van Rensselaer Potter at the
University of Wisconsin.90 Bioethics as a specific discipline emerged in the United States
in the 1960s and 70s, coinciding with the post-Holocaust Nuremburg Trials and the US
89
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Civil Rights Movement, at the time of drastic changes in medical science and amid
historical medical atrocities.91 Early on, bioethics rejected the old-style paternalistic
physician-driven morality in favor of patient rights and autonomy. In essence, when the
long-standing discourses of theology, philosophy, and liberal humanism became exposed
to the modern historical moments of life-saving medical technologies such as dialysis and
ventilators, a dominant liberal and secular society, and a growing medical research
agenda, bioethics was born.
Bioethics: Roots in Theology and Philosophy
The discipline of bioethics emerged in the 20th century in the United States. But
as philosopher K. Danner Clouser said in the first edition of the Encyclopedia of
Bioethics, “bioethics is not a new set of principles or maneuvers, but the same old ethics
being applied to a particular realm of concern.”92 As Albert Jonsen has portrayed in The
Birth of Bioethics, the discipline stands on a long history of both Western theology and
philosophy.93 At different times in history both disciplines have been more or less in
dialogue with each other, particularly until the 17th century.
Specifically, the contemporary discipline of bioethics arises out of two
academic traditions: social ethics and moral philosophy. Social ethics is the Christian
movement starting in the 1880s with the social gospel, with a “social-ethical mission to
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transform the structures of society in the direction of social justice.”94 Early bioethics was
started by theologians who, in importing the social ethics tradition, were concerned with
issues of human dignity and the sacredness of life in the face of a changing practice of
medicine and medical technologies. The three “founders” of bioethics, as suggested by
Albert Jonsen, ushered in various elements of social ethics, with Paul Ramsey coming
from the Christian realist tradition in the spirit of Reinhold Niebuhr, Richard McCormick
from the Catholic ethics tradition, and Joseph Fletcher, who ultimately rejected his
Episcopalian affiliation for a secular utilitarian approach to ethics.
Moral philosophy followed theology into the new discipline of bioethics, with
an Enlightenment perspective rooted in rationality and empiricism, which, in the U.S.,
primarily centered around analytical rather than continental philosophy95. Analytical
philosophy provided tools for the trade: systematic problem-solving, linguistic and
conceptual analysis, and a discipline of the mind. Around the time of the Civil War,
moral philosophy took a pre-eminent place in the U.S. at Harvard, Yale, and Princeton as
a discipline in its own right, and yet was taught with reference to Scripture and Christian
doctrine, in essence a “Christian ethics in thin disguise.”96 The presidents who taught the
ethics courses were “custodians of certain truths necessary to the function of a civilized
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society.”97 From Yale alone hailed many early and prominent bioethicists including Paul
Ramsey, Joseph Fletcher, Daniel Callahan, Tom Beauchamp, James Childress, and
Albert Jonsen.
In the early 20th century, American pragmatism and a philosophy based on
logical positivism and epistemology became a dominant discourse that rivaled theological
ethics in the United States as well as the continental philosophies of existentialism,
hermeneutics, and phenomenology found in Western Europe. The empirical and scientific
nature of knowledge became important in both philosophy and the biological sciences,
including medicine. From the colonial period onward, the unfolding of a succinct
discourse can be traced which included industrialism, a profit-driven economy, a new
American type of freedom and natural law, the focus on a civilized society built upon
science and technology, and a sense of national exceptionalism.98 This discourse is the
dominant eurochristian narrative, on which this dissertation will argue is also the
narrative of bioethics. While in the last few centuries American scholars have contributed
greatly to an approach to moral philosophy no longer strictly European, the essence of the
worldview was firmly rooted in a history of European and Christian traditions and
colonial enterprise harkening from early Spain, Portugal, and Great Britain.
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If this discourse is traced into the realm of the 1960s and to bioethics, the
eurochristian worldview continues uninterrupted in its predecessors. The first bioethicists
were theologians, and included the likes of Joseph Fletcher, Richard McCormick, and
Paul Ramsey. Joseph Fletcher was an Episcopal priest turned humanist. In Joseph
Fletcher’s Situation Ethics can be found the utilitarian logic of Bentham and Mill, as well
as strong advocacy for medical science and technology. Paul Ramsey, a Methodist
Christian ethicist, was an emphatic deontologist as opposed to Fletcher; and often turned
to scripture for moral truths. He wrote the book Patient as Person, extolling the primacy
of the duty of physicians to their individual patients over duty to society. Richard
McCormick, a Jesuit theologian, was a friendly colleague of Ramsey. They often debated
on issues around the Ethics at the Edges of Life, also the title of Ramsey’s book,
especially about when quality of life can be considered in withdrawing life sustaining
treatments.99 These three theologians have been considered the early architects of
bioethics.
Following the theologians into the realm of medicine were American
philosophers including Tom Beauchamp and Tristram Engelhardt. Philosopher Tom
Beauchamp, along with James Childress, wrote The Principles of Bioethics, which has
been one of the most accessible and widely used theories of ethical decision-making in
health care. Engelhardt was a philosopher trained as a physician, but never practiced, and
instead focused on the philosophy and history of medicine. Of these three philosophers, it
is worth pointing out that Beauchamp also attended divinity school and studied religion,
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Childress was a theologian, and Engelhardt rejected his Catholic upbringing to become a
practicing Orthodox Christian. Yale Divinity School seemed to be one of the main origins
for the founding and practice of bioethics, and is firmly rooted in Christian traditions. On
the other side of the world Peter Singer studied at the University of Melbourne and
University of Oxford between 1967-71, and later became the Ira W. DeCamp Professor
of Bioethics at Princeton University, where he continues to be affiliated.
The differences between contemporary bioethics theories and theorists are not
trivial. Each has made important contributions for the discipline and the practice of
bioethics, and in the treatment of patients and communities. But often missing from the
scope of bioethics are the voices, ethics, and preferences of people who are non-white,
Indigenous, and/or queer persons. Adjacent to what appears to be a culture of tolerance,
pluralism, and multiculturalism are voices silenced by the dominance of eurochristian
language, medical practices, and control. Bioethicists and health care workers are not
always conscious of the discrimination experienced by Blacks within the health care
system. But it is common and correlates with physician mistrust, suspicion about medical
care, adherence behaviors, and decisional control preferences.100 Native Americans
experience high incidences of diabetes, asthma, hypertension, mental illness, and
alcoholism while receiving care “free” in a system that is underfunded and is unaligned
with their own historical practices of health and healing, diets, and means of
100
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livelihood.101 But often their health is attributed to bad behavior and poverty, or treated
like a statistical project for public health. Latinx patients are “sent back” to a country
where they have never lived and have no family to get chronic treatments such as
dialysis. Women of color are disproportionately affected by strict rules around
reproduction and abortion.102 Those operating from within a eurochristian worldview will
rarely go far enough to understand and remedy the historical wrongs against those who
have been racialized and oppressed. The worldview that allowed conquest, mass
genocide, slavery, and violent civilizing of barbarians and savages did not vanish in thin
air. The worldview that somehow blinded philosophers Immanuel Kant and John Stuart
Mill to the full humanity of “Negros” and Indians, and allowed social ethicists Walter
Rauschenbusch and Reinhold Niebuhr to believe in the exceptionalism of Christianity
and America over racial and unfortunate others did not disappear.103 The worldview has
only evolved. It is incumbent upon the discipline of bioethics to understand how the
embeddedness within a eurochristian worldview continues to signal participation in
racialization and colonialism. How might we be blind to our own complicity in
oppression that our successors will look back on as we do with Kant, Mill, Niebuhr,
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Rauschenbusch, and Fletcher? Bioethics is often expressed in terms of sanctity of life,
human values, dignity, conscience, equity, autonomy, and the “good”. A definition of the
good has run the course of duty, pleasure, absence of pain, flourishing, and virtuous
character. What is different about the “good intent” of Christian theologians who wished
to impress their form of Christian and American exceptionalism upon others, and the
“good intent” today of bioethicists? Without a major awareness of the eurochristian
worldview, one cannot expect to see power shift into the hands of those who are
racialized, oppressed, and still colonized in the U.S. (if the desire is to address racism in
healthcare). What is required of bioethics is an awareness of its own worldview, the
relinquishing of both epistemological and political power, and the challenging of current
narratives of the eurochristian worldview with alternative views from those on the
margins. This will be the content of chapters 4-6.
As has been noted, bioethics is buttressed upon the disciplines of theology and
philosophy. Two highly influential philosophers whose work is ubiquitous in ethics are
Immanuel Kant with his deontological theory of the categorical imperative, and John
Stuart Mill, who (along with Jeremy Bentham), is known as one of the fathers of
utilitarianism. These theorists are foundational to understanding the rational decisionmaking methods used frequently in bioethics education, and frame the philosophical
debate between making moral choices based on duties vs. consequences. These
philosophers’ works are largely rooted in European Enlightenment, and both with
copious attention to matters of morality. The examination of these two influential moral
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philosophers reveals the racist and colonizing involvement of these “secular” precursors
to bioethics.
Three Christian social ethicists will also be examined in accord with their
influences on moral thinking as a precursor to bioethics: Reinhold Niebuhr, Walter
Rauschenbusch, and Joseph Fletcher. Niebuhr and Rauschenbusch, while not bioethicists,
have been highly influential Christian scholars in the early thinking of social ethics, and
serve as examples of Christian and U.S. exceptionalism, social gospel, and political order
(at the expense of social justice) that I will demonstrate continue to underlie the works of
some prominent bioethicists. Fletcher, on the other hand, is an early bioethics scholar
who began as a liberal Episcopal theologian with a concern for justice, who represented
the changing social climate of the civil rights era. He is an outlier in this group in that he
left the theological realm for a more secular view later in his career. These five (white
male) precursors to bioethics are all products of eurochristian thought. They share a
similar worldview and thought trajectory, even if on different sides of the same coin.
While they may disagree on first principles and final ends, these eurochristian thinkers all
proselytize some set of exceptional moral values and notions of progress upon others
who, in their estimation, lack rationality, humanity, agency, or civility.
The Moral Philosophers
Immanuel Kant is recognized as one of the greatest moral philosophers of the
Enlightenment period. John Stuart Mill, in the 19th century, represents the paradigm of
classical liberalism. Both were intellectuals who were highly influential not only in their
time, but continue to be respected and read widely today. In the study of bioethics,
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students are exposed to both as required foundational knowledge. Kant’s categorical
imperative is a moral theory based on the metaphysical good will acted on through
individual choice of the moral agent. For students, Kant represents an approach to ethical
decision-making that recognizes morality to be universal for all humans capable of
rational thought. In comparison, students also learn utilitarian approaches to decisionmaking, most often through the writings of John Stuart Mill. Instead of a duty or
rule-based ethic, the utilitarian approach appeals to students whose moral instincts align
with a societally-based liberal approach in which a calculation of the greater good is
prioritized over a Kantian duty-based method. These two intellectuals are ingrained in the
discipline of bioethics. In both their pedagogical presentation and their application to
medical cases, these theories appear reasonable and noble. This chapter sets out to situate
these theorists and their theories within the colonial-racial discourse, and in no
insignificant way. What does it meant for the genealogy of bioethics that Kant has been
considered the “inventor of race”, and Mill was a vociferous proponent of British
imperialism?
Treat (Some) Humans with Dignity: Immanuel Kant (1724-1804)
“So you act that you use humanity, in your own person as well as
in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never
merely as a means.”104—Kant
Immanuel Kant, an 18th century Prussian scholar, is a bedrock for moral
philosophy and bioethics. Kant is ubiquitously recited in health care and bioethics classes
and in bioethics scholarship as the moral philosopher who sought a metaphysical
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universal morality known only through human rationality. Kant’s morality was secured in
human goodwill, which lies in the individual choice of a human to fulfill one’s duty in
respect for the laws of human morality. As the classic example of deontology, for Kant
morality is not based on feelings, emotions, inclinations, or self-serving ends (or any end,
for that matter). Morality is the compliance of rational human beings with three rules,
which he names categorical imperatives. These three imperatives are 1) “I ought never to
proceed except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a
universal law”;105 2) “…act that you use humanity, in your own person as well as in the
person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means;”106 and
3) act “so that the idea of the will of every rational being [is] a universally legislating
will.”107
The duty-based morality of Kant has appealed to students and scholars of
bioethics who resonate with the idea of having a set of moral rules to follow, such as
those in the Hippocratic Oath (First do no harm) and the Ten Commandments (Thou shall
not kill). The first imperative assures that actions taken by individuals accord with the
good (and continued existence) of humanity. The second imperative, as written in the
epigraph of this section is also appealing to students and health practitioners, which
translates roughly to human dignity – always treat others as an end in themselves, never
only as a means to an end. In other words, morality exists within the reasoning faculties

105

Ibid., 17.

106

Ibid., 40.

107

Ibid., 43.

54

of individual humans a priori to human experience, is not concerned with consequences
of these actions, and can be accessed through the categorical imperatives that hold
universal scope. All rational humans rational humans are ends in themselves, should
never be exploited, and have access to the universal laws through reason. At face value
Kant’s moral philosophy sounds quite reasonable to those looking for a moral theory on
which to base their practice.
As highly regarded as Kant’s theories are in moral philosophy, many of his
post-Enlightenment writings have contributed greatly to the conceptualization of race as a
hierarchical category, to the dehumanization of people of color, and to the appointment of
white Europeans as morally and physically superior. Concepts such as progress, human
agency, and teleology strengthen these identity categories of race, and underwrite the
eurochristian worldview. What follows is a brief discussion of the less well-known (but
plentiful) writings of Kant, those that accomplish such a conceptualization. Kant’s views
on morality are held in tension with his understanding that not all humans are rational,
including many racialized groups. These theories are of major contribution to the
racialization of people still today in bioethics and medicine, and of major source of the
continuation of the differential treatment of those people. The contradictions in Kant’s
theories highlight the ability for ethics scholars and their ideas to cause great harm.
Kant’s moral philosophy is based on his anthropology and geography, which
contain theories that propose a hierarchy of human moral and physical superiority.108
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Contrary to what one might assume, Kant taught only 28 courses on moral philosophy,
compared to 72 courses in anthropology or geography, which started in 1772.109 So not
only is his moral philosophy based on his racial theories, his direct contribution to racism
through his scholarship is substantial, even at a time in history where the moral
justification of slavery was being challenged, as will be discussed next. Some of the
works where these sentiments can be found include Anthropology from a Pragmatic
Point of View, Physische Geographie, “Conjectural Beginning of Human History”
(1785), “On the Varieties of the Different Races of Man” (1775), and “Bestimung des
Begriffs einer Menschenrace” (1785).110
For Kant, race was a part of the physical domain of geography, which classified
physical characteristics of the externalities of places and people. Therefore, skin color,
hair, and facial features were in the realm of geography. Anthropology was the study of
the inner domain of humans, including rationality, agency, and morality. For Kant, those
people closer to a “natural state” were closer to evil, and did not possess the gift of
rationality or the ability to cultivate morality. In the same vein of contemporaries Carl
Linnaeus and Friedrich Max Muller’s categorization of humans and human languages
respectively, Kant develops a hierarchical lineage of human classification in which the
European white brunette is the stem genus, that from which all other races originate, and
because of their habitation in the most hospitable climate for the achievement of progress.
The telos of progress is represented through Kant’s demonstration of the superiority of
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the white European (males), which is a fixed concept. All races are static in their current
levels of humanity. For him, only white Europeans have true worth; only in them does
true human nature and morality reside. Other humans have “value”, but not inherent
worth or dignity.111
In his classification Kant notes:
“In the hot countries the human being natures earlier in all ways
but does not reach the perfection of the temperate zones. Humanity
exists in its greatest perfection in the white race. The yellow
Indians have a smaller amount of talent. The Negroes are lower
and the lowest are a part of the American peoples.”112
The essence of humanity, for Kant, is defined by the ability for man to perfect himself, to
live according to goodwill and duty (the categorical imperatives). But this essence is only
accessible to white Europeans. He theorizes that Native Americans are uneducable:
“The race of the American cannot be educated. It has no
motivating force, for it lacks affect and passion. They are not in
live, thus they are also not afraid. They hardly speak, do not caress
each other, care about nothing, and are lazy.”113
About Blacks he writes,
“The race of the Negroes, one could say, is completely the
opposite of the Americans; thy are full of affect and passion, very
lively, talkative, and vain. They can be educated but only as
servants (slaves), that is they allow themselves to be trained. They
have may motivating forces, are also sensitive, are afraid of blows
and do much out of a sense of honor.”
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In the late 18th century one can watch as the colonial-racial discourse becomes
more entrenched at the hands of the most influential moral philosopher of his day.
According to translator Helen O’Brien, “His reputation as a thinker was already made
when events in France drove men to reconsider the justification of their political ideals,
and it was but natural that many should look to him for guidance and advice.”114 For
centuries Kant has been widely read and respected for his ideas on morality. To drive
home the connection between moral language and colonial-racial violence, while Kant
waxed on about the universal goodwill, the dignity of humans, and the categorical
imperative, he was also giving precise advice on how to beat the flesh of “Negros” in
order to train them into submission. In Physische Geographie Kant
“advises us to use a split bamboo cane instead of a whip, so that
the ‘negro’ will suffer a great deal of pains (because of the
‘negro’s’ thick skin, he would not be racked with sufficient
agonies through a whip), but without dying.”115
Not only does Kant fail to see the repugnance of the use of slaves for European labor, he
recommends a gruesome violence on the bodies of Africans to further show is disregard
for the humanity of Africans. What explains this disconnect between moral high theory
and the infliction of horrific pain on human beings?
Benevolent Despotism: John Stuart Mill (1806-1873)
“This firm foundation is that of the social feelings of mankind; the
desire to be in unity with our fellow creatures, which is already a
powerful principle in human nature, and happily one of those
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which tend to become stronger, even without express inculcation,
from the influences of advancing civilization.”116
John Stuart Mill was a British moral and political theorist, philosopher, and
administrator for the East India Company for 30 years. Mill, in responding to Kant-like
duty-based theories, proposed a theory of morality based on
“Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, [which] holds that
actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness,
wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By
happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain…”117
Certain types of pleasure, for Mill, are superior, especially those of the mind over those
of the flesh. And the pleasure of the utilitarian kind is not the “agent’s own happiness, but
that of all concerned…. utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a
disinterested and benevolent spectator.”118 The motivation of individuals to make
decisions that benefit the “greatest number” is nurtured through education and
habituation of one’s conscience “based in the desire to be in unity with our fellow
creatures.”119
Mill was a British social reformer who supported women’s rights in The
Subjection of Women and liberal ideals in On Liberty. His liberalism can be detected in
his faith in science and education, and his concern with political reform to protect people
from poverty and bad laws. Mill also is a product of Enlightenment thinking in his belief
in progress of civilizations through development and institutional reform. At first read,
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like Kant, Mill seems to be a leader in ethical thinking, and a useful tool in bioethical
decision-making. His work suggests that students and practitioners of ethics consider the
consequences of their choices, and to consider what creates the most happiness for the
greatest number of people.
How can this moral theory be understood in the context of John Stuart Mill’s
life as a high official within the British East Indian Company120, as a contributor and
benefactor to British imperialism and exploitation of ethnic others? In this genealogy of
bioethics, again we encounter moral language alongside the justification of the colonialracial discourse. Mill worked for the Company from 1823 until the Indian Mutiny
(rebellion) of 1857. The Company started in 1600 as a trade company for items such as
salt, tea, opium, cotton, and silk, becoming a monopoly by the 18th century. On Mill’s
watch the Company ruled India with its own military, a military twice as large as the
British military at the time. Mill’s attitude towards British imperialism in India has been
referred to as a “benevolent despotism”, tolerant imperialism, and benign imperialism.
Mill was opposed to a violent or brutal imperialism, and attempted to provide some
freedoms for Indians through the concept of “empire of opinion”.121 This suggestion that
Indians be given influence in social institutions was a pragmatic one, to keep Indians
from subverting allegiance to the British.122 Although his treatment of Indians came from
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liberal ideas and good intentions, for Mill Indians were still backwards and in need of the
civilizing interventions and education of the British. . How can Mill be at once the
embodiment of liberal values while simultaneously taking part in the imperialization of
India?
It is difficult to concern oneself with the deleterious effects of Mill’s liberal
British writings because they are well-mannered and concerned with the plight of
women, the poor, and the colonized. Mill’s ethics were socially liberal in his concern
with the oppressed, but his life’s work in the Company also positions him within the
realm of classical liberalism, similar to what we know today in the U.S. as libertarianism:
free markets and minimal government interference. This contrast provides us with the
opportunity to confront the insidious nature of Mill’s social and classical liberalism in the
continued racialization and oppression of people. Imperialism and despotism are just that,
despite whether they are practiced with benevolent intentions. Mill has managed to
reconcile England’s imperialism in India, and simultaneously his work with the Company
and his moral theory of utilitarianism. First, Mill, like Kant, believed in the superiority of
the British, that they represented a greater form of civilization, progress, and morality in
comparison to the backwards, barbarous, semi-barbarous and the savage, all language he
used to describe Indians. He writes “Savages are always liars. They have not the faintest
notion of truth as a virtue. ”123 While it is clear Mill is against the use of violence, he
thinks it is the civilized societies’ duty to rule the uncivilized through moralizing and
pedagogy. He thought that the Company was required to act as benevolent despot over
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Indians since they were still unable to self-rule, and the Company was in a good position
to represent their interests.124 Mill was supportive of British intervention in India and
French intervention in Algeria. Some critics, such as Bikhu Parekh in his Decolonizing
Liberalism, calls Mill “a ‘missionary’ for liberal ideologies.”125 Others including Mark
Tunick have made a case against this interpretation of Mill, arguing that Mill was quite
tolerant of “even some illiberal practices,” did not seek forced assimilation, and did not
waive the “harm principle for the ‘not yet civilized’.”126
More recently, scholars have looked at whether Mill compartmentalized his
career in the Company from his metropolitan philosophizing; or whether there is some
influence of his work in India on his moral philosophy. Lynn Zastoupil and other authors
have painstakingly attempted to align Mill’s theoretical work with his official writings as
an imperial administrator of the Company. Sandhya Shetty notes the lack of mention of
Mill’s colonial work in his summative Autobiography. For Shetty this is indicative of not
only a domestic/colonial split within Mill, but is also performative of the overall
disconnect between liberal metropolis center and the colony, a “benign imperialism.”127
Ilsup Ahn, in reading Mill “from the margins,” finds in his Utilitarianism that the
“complex moral worth of an individual is largely reduced to the kinds of pleasures he
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enjoys.”128 Reflecting on Mill’s statement “It is better to be a human being dissatisfied
than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied,”129 Ahn notes
that this utilitarian statement also implies those who enjoy more qualitative pleasures of
the mind (read as British) are morally superior to those who are uncivilized, who prefer
“more base” pleasures. It is an easier move from here to see how colonialism was
justified by Mill, where the British were the white saviors of the less-civilized.
A generation later we see Aimé Césaire defending non-European civilizations.
“Every day that passes, every denial of justice, every beating by
the police, every demand of the workers that is drowned in blood,
every scandal that is hushed up, every punitive expedition, every
police van, every gendarme and every militiaman, brings home to
us the value of our old societies.”130
And then,
“the great historical tragedy of Africa has not been so much that it
was too late in making contact with the rest of the world, as the
manner in which that contact was brought about; that Europe
began to “propagate” at a time when it had fallen into the hands of
the most unscrupulous financiers and captains of industry…and
that Europe is responsible before the human community for the
highest heap of corpses in history.”131
Franz Fanon in The Wretched of the Earth coming to the defense of Algeria and
all colonized countries, says
“For centuries Europe has brought the progress of other men to a
halt and enslaved them for its own purposes and glory; for
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centuries it has stifled virtually the whole of humanity in the name
of so-called “spiritual adventure”….This Europe which never
stopped talking of man, which never stopped proclaiming its sole
concern was man, we now know the price of suffering humanity
has paid for every one of its spiritual victories…When I look for
man in European lifestyles and technology I see a constant denial
of man, an avalanche of murders.”132
Are these realities of the colonized the effects that Mill imagined from a benevolent
imperialism? Was Mill ignorant, an idealist, or a defector of the Company’s ideology as a
whole despite his 30 years with the Company?
In essence, Mill had replaced the old regime of despotic imperialism with a
kinder, gentler form of paternalism for the good of who he deemed to be barbarians,
savages, and uncivilized. Mill is the liberal (both social and classical) precursor of the
current trends seen in both bioethics and global development, that require the beneficent
exceptionalism of America to save brown bodies from themselves for virtuous reasons
and in the name of progress.
Theology and the Social Gospel
In addition to a robust dialogical trajectory of moral philosophy, bioethics
enjoys the contributions of a christian worldview through the influences of Medieval
Catholicism, Calvinist Protestantism, and social ethics, as well as the influence of
contemporary christian Empire apologists, neoconservative Catholics, and atavistic
christian sectarians.
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Evangelizing Christian Exceptionalism: Rauschenbusch (1861-1918)
Walter Rauschenbusch is often considered the spokesperson of the social gospel
movement, the movement that ignited a third trajectory of christianity: namely christian
social ethics. Rauschenbusch was a German Baptist pastor who traveled to Rochester
New York to attend seminary school. While in Rochester he worked among the poor in
the Hell’s Kitchen neighborhood, where he acquired a Christ-like love and sense of
justice for the poor. Much of his experience flew in the face of the Protestant focus on
apocalyptic individualistic salvation. Why must humanity wait for a future salvation
when people are suffering in the world, and “the kingdom of God is always but coming”?
And second, it is social and political structures that are evil, not man. Turning to a more
organic and revolutionary vision of Jesus, he called for a christianization of societal
structures. For Rauschenbusch, the church held a responsibility for serving the poor and
challenging the oppressive structures of capitalism and unjust social policies through
pacifism, collectivism, socialism, and internationalism. Rauschenbusch and his
interlocutors in early social gospel ushered in transformative ideas of social justice, of
praxis, and of structural violence.
Considering context and with hindsight, Rauschenbusch also ushered in several
ideas that have proven to be dismissive and harmful for marginalized peoples. Besides
the usual criticisms that social gospel is idealistic and politically naïve, three major
criticisms include his elaboration on the Darwinian justification of racial superiority, of
universal moralizing, and of a christian and Western exceptionalism.
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During the 19th century Darwin’s theory of evolution as written in The Descent
of Man was heavily drawn upon by social gospelers. John Fiske as Dorrien puts it,
“helped the liberals save a role for God in the evolutionary process”, but also theorized
Manifest Destiny which justified Anglo-Saxon superiority for the social gospel
movement.133 Rauschenbusch fought for the mainly white male victims of
industrialization and evil social structures, at the same time exhibiting an underlying
thread of christian and Western superiority. In the slums of New York, he ministered to
poor white German immigrants, not African Americans or other people of color. His
belief in the moral superiority of certain races can be seen in his discussion on the
celibacy of monks and nuns in the medieval period. For Rauschenbusch, this was the
sterilization “of the best individuals” which “turned the laws of heredity against the moral
progress of the race.”134 Elsewhere he essentializes the character of the poor as childlike,
with a “dislike of regular work, physical incapability of sustained effort, misdirected love
of adventure, gambling propensities, absence of energy, untrained will, careless of the
happiness of others”.135 In some ways this is more reminiscent of a Marxian proletariat,
the ignorant masses, than a genetic Darwinian argument. Still, Rauschenbusch seemed to
recognize the sociocultural causes of certain inferior behaviors all the while attempting to
fit his social gospel into the scientific paradigms of Darwinism. In later years he does
discuss antebellum race relations, rejecting lynching and slavery, as well as the restriction
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of immigration. He also criticized southern men for concluding blacks did not descend
from Adam, in what appeared to be a justification of their continued exploitation of
Blacks.136 In the meantime, his clear preference for a certain race can be read through
Rauschenbusch as morally superior.
In recent years academics have learned to contextualize and locate themselves
in their writings, but for Rauschenbusch, he was sure that the christian truth was the
Truth. The idea of universal moralization is prevalent in his liberal evangelical approach
to social gospel. For Rauschenbusch, the universal state and universal religion were twins
by birth (p. 96). The universal religion, christianity, would continue to partner with
civilizations as they increased in size and reach. For early Christendom the religion
served to moralize the nation. christianity was needed to tame the sexual indulgences of
the Greeks and to pull all men into a morally perfect disposition and society. In the 19th
century christianity should serve as a moral leavening in international structures. This
“international and purely human religion” …”as we now know, was destined to fulfill
this function.”137
In addressing foreign missions, Rauschenbusch laments that trade and
commerce have introduced other countries to the corruption on our own soil. He claims
that the “moral prestige of christian civilization ought to be the most valuable stock in
trade for the foreign representatives of christianity.” He believes that the “foreign mission
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work of the modern Church is one of the most splendid expressions of the Christ-spirit in
history…”138 This christian exceptionalism undergirds American exceptionalism and
justifies imperialistic tendencies of both. In fact, while Rauschenbusch was writing in
support of pacifism and against militarism and capitalism, the Spanish-American War
had taken place in 1898, without mention by Rauschenbusch, in which many colonized
and marginalized people were being killed in the name of American colonialism. But
Rauschenbusch in fact celebrated the war as a defeat of Spanish Catholicism in favor of
his brand of christianity and American exceptionalism. The implication of America in the
continued oppression, exploitation, and deaths of people in the Philippines, Guam, Cuba,
and Puerto Rico seemed to be lost on Rauschenbusch.
In the end, it may be difficult to perform a utilitarian calculation as to the
overall impact of Rauschenbusch’s ethics on the marginalized. While he was a gadfly to
the conservative Protestants and of the political economic structures of his day, one must
also consider his social location. He is still writing from a position of privilege about
groups of people he does not know, in a specific time in history.
Social Order at the Expense of Justice: Reinhold Niebuhr (1892-1971)
Niebuhr was a liberal Protestant German-American theologian, ethicist, and
public intellectual. His christian realism challenged the social gospel for being too
idealistic and naïve; in Niebuhr’s mind human nature is implicitly selfish, prideful, and
anxious. His realism also challenged religious conservatives who he thought were naïve
in their view of scripture. Being a disciple of Christ in the world was more important than
138
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focusing on the divinity of Christ. For Niebuhr, the sin of hubris applied more to nations
and corporations than to individuals; and these power structures cannot be easily
overcome. He lived in Detroit during the industrial boom, where he became acquainted
with Henry Ford, and learned to despise him for his capitalist exploitation of his workers.
Early in his career Niebuhr was a Marxist and a pacifist, but as the 20th century unfolded
with Great Depression, World War I and II, the Nazi Holocaust, and the Cold War,
Niebuhr’s perspectives changed. He turned toward American exceptionalism with
military intervention as an increasingly acceptable possibility. While he remained against
the atomic bomb and the Vietnam War, his nonviolent disposition and his bent toward
justice began to morph into protectionism in the face of nuclear war.
Early on, Niebuhr responded to many of the failures of Rauschenbusch.
Rauschenbusch’s universal moralizing was untenable for Niebuhr, who points out a clear
delineation of ethics of the state, privileged classes, and proletariat. Niebuhr also
challenges the liberal democrat, who tends to be middle-class and enmeshed with ego and
racism cloaked with a “benevolent condescension”.139 In addition, Rauschenbusch’s
liberal democracy depends too much on science and reason, and especially pacifism,
while remaining naïve to the real political and military threats to the mostly good
christian democratic America. In addition, Niebuhr calls to task the national hypocrisy of
the Spanish American War, especially the civilizing and peace-worthy justifications for
imperialism – a war supported by Rauschenbusch. But what Niebuhr does retain is
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Rauschenbusch’s belief in the Christianizing of America. Christianity and its virtues of
love, humility, and justice are necessary in a sinful society. While not for quite the same
reasons, both Niebuhr and Rauschenbusch maintain a theological stance in contrast with
socio-political structures.
Other classic criticisms of Niebuhr include his German (and eventually
American) exceptionalism, his ambiguous and confused views on race, his limited classbased view of inequality, and an eventual proclivity toward neoconservative values.
While not always overt, Niebuhr appears to hold on to the virtuous superiority of his
German background, despite his denunciation of Nazi German behaviors. While in
graduate school he reveled in the Teutomania of Yale, and commented on occasions of
the virtuous superiority of the German race.140 It is not necessarily the condemnation of
other races that is most disturbing, as is the underlying notion of racial hierarchy with his
race at the top.
The leniency he affords early on to German virtue in spite of significant
immoral proclivities is not extended to the moral character of other races. In some
instances, Niebuhr can be found to be sensitive to the plight of “Negros”. In Moral Man
and Immoral Society, he frames the unjust situation of the African American, saddled
between the acceptance of superficial rights which “do not touch his political
disfranchisement or his economic disinheritance,”141 while facing increased animosities
and prejudices if violent revolution is pursued. And while this seems a sincere attempt to
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address race issues, other passages can be found expounding the inferior traits of
“Negros” and “Orientals” for a variety of reasons. For instance, in preparation for a
revolution the African American would “need only to fuse the aggressiveness of the new
and young Negro with the patience and forbearance of the old Negro, to rob the former of
its vindictiveness and the latter of its lethargy”.142 And while the stereotypical
descriptions are disturbing alone, the context of this passage implies the responsibility for
African Americans to overcome their own oppression through the attainment of certain
virtuous traits. Asians were also type-casted by Niebuhr during the Cold War. According
to Traci West, Niebuhr fits Edward Said’s description of the Western male subject
objectifying and racializing the Orient.143 In essence, the Orient must be saved from
themselves and their “particular cultural and spiritual deficiencies” in order to save them
from communism.144 African-Americans and Asians are caricatures for Niebuhr, echoed
in Emilie Townes’ caricatures of black folk and in Chandra Mohanty’s white feminist
classifications of Third World Women.145 Along these same lines, Niebuhr has been
criticized for his dismissive idea of inevitability. As West points out, in Niebuhr’s resting
of racism on a persistent prideful human proclivity for power over another, the race issue
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must be approached at best as a proximate justice, one that is circumscribed by a notion
of relative futility.146
Later in life Niebuhr makes a turn to the maintenance of national order at the
expense of justice. A more pronounced Anglo-Saxon imperialism spurred on by the
threats of communism caused Niebuhr to side with Empire. In his attempts to shatter
liberal illusions, Niebuhr may have traveled the slippery slope to the benefit of future
neoconservatives. Michael Novak and others co-opted Niebuhr’s American
exceptionalism claims for their own ends. This type of thinking is contrary to young
Niebuhr who chided the privileged for “appointing themselves the apostles of law and
order”, and for claiming that “it is dangerous to disturb a precarious equilibrium…”147 He
wrote that
“The human mind is so weak an instrument, and is so easily
enslaved and prostituted by human passions, that one is never
certain to what degree the fears of the privileged classes, of
anarchy and revolution, are honest fears…an to what degree they
are dishonest attempts to put the advancing classes at a
disadvantage.”148
When are they real threats, and when are they protecting the privileged? It is possible the
younger Niebuhr was more optimistic than the older Niebuhr, and even more so is the
possibility that a lifetime of witnessing the vicissitudes of war might create fear, a
defensive stance, and the need for national stability over the moral fight for equality.
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In sum, the reality is that for Niebuhr his arguments were limited to class, with
very little engagement on race and gender. And the lens from which he envisioned
racialized others was primarily as object, never as totalizing and equal subject.
Love is Not Justice: Fletcher (1905-1991)
Joseph Fletcher was a theological pioneer in bioethics, along with Paul Ramsey
and Richard McCormick. Fletcher was an Episcopal priest who later turned agnostic,
unlike Ramsey and McCormick, who remained theologians throughout their professional
lives. But Fletcher is an interesting case because he straddled Christian and secular
thought and attempted to accommodate the climate of justice in the 1960s and 70s during
the rise of the discipline of bioethics. He grew up in New Jersey and worked for a coal
company which ignited his sense of social justice and activism. His Situation Ethics was
weakly based on the scriptures, but the theological Fletcher receded over his career. His
ethics reflected the spirit of the 1960s, when secularism and human rights were
bourgeoning. It also reflects an Augustinian account of the virtue of love as well as an
Aristotelian notion of individual practical wisdom. Fletcher had a strong distaste for the
dogmatic legalism of Protestant and Catholic ethics, while displaying a penchant for the
postmodern. Although situation ethics was not relativistic in the total sense, his reliance
on love as the only reigning principle over utilitarian arguments put him on the
postmodern end of the spectrum. Agape, or a neighborly unemotional love, IS
utilitarianism (greatest good for the greatest number), and love is also justice. His method
of ethical decision-making was pragmatic in nature, dealing in relationships and human
reason and not in metaphysical or essential truth. Fletcher’s nontheistic, utilitarian,
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optimistic, and individualistic philosophical ethics takes a hard turn from both
Rauschenbusch and Niebuhr, in almost every sense.
The classical critiques of Fletcher are many. First, he retains all of the
arguments heaped on utilitarians generally. How and who defines the good? Is the good
defined as pleasure or human welfare (or agape for Fletcher)? How does one not fall into
the trappings of moral relativism? How can one’s choices necessarily predict good
consequences? Is it morally acceptable to justify good ends with unethical means? What
are the boundaries of a situation? Does a situation include proximal persons and short or
long time-frames? Who is thy neighbor?
At first glance Fletcher does seem to attend to the situation of the oppressed. He
argues that love is justice, and justice is distributive. Love is preferential, meaning it is
thoughtful and responsible.149 Love is a moral law, which surpasses human law. Love can
in fact be subversive and can take the form of revolution if the outcome is for the greater
good. (Yet, it is hard to see love in his example of President Truman’s decision to drop
the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki).150 But a good first clue of the disconnect
between the love and justice comes from Fletcher’s quoting Sammy Davis Jr. about
Davis’ conversion to Judaism. “As I see it, the difference is that the Christian religion
preaches love thy neighbor, and the Jewish religion preaches justice, and I think justice is
the big thing we need.”151 This conflation of love with justice problematic. What justice
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is for Fletcher, or anyone else applying his method, only must be based on love. Love
may be a non-sentimental neighborly-love, but that is all one can assume. The problem is
revealed here. When love or justice comes from one’s social location, the definition of
neighbor and of love will vary. One can imagine a group of physicians and nurses in a
Western hospital making decisions, and love being defined by those who are a part of the
dominant culture. Situation ethics still privileges the privileged, especially when working
within a Western power dynamic.
For sake of argument, if the community is a marginalized community operating
with his model, we could deduce that they could choose their own brand of justice. But
practically, if a marginalized person wants to uphold love or justice short of revolution in
a dominant society, what are her options? Yes, love might look like revolution. But why
should those who are marginalized be reduced on one hand to revolution, and on the
other hand applying a basic utilitarian calculation to justify breaking the law or engaging
in civil disobedience repeatedly in order to survive? The liberative message is lost.
Fletcher is still operating within the power structure, despite leaving a bookmarked space
for revolution.
While this method for making decisions seems to be based on an objectively
neutral process that deems all humans equal, some serious problems arise for those on the
margins. People are not equivalent utilitarian units. While ideal in theory, utilitarianism
does not consider the power dynamics and inequalities inherent in society. There is no
preferential option for those who need preference within unjust structures. Another
critique from the margins comes from Henderson-Espinoza who says “Ethics is not a
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responsible moral system for those who are marginalized and for communities of
color”152 Fletcher’s position on self-sacrifice sounds virtuous to the untrained christian
ear. But to ask people who are marginalized to put other’s interests over their own
(especially the dominant culture) is asking them to continue to prioritize the privileged
while those who are marginalized are still fighting to survive. This idea of love is not
“ordered by the community or engaged by the community. It is driven by christian
narratives and individually embodied.”153 Henderson-Espinoza also points out the lack of
intersectional analysis in situation ethics. While Fletcher has a vague idea of justice, his
omission of power analysis is a deal-breaker for marginalized communities.
Bioethics clearly shares a much deeper historical worldview with medicine
proper. Medicine and bioethics are steeped in the promises of both modern liberalism,
those of “human freedom, rational progress, and social equality,” 154 and a 2,000-year
history of Christendom. The very aims of bioethics are thwarted by the worldview155 and
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ideologies within which it was produced, including Western theology, philosophy, and
medical science. The intentions borne of the discipline of bioethics are respectable; yet,
disparities in access to health care continue to exist for people of color; overt and covert
racism are still ubiquitous in medicine; and the health care professionals and leadership
who dominate Western medicine are still primarily white.156
This dissertation does not aim to dig into each contemporary bioethicist’s life
and scholarship to prove some kind of individual proclivity for racism or personal flaw.
On the contrary, the eurochristian worldview is one in which the Western world is
immersed, and is often unconscious and biologically and cognitively programmed. What
the next three chapters will explore is how a eurochristian bioethics discourse affects the
bodies, minds, and flourishing of people of color. The cases in these chapters are meant
to highlight and illuminate some of the profound effects that a bioethics unaware might
be able to perceive in the future.
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CHAPTER 3: THE EUROCHRISTIAN COLONIAL DISCOURSE: RELIGION,
ENLIGHTENMENT, AND RACE
Bioethics is a discipline157 based in theology, philosophy, and medicine. These
three knowledge groupings are derivative of the eurochristian trajectory of both
Christianity and the Enlightenment. As discussed by Linda Tuhiwai Smith in
Decolonizing Methodologies, Western academic fields and disciplines such as
anthropology, geography, and history share similar genealogical foundations in
colonialism and the Enlightenment. These disciplines are grounded in the eurochristian
worldview and “are either antagonistic to other belief systems or have no methodology
for dealing with other knowledge systems.”158 And while they have been built upon the
foundation of the “truth” as revealed through science, the disciplines as we know them
were built in the laboratories called colonies.159 Bioethics as a discipline is also a
eurochristian discourse.
This chapter will outline the foundation bioethics shares with most Western
academic disciplines. The purpose of this chapter is two-fold: to describe the
eurochristian colonial foundations upon which the discipline of bioethics arose, and to
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demarcate the categories of eurochristian colonial thought through which bioethics can be
critiqued. First, to contextualize bioethics within the eurochristian colonial discourse I
define colonialism and imperialism, the colonial-racial discourse, and the eurochristian
worldview through both Christian and Enlightenment paradigms. Second, I define anticolonialism and its relation to postcolonial and decolonizing discourses and explain why I
chose this framework. And third, I outline specific categories of colonialism for
application to specific bioethics texts and cases in the following chapters. These
categories will serve to expose the continuity of the structures of the colonial-racial
discourse found within bioethics.
Colonialism and Imperialism
Colonialism160 and imperialism are major expressions of the eurochristian
worldview. I briefly define them here before describing the colonial-racial discourse,
which in turn will be fundamental to my argument that anti-colonialism is required to
deal with issues of race in bioethics. Lorenzo Veracini defines colonialism as the
“exogenous domination” of one group over another, and is defined by “an original
displacement and unequal relations.”161 Ania Loomba puts it succinctly as “the conquest
160
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and control of other people’s land and goods”.162 Settler-colonialism, the primary form of
colonialism experienced in the Americas, is not a colonialism that maintains the
distinction between colonizer and colonized, but actually attempts to erase those whose
lands they have invaded.163 Patrick Wolfe wrote that “settler colonizers cone to stay:
invasion is a structure not an event,” intimating the ongoing elimination of Indigenous
peoples until colonization is complete.164 Although colonization and the formation of
empires have occurred throughout history, European colonialism beginning in the 15th
century is a particularly extreme and paradigmatic example of colonialism. The shear
geographical extent of European colonialism is often cited as one reason for its
distinctive type of domination. In the 1930s, 84.6 percent of the land surface of the globe
was colonized.165 Loomba suggests as another distinguishing characteristic of European
colonialism its ability to restructure whole economies; in short, its synergistic
establishment alongside capitalism.166 It can also be distinguished by its use of race to
justify conquest, profit, and progress on stolen bodies and stolen lands.
Imperialism is “the forceful extension of a nation's authority by territorial
conquest or by establishing economic and political domination of other nations that are
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not its colonies.”167 Through imperialism, a nation need not travel to dominate other
nations. Western imperialism replaced formal colonialism across the globe through a
growing global strategy of neoliberalism.168 Western neoliberal policies include tenants
such as less governmental regulation, a market economy, open trade, and individual
freedoms (which often translates to market freedom). The hallmarks of this new form of
global capitalism including multinational corporations, financial markets, global labor
forces, and foreign direct investment changed the face of Western intervention in the
world.169 170 Despite the formal decolonization171 of most former European colonies,
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imperialism continues to exist through market globalism and neoliberalism which make
up what Steger calls the modern imperial ideology.172 According to Loomba,
“If imperialism is defined as a political system in which an
imperial centre governs colonized countries, then the granting of
political independence signals the end of empire, the collapse of
imperialism. However, if imperialism is primarily an economic
system of penetration and control of markets, then political
changes do not basically affect it, and may even redefine the term
as in the case of ‘American imperialism’ which wields enormous
military and economic power across the globe but without direct
political control [emphasis mine].”173
Hardt and Negri go even further to assert that what they call Empire, the
neoliberal regime, is postcolonial and postimperialist.174 Globalization has a diffuse
power base and dynamic flowing borders and margins. For Hardt and Negri power lies in
communications networks, in multinational corporations, and in financial markets; it does
not belong to a single person, a despot, an emperor, or a royal representative.
No bright line exists between acquisition of flag independence and what might
be called the imperialism of hegemonic system of capitalism. The varied experiences of
colonialism and imperialism in the immediate postcolonial period were, and continue to
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be, complex and varied. As primarily bourgeoisie matter, decolonization did little for
Indigenous, women, Blacks, and workers. As J. Klor de Alva noted, those on the margins
in postcolonial nations would often be wiped out, micegenated, made to endure forced
cultural change, or continue be marginalized.175 In settler-colonial states such as the
Americas, Canada, and Australia, Indigenous people are still effectively colonized, while
simultaneously being affected by more modern forces of imperialism in the form of
neoliberalism.
The Colonial-Racial Discourse: Race as a Tool for “Progress”
The idea of race in medicine and bioethics is often considered in terms of
individual overt racism, implicit bias, and structural racism. The colonial discourse on
race is what underlies the latter, that which is embedded in the fabric of Western
institutional success. European colonialism owes its success to racism.176 Colonialism is
co-constituted with, and served by, the racialization of people, creating the colonial-racial
discourse. According to Jodi Byrd, “racialization and colonization have worked
simultaneously to other and abject entire peoples so they can be enslaved, excluded,
removed, and killed in the name of progress and capitalism.”177 Western prosperity was
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cultivated over 20 generations of slavery, genocide, and removal from land of racialized
people in the service of the owners of mining, cotton, sugar, indigo, tobacco, and fruit
industries. Aníbal Quijano called the idea of race the most efficient instrument of social
domination invented in the last 500 years.178
This discourse is important to the arguments in this project for two reasons.
First, the colonial-racial discourse sets the stage for the arguments herein that are not
concerned with race alone but has deeper historical implements in the colonial narrative.
While bioethics and health care literature focusing on race and healthcare is growing,
very little can be found that explicitly situates race within the colonial context,
particularly in the bioethics literature. Second, it is important to note that colonialism’s
co-constitution with racism over the last five centuries supports the fact that racialized
groups in the U.S. still have poorer health, health care, and experience discriminatory
treatment despite attempts to address “diversity and inclusion”.179 Race is an instrument
of a broader and enduring discourse, not just one of skin color. It is one of Christianity,
capitalism, empire-building, and military force that some might call progress, and others
consider genocidal. Bioethics is a part of this continued colonial trajectory of progress.
A Short Genealogy of Race in Colonialism
In the 15th century, Europe was inundated with military conflict, religious
intolerance, depressed wages, and devalued currencies. Portugal, Spain, France, and
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England were the first to set out to acquire new resources to mitigate their impoverished
conditions and fortify their commercial ventures. In the 16th and 17th centuries the
European invaders began to colonize the Americas driven by their desire for land,
simultaneously raising questions about the religion and humanity of the Native
Americans. Early on, the justification for enslavement and genocide came from
Christendom’s view of Native Americans as savages and Africans as degenerates, not as
fully human or Christian. Missionaries forced Native Americans and Africans to convert
to Christianity while engaging in torture, starvation, and forced labor. Alongside the
missionaries, the European military used genocide, torture, removal, and disease to gain
access to Native American land and resources.
The 15th century Doctrine of Discovery180 which was led by European explorers
with the appointment from papal authority led the Christian world toward enlightenment,
eventually followed by the transformation of Christian Man into the Man of science and
rationality.181 In Man’s shadow the “other” became defined as the irrational, taking on
labels such as savage, barbarian, and degenerate. “With [these] population group’s
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systemic stigmatization, social inferiorization, and dynamically produced material
deprivation,” Wynter writes, this served “both to ‘verify’ the overrepresentation of Man
as if it were the human, and to legitimate the subordination of the world and well-being
of the latter to those of the former.” (emphasis mine)182 The designation for being fully
human was limited to only European Christian and rational Man. Lisa Lowe, in her book
Intimacies on Four Continents, performs a genealogy of European liberalism in which
she demonstrates the intertwined colonial and racial connections across the Americas,
Africa, and the East Indies and China trades.183 Lowe points out how race was one factor
in the larger project of dividing humanity for the benefit of the colonizers. She goes on to
point to some of the common representations of racialized others: Indigenous peoples as
non-Christian and threatening savages, Africans as non-human property, and Asians as
degenerates, vagrants, or prostitutes. While racialization and colonization have been
shaped by local contexts and circumstances, amongst them the colonized/racialized share
“intimacies” in their experiences with the colonizer.184
The 18th century brought race, as a new technology of power, to the forefront as
an alternative to exploitation via religious justification. The science of Enlightenment
produced the likes of Karl Linnaeus, one of the first to categorize the human species. In
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1740 Linnaeus divided humans into four sub-categories or varieties, considered the first
steps toward defining race based on geographical location, physical characteristics, and
temperament. The four divisions were: Europaeus albus (white Europeans) who were
gentle and inventive, Americanus rubescens (red Americans) who were stubborn and
angry, Asiaticus fuscus (yellow Asians) who were avaricious and easily distracted, and
Africanus niger (black Africans) who were relaxed and negligent.185 The category
“monstrosus” was delegated to wild humans. John Burke, in his essay “The Wild Man’s
Pedigree: Scientific Method and Racial Anthropology”, he describes Linnaeus’ list of
five levels of humans, ranging from the four-footed, mute, hairy wild man to the black,
phlegmatic, relaxed, capricious African.186 19th Century science used phrenology and
craniometry to perform studies on skulls, often in an attempt to “prove” the inferior
intellectual ability and undesirable behavioral traits of non-whites.187 Science, although
touted as objective, was (and continues to be) tethered to the racist cognitive metaphors
of the eurochristian mind.
Also during the 18th century Immanuel Kant put forth his theories on race, for
which he has been credited as inventor.188 Kant divides the races into four groups as well,
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all originating from the superior white and blonde stem-species and a climate best suited
for progress and civilization.189 For Kant, the three other groups, Negro, Hunnish, and
Hinuish had acquired internal and external features, particularly skin color and
temperaments, to adapt to their migratory environments. The color of one’s skin, for
Kant, was indicative of internal characteristics and ability to be rational, therefore human.
The religious scholar and linguist Müller divided up languages in a similar fashion to
Kant’s categories in the prior century.190 And while not intending to be racist, Müller’s
classifications of languages and peoples served history as a favorite of Hitler in justifying
the Holocaust. The 19th century solidified race as a concept, notably based on Darwin’s
theory of evolution, which consolidated the myth of biological teleology of human beings
on the path to civilized humanity.
Modern continuities of race and colonialism manifested in Indian boarding
schools which ran from the late 19th century and peaked in the 1970s, the mass
imprisonment of people of color (a significant source of free labor), 20th century
sterilization programs carried out on women of color, the poverty of Native Americans
that underwrites many of the top 10 poorest counties in the United States, the
environmental destruction of Native lands by the U.S. government and private industry,
the current removal of Native children from their homes and subsequent adoption, the
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imprisonment of Latinx migrant children and adults, and the racial and ethnic disparities
in health care, both at the individual and systemic level. According to the 2002 Institute
of Medicine’s “Committee on Understanding and Eliminating Racial and Ethnic
Disparities in Healthcare,”
“disparities were found across a wide range of disease areas and
clinical services…in virtually all clinical settings…including
cardiac care, cancer screening and treatment, diabetes
management, end stage renal disease, treatment of HIV infection,
pediatric care, maternal and child health, mental health,
rehabilitative and nursing home services, and many surgical
procedures.”191
It is no coincidence that Native Americans, Latinx, and African Americans, those people
whose bodies and land were exploited to “make America great,” are still suffering under
the weight of the colonizer. Thomas McCarthy puts this into perspective writing, “five
centuries of imperialism and racism did not disappear without a trace fifty years since the
postwar successes of decolonization and civil rights struggles.”192 Lowe also indicates the
continuation of the colonial-racial discourse in her observation, “race as a mark of
colonial difference” is an enduring remainder of the processes through which the human
is universalized and freed by liberal forms, while the peoples who created the conditions
of possibility for that freedom are assimilated or forgotten.193 In modern times, the
function of racism has evolved from justifying slave labor, genocide, and erasure, to
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supporting nationalism, creating in-groups and out-groups, and for targeting (non-white)
immigrants.194 It is still the reality that the oppression of certain groups allow for the
flourishing of others.
The (e)urochristian195 Worldview
Bioethics, along with most Western institutions and the individuals therein,
operates according to what I will refer to frequently, as the eurochristian worldview. The
enduring nature of the eurochristian worldview has driven 500 years of colonialism,
imperialism, and racism, and is fundamental to the argument that bioethics is also
complicit in the colonial-racial discourse. Although worldview has various colloquial
meanings, for the purposes of this argument I define it as a deep linguistic-conceptual
structure of the brain. According to Mark Freeland, worldview is an “interrelated set of
cultural logics that fundamentally orient a culture to space, time, the rest of life, and
provides a prescription for relating to that life.”196 Worldview is partially rooted in the
pre-cognitive, and can hold within it various communal norms, rules, and ideologies.
Worldview is made up of one’s ontology, epistemology, and the socio-political and
economic structures that frame one’s world. One’s worldview is resistant to change
because it centers a person in a certain reality, likely causing cognitive dissonance if
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challenged. Persons from Western Europe and the U.S. generally share the same
worldview which is oriented to time as linear, progressive, and redemptive; view land as
property; engage in activities of “competitive achievement”; are individualistic; and share
a common history based in the philosophies and religions of Western antiquity.197
According to George Tinker, the eurochristian worldview is by nature evangelistic and
has “inherently globalizing aspirations.” The eurochristian worldview, according to
Tinker, contains an “up-down” schema, categorizing different species along a progressive
hierarchy. This hierarchical schema is also responsible for arranging people as more or
less human, valuable, and civilized. Within this eurochristian worldview are more
conscious categories of identity such as Catholicism, Marxism, socialism,
conservativism, and Protestantism; yet all are eurochristian. For instance, while
ideologically Marxism critiques capitalism and wage labor, it still assumes the
governance of the white male position, the organization of the nation-state, and the idea
of economic progress. The consequences of this kind of progressive, hierarchical,
evangelistic, and competitive thinking have underwritten colonialism and racism. It is
this same worldview that centers bioethics and medicine: a linear and progressive view of
time, a hierarchical structure, rules of logic that follow Anglo-Saxon analytic philosophy
based on human rationality, and moral proselytizing.
In order for eurochristians to comprehend their own worldview as one of many
possible ways of experiencing the world, it must be compared with a differing
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worldview. For this purpose I will compare it to an Indigenous worldview.198 According
to George Tinker, a Native American worldview is “inherently both local and cosmic in
orientation;” positions itself spatially rather than temporally, primarily around land; is
community-centered; and places “cosmic/holistic harmony and balance as the ultimate
ideal or goal of all human activity…”199 In contrast to the eurochristian anthropocentric
up-down schema, Native Americans have what Tinker calls an “egalitarian-collateral
image schema that results in a perception of the world that puts humans on the same
plane as all other living nonhuman persons,” including the two-leggeds, the four-leggeds,
the flying persons and the living-moving ones such as plants, fish, mountains, and
rocks.200 The Indigenous worldview respects all life, strives for continual balance through
ceremony and oral tradition, and is rooted in the place of ancestors and communal life.
For Native Americans life is cyclical, balanced, and egalitarian where eurochristian
worldview holds in esteem the myth of progress, human-centered individualism, and a
Darwinian notion of competition and “natural order” rather than cooperation.
The eurochristian thinking that has led to “progress” and “civilization” has also
led to environmental degradation, mass genocide, racial oppression, and extreme
economic inequality, none of which would have likely occurred based on Indigenous
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values and worldview.201 An Indigenous worldview aporetically challenges the “reality”
taken for granted by Westerners. The ability to perceive the eurochristian worldview is
fundamental to understanding how thoughts and actions are driven by a much larger and
insidious order.
The Frenemies of Christianity and the Enlightenment
This eurochristian worldview encompasses both Christianity and the
Enlightenment. When these two “arch-enemies” are viewed from a distance, it becomes
clear that, despite their differences, they have worked on colonial-racial projects in
tandem over the last five centuries. Colonialism occurred through a synergy of the
expansion and conquest of nation-states and the evangelizing of the Church. Sylvia
Wynter’s work is helpful in understanding this macro-level fusion of Christianity and the
Enlightenment, and their interrelated evolution and contribution to the eurochristian
worldview. Wynter, in her sociogeny202 of Man in Unsettling the Coloniality of
Being/Power/Truth/Freedom, traces the dominant schemas of Western society from 1)
Greek ontology, to 2) Gregorian Latin Christianity, to 3) the Reformation and
Enlightenment. The first transition in Western history saw a gradual replacement of the
Greek supernatural celestial central organizing principle of perfection with the Gregorian
Christian spiritual perfection. The second transition called the “intense historical rupture”
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by Winant began with ocean navigation in 1500s which proved Copernican theories and
positioned man as a political subject rather than a Christian subject.203 In this second
Western transition, science, evolution, and rationality abruptly replaced the Christian God
as central to worldview. Wynter calls these three ontologies “schemas”, all which dictate
what humans consider truth, morality, and conscience. The newer humanist schema of
the Enlightenment, while grounded in rational thought and dismissive of supernatural
organizing principles, merely overlays its structure atop the Church’s Judeo-Christian
conceptions. Pragmatically, those who were sinners become the irrational; salvation
becomes adherence to law; monarchy becomes expanding mercantilism and commercial
interests; and Christian Man becomes rational Man. This profound shift to rational Man
legitimated the expropriation of the land of “savages” and of the enslavement of African
“degenerates”, neither of them meeting the criteria of rational Man; and therefor
comprising the secular shift from “enemies of Christ” toward a more secular racism.204
No matter which schema, they all comprise the same general structure of defining who is
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human (always Man) and who is not. In considering the reliability of the organizing
principles that have placed Man as superior over the last five centuries, we can begin to
question whether medicine and bioethics has miraculously broken from this deep-seated
trajectory. In sum, whether identifying as a Christian or humanist, liberal or conservative
bioethicist does not relieve one from the eurochristian worldview or its bad habits.
Religion and Colonialism
Christianity has historically been fundamental to the colonial apparatus, and
foundational to both religious and secular bioethics. As the term will be used throughout
this project, Christianity indicates a socio-political designation and a social movement
that has been institutionalized within both the church and state; in other words, modern
Christendom. Peter d’Errico describes “Christendom” as “consisting of alliances among
secular princes and priestly authorities; it culminates in the doctrine of divine right of
kings and popes.”205 Christianity in this way is both political and religious and can be
found in churches and in court houses alike.206 What I exclude from the category of a
church-state type Christianity is the actual life and teachings of Christ. This is not an
attack on Christians who believe and follow Jesus’ teachings without evangelizing or
proselytizing. But it is imperative for this project to look realistically at Christianity and
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its generous contributions not only to doing good in the world, but to the harms it has
done whether with noble intent or through outright violence.
The Christian Apologetic
Christianity has legitimized colonial activities and the exploitation of people
and land for hundreds of years. Christianity was essential to what Steven Newcomb has
called the conqueror model, a cognitive model pervasive in eurochristian thought that
drives both colonialism and imperialism.207 The European conqueror’s power originated
in the divine power of the pope in Europe through the infamous Doctrine of Discovery.208
The Doctrine of Discovery, a collection of 15th Century papal documents became the
impetus and justification for Portuguese and Spanish colonialism. Eventually the idea of
discovery was adopted throughout Europe. Although not limited to these, three papal
bulls, the Dum Diversas, Romanus Pontifex, and the Inter Caetera provided a foundation
for the Doctrine. In 1452 Pope Nicholas V wrote the Dum Diversas, granting the
Portuguese King Alfonso V “the … full and free power, through the Apostolic authority
by this edict, to invade, conquer, fight, subjugate the Saracens and pagans, and other
infidels and other enemies of Christ…” Between the Dum Diversas and Romanus
Pontifex of 1455, the Portuguese monarchy was given permission by the Pope to seize
any lands and possessions in West Africa with exclusive rights to trade and colonize. The
third document, Inter Caetera, was written by Pope Alexander VI for Ferdinand and
Isabel of Spain in order to clarify Spanish rights to land in the new world, as well as to
207
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define the nature of Christian-infidel relations and the responsibility of the pope to
protect the infidels and to convert them to Christianity. By the time of Christopher
Columbus’ first voyage to the Americas in 1492, the content of these papal proclamations
had become well known. Per Newcomb, the perceived “divine right” of the conqueror,
gifted to him from God, is accompanied by the right to discover, to subdue, and to
dominate. As Newcomb describes, the myths of domination and conquering have biblical
roots. Newcomb breaks down the word dominion etymologically and argues that the
word dominion shares the same meaning with the word subdue. As he points out, Lord
“translates into the Latin term dominus, ‘he who has subdued’.”209 This language can be
found in Genesis 1:28 which reads: “God blessed them and said to them, ‘Be fruitful and
increase in number; fill the earth and subdue it. Rule over the fish in the sea and the birds
in the sky and over every living creature that moves on the ground’.”210 The biblical
language of subduing and dominating is a component of the eurochristian worldview, one
that has driven the justification of not only the exploitation of the natural world, but also
the justification of violence in slavery, genocide, and oppression.211 The bible serves as a
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form of collective consciousness in the minds of eurochristians, whether self-proclaimed
Christians or secularists, through which they continue to perform acts of subjugation.
The story of God’s Covenant with the Israelites is another site of biblical
seeding of the eurochristian colonial trajectory as represented by the following verses:


Genesis212: Abram traveled through the land as far as the site of the great tree of
Moreh at Shechem. At that time the Canaanites were in the land. The LORD
appeared to Abram and said, “To your offspring I will give this land.”



Psalms213: “Ask me, and I will make the nations your inheritance, the ends of the
earth your possession. You will break them with a rod of iron; you will dash them
to pieces like pottery.”



Deuteronomy214: When you march up to attack a city, make its people an offer of
peace. If they accept and open their gates, all the people in it shall be subject to
forced labor and shall work for you. If they refuse to make peace and they engage
you in battle, lay siege to that city. When the LORD your God delivers it into your
hand, put to the sword all the men in it. As for the women, the children, the
livestock and everything else in the city, you may take these as plunder for
yourselves. And you may use the plunder the LORD your God gives you from your
enemies. This is how you are to treat all the cities that are at a distance from you
and do not belong to the nations nearby. However, in the cities of the nations the
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LORD your God is giving you as an inheritance, do not leave alive anything that
breathes. Completely destroy them—the Hittites, Amorites, Canaanites, Perizzites,
Hivites and Jebusites—as the LORD your God has commanded you.
These biblical stories are the foundation of colonization. The Chosen Ones
(Israelites/Christian Europeans) are divinely guided to conquer and subdue the Promised
Land (Canaan/Indigenous lands). The deal given to the Native Americans was to
cooperate and live in peace, or resist and be subjected to slavery or obliteration. Africans,
on the other hand, were given no deal in relation to slavery. In drawing from Genesis 9,
enslavement was the proper course for Black “descendants of Ham”.215 These Christian
tropes of domination did not end with the postcolonial period.
In the 19th century, Christian ideology continued to dominate the world, this
time under the academic discipline of “world religions”. According to Tomoko
Masuzawa, concept of world religions was likely invented out of Christian comparative
theology, which saw Christianity as “the world religion,”, and “uniquely universal.”216
The concept of world religions and its accompanying ideas of pluralism are extensions of
European/Aryan universalism. By examining the 19th century pre-scientific texts whose
authors framed “other” religions as deviants to the universal nature of Christianity, the
assumption of a neutral and objective categorization of “world religions” is challenged by
Masuzawa. The same myths of religious pluralism and diversity are only different in
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category from the myths of racial pluralism and diversity. The World Parliament of
Religions is a case-in-point. This organization, while instrumental in establishing
religious categories as well as upholding pluralism is still largely Protestant in
representation.217 This is analogous to the stance of health care institutions and
professional codes of ethics; white and eurochristian in nature, despite the language of
pluralism and diversity.
Ted Vial, in his book Modern Race, Modern Religion makes the argument that
the construction of modern race and religion are inextricably bound, and continue to
define modern conceptual categories of identity, in large part due to the teleological and
hierarchical ideas of several German thinkers such as Herder, Schleiermacher, Kant, and
Müller. Because of the eurochristian worldview, religion is always a racialized category
in the modern world.218 Hence, we can conclude that, with early bioethics foundations set
exclusively by Christian theologians, bioethics is also inextricably bound to racism.
Christianity is half of the eurochristian worldview. The underlying tropes of
domination and conquest, of Christian exceptionalism and hierarchy, are threaded
throughout the Western colonial-racial apparatus. The other half of the eurochristian
worldview takes off during the Enlightenment, a period when Europeans were actively
colonizing, “discovering”, and appropriating other people’s knowledge, land, and bodies.
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The Enlightenment and Liberalism
Humanistic Western disciplines arose out of the Enlightenment, the project of
modernity that brought with it liberal politics, the industrial revolution, and the
Darwinian idea of evolution and progress. Modern-day liberalism is based on the “rights
of man” as declared by the 1789 French Revolution through the concepts of “human
freedom, rational progress, and social equality.”219 As Lisa Lowe points out, modern
liberalism is constituted by
“political emancipation through citizenship in the state, the
promise of economic freedom in the development of wage labor
and exchange markets, and the conferring of civilization to human
persons educated in aesthetic and national culture…”220
What is forgotten is the simultaneous necessity of slavery, settler-colonialism, land theft,
and capitalist imperialism in order to sustain modernity. In France in 1789, it was not
persons of color, Indigenous persons, or even white women whose rights were being
asserted. It was the “rights of man”. In The Intimacies of Four Continents, Lowe
examines the separate archives of both European liberalism and colonial documents,
exposing their co-constitution in the defining of humans along a hierarchy. She states,
“even as it proposes inclusivity, liberal universalism effects principles of inclusion and
exclusion,” and that
“universalizing concepts of reason, civilization, and freedom effect
colonial divisions of humanity, affirming liberty for modern man
while subordinating the variously colonized and dispossessed
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peoples whose material labor and resources were the conditions of
possibility for that liberty.”221
The language of liberal societies make colonialism less visible, but the schema is still in
place. Similarly, Walter Mingolo and Catherine Walsh write, “there is no modernity
without coloniality.”222 According to them, right-wing nationalisms such as Trump’s
America and Britain’s Brexit are not worse than the neoliberal globalism that has spread
a capitalist economy worldwide.223 Why? Because the nation-state and capitalism are
both colonizing tropes of a particular worldview. Similarly, liberalism is no better than
conservativism. While political liberals use the modern language of freedom and
equality, they continue to uphold the political economy of the nation-state, which in-turn
is co-constituted with the historical structures of race. Modernity orients itself toward the
future, to some sort of “progress”. This trope of progress is based on a teleological view
that is also wrapped up in the colonial narrative, and is inseparable from the categorizing
of humanity through race. According to Vial, despite our best efforts as scholars and
liberals,
“we are led…to theorize difference by comparing groups based on
their proximity to a historical telos. When we rank parts of the
world by how developed or progressive or modern they are, by
how compatible their religions are with democracy, and when we
notice what color the people are who live there, we find that our
categories are not so different than Kant’s and Müller’s.”224
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Modernity, replete with the promises of science, capitalism, and the nation-state, has
failed in many ways. It did not prevent a century of world wars and genocides, it has
contributed greatly to the destruction of the environment, and it has not solved problems
of inequality and racism. Modernity is constitutive of these things. To eliminate them
would be to eliminate modernism.
During the period of Enlightenment, both colonialism and imperialism set the
stage for stealing valuable land and appropriating knowledge from others, while defining
those others based on the Western worldview (and always as inferior). In Decolonizing
Methodologies, Linda Tuhiwai Smith points out how Western disciplines, and
particularly anthropology, “catalogued, studied, and stored” Indigenous communities as if
their cultures were objects of study rather than subjects who existed with an equally valid
worldview in their own right.225 The “objects” of study, Indigenous people, while
contributing heavily in the scientific foundations of Western research, were given as
much credit as a “variety of plant, a shard of pottery, or a ‘preserved head of a native’”.226
Edward Said made a similar argument in Orientalism by arguing that the West reified and
defined the East, thus disallowing those in the East to speak for themselves. This
representation of the East by the West was possible because of the political, cultural,
intellectual and moral power of imperial America, Britain, and France.227
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The “globalization of knowledge and Western culture constantly reaffirms the West’s
view of itself as the center of legitimate knowledge, the arbiter of what counts as
knowledge and the source of ‘civilized’ knowledge.”228 And the knowledge was spread
through both religious boarding schools or, later, public and secular schooling, which
continues today. If Indigenous peoples were thought to be educatable, they were offered
schooling. If they were thought to have a soul, they were offered salvation.229
The promises from the point of view of the Enlightenment, modernity, and
political liberalism are no better at dealing with race than those from a religious or
conservative space. The conservative Christian bioethicist and the secular liberal
bioethicist alike are complicit in continued racism, just as Christian trope drives
domination and hierarchy, and liberalism touts freedom while exploiting those who do
not count. The eurochristian worldview did not disappear.
Postcolonialism, Anti-Colonialism, or Decolonization?
The proposed framework for the ensuing analysis is anti-colonial. In this section
I will define and critique postcolonialism, situate the discourse of decolonization within a
larger anti-colonial framework, and finally make a case for an anti-colonial approach.
Anti-colonialism as defined by Dei and Lordan is a “resistance to white
supremacy and Eurocentric cultural organization…” that “looks for possibilities of
resisting and transforming cultural systems of oppression and domination, or imposed
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ways of knowing, being, and living.”230 Anticolonialism is a political praxis, adept at
responding to the material consequences of the continued colonialism and global
imperialism. Anti-colonial praxis centers non-eurochristian communities while making
whiteness visible to white people.231 If there is a place for the
“dominant/colonizer/oppressor in the anti-colonial struggle,” which some argue there is
not, it is because “it provides [them] with an avenue for asking and insisting upon
accountability and addressing responsibilities.”232 Herein lies the ultimate role of the
bioethicist who is serious about dealing with race: to learn and teach the colonial-racial
discourse, to act with marginalized patients and against colonial structures in practice,
and to center scholars of color in the bioethics discourse. For bioethicists, anti-colonial
deconstruction of one’s consciousness and confronting colonial practices in one’s own
neighborhood are crucial steps toward reimagining a world where human means
something other than Wynter’s “Man”. According to Wynter, a new definition of human
can only be accomplished through the leadership of the external observer of the power
structures, specifically those who experience the injustice based on their exclusion in
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access to representation and frames of reference; in other words, those on the margins.233
This work is incremental and without a clear endpoint (rejecting the trope of linear
progress). The challenging of worldviews is always met with resistance, the
transformation of culture sluggish, and the changing of power structures intransigent. But
if bioethics resists coming to terms with its own history and complicity, if it has little to
say about racism and inequality, how can it consider itself concerned with the morality of
life, its namesake?
Postcolonial Theory
Anti-colonialism and postcolonialism have often overlapped in their meanings
and practices and have various divergent interpretations. Both aim to understand and
respond to the aftermath and continued violence of colonialism, albeit in different ways.
Postcolonial theory originated in South Asia from subaltern studies, inspired by Indian
historian Ranajit Guha. Subaltern studies, rooted in Marxist notion of class struggle,
began in 1970s among English and Indian scholars who wanted to write history “from
below,” from the perspective of the voiceless masses. The term subaltern was coined by
Antonio Gramsci, and signifies those people who are oppressed and powerless, the
masses who are left out of sociopolitical dialogue and power structures. The Calcuttaborn Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak also engaged in subaltern studies and is often
considered one of the founders of postcolonial theory.234 According to Spivak, the
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dominant culture can either represent the subaltern as an agent of power, or re-present as
a signifier of historical account, both which are problematic for the subaltern.235 The
subaltern cannot speak because they will not be heard. It is a Western epistemological
privilege to designate the identities of, and speak for, others.236 Yet his “speaking for”
only serves to essentialize and homogenize a diverse group of people.237
Also considered a forerunner of postcolonialism is the Palestinian literary
theorist Edward Said. Through textual analysis, Said reveals how the West has reified the
“Orient”, including but not limited to the Middle East. Like Spivak, he uses the language
of representation. He wrote that through a “re-presence”, or representation of
Orientalism, the Occident has “excluded, displaced, made supererogatory” any such real
thing as “the Orient.”238 Said is anti-essentialist in the tradition of postcolonial scholars,
careful to recognize the diversity within the subaltern and to eschew the rash stereotyping
of the Western representations of others, especially the “Orient”.
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Homi Bhabha expanded the postcolonial anti-essentializing arguments beyond
the colonizer/colonized binary through his concept of hybridity. In contrast to Franz
Fanon’s search for authenticity, hybridity is derived from the multiple and heterogeneous
sites of contact between colonizer and colonized and accounts for the intersectionality of
identities such as gender, race, and nationality. This “in-between space” is where cultures
are engaged in dynamic formation and serve as a site of agency for the colonized. Like
Spivak, he considers Marxist binaries, and those contemporary tactics to elevate
“difference” as ineffective and counterproductive to the process of moving beyond
decolonization.239 240
Postcolonial Realities
Postcolonialism has had many critiques. First, the “post” in postcolonialism
connotes its succession to colonialism, and therefore erroneously implies the conclusion
of colonialism. Is post-colonialism only the literal successor of the formal colonialism of
the last few centuries? Many postcolonialists, including, Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths,
and Helen Tiffin, want to start the clock of postcolonialism at the moment of the
discovery of Hispaniola in 1492.241 Looking forward, Loomba suggests that
postcolonialism is “more flexibly the contestation of colonial domination and the legacies

239

Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture (London ; New York: London ; New York: Routledge, 2004).

240

Arif Dirlik calls Bhabha is a leftish libertarian. He views Bhabha’s approach in the politics of identity,
including his concepts of hybridity, heterogeneity, and in-betweenness as too postmodernist, denying the
relevance of political and economic structures. Arif Dirlik, The Postcolonial Aura: Third World Criticism
in the Age of Global Capitalism (Routledge, 2018), viii.

241

Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin, The Empire Writes Back: Theory and Practice in PostColonial Literatures (Routledge, 1989).

108

of colonialism.”242 Both of these approaches signify colonialism in its temporal formality,
as something that is over, despite its continued after-effects on the colonized. Achille
Mbembe goes even further to attach a specific time frame to postcolonialism when he
states “the younger generation of Africans have no direct or immediate experience” of
colonialism.243 Therefore, postcolonialism ends with the fading of memory.
Anne McClintock’s critique of postcolonialism interrogates the
“almost ritualistic ubiquity of “post” words in current culture
(postcolonialism, postmodernism, poststructuralism, post-cold war,
post-Marxism, post-Soviet, post-Ford, postfeminism, postnational,
posthistoric, even postcontemporary),” …which “signals…a
widespread, epochal crisis in the idea of linear, historical
progress.”244
Here, the prefix “post” is indicative of what is still a Eurocentric period of time to which
all other peoples and events are affixed. The enlightenment project of colonization and
“progress” has failed, but the West blindly continues to move along its imagined
narrative of salvation.
McClintock also takes issue with the “post” in postcolonialism, like Dirlik, in its
inability to handle the transition to modern imperialism. She wonders what is “post”
about South Africa, East Timor, Australia, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and Native American
peoples of the United States.245 In her words, postcolonialism is “prematurely
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celebratory”.246 In addition, for McClintock the “post” in postcolonialism may not
consider fully the variation in postcolonial-ness of different countries and cultures, asking
whether they share enough in common to be categorized under one name. McClintock, in
sum, recognizes not only the textual and dialogical power of imperialism, but also the
physical and institutional violence of the state machinery as set up by colonialism.
Second, postcolonialism has blurred the location of power, hence the target for
praxis. The poststructuralist postmodernist approach is sometimes blamed for creating
this distortion. Jorge Klor de Alva, despite his acknowledgement that the effects of
colonialism continue to impress upon peoples today, is a poststructuralist who favors a
‘multiplicity of histories’ rather than the master narrative.247 If postcolonialism becomes
unattached to any institution or structure, including de Alva’s poststructuralist approach,
it quickly becomes a vague condition difficult to locate, and vague enough to lose its
usefulness. Although Foucault did not consider himself a poststructuralist, his 'discourse'
is also consistent with the poststructural idea of insidious diffuse power. This leads to the
hopeless state in which “power is everywhere and so ultimately nowhere.”248 Postcolonialism is poststructural from Derrida’s point of view as well, focusing on
multiplicity and dispersal. Shohat echoes this same critique, writing that the category
does not lend itself to identifying the opposition, and in effect distorts the political
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choices for resistance.249 If postcolonialism is both directly following formal colonialism
and applies vague poststructural conditions, what is the foundation for approaching the
present continued colonial-racial structures? Does the power lie in systems or in
individuals?
Third, postcolonialism is often referred to as an academic enterprise of
intellectual elites. For instance, a criticism of Spivak is that despite her early years in
India, her education is rooted in Western approaches, and she enjoys a privileged position
in society.250 In addition, the subaltern cannot access her writings. Often postcolonialism
is entangled with Western academics and epistemology; issues of individualism and
identity; and the idea of liberal progress. Take, for example, Dirlik’s criticism of
“postcolonial” as a marker for the elite American academy:
“What then may be the value of a term that includes so much
beyond and excludes so much of its own postulated premise, the
colonial? What it leaves us with is what I have already hinted at:
postcolonial, rather than a description of anything, is a discourse
that seeks to constitute the world in the self-image of intellectuals
who view themselves (or have come to view themselves) as
postcolonial intellectuals. That is, to recall my initial statement
concerning Third World intellectuals who have arrived in First
World academe, postcolonial discourse is an expression not so
much of agony over identity, as it often appears, but of newfound
power.”251
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For Dirlik, the postcolonial has been decoupled from the third world, and
postcolonialism has become primarily the discursive realm of postcolonial intellectuals.
Postcolonialism’s attention has been distracted from global power sources such as
capitalism, multinational corporations, and financial markets as a continuation of the
colonial project. Dirlik advocates for indigenism as an alternative source for development
in response and resistance to the ideology and ubiquity of capitalism.252
Fourth, postcolonialism is an attempt to move beyond binaries of
colonizer/colonized, to more hybrid, multicultural, and transcultural approaches. Yet,
rejecting essentialism and binaries blurs the line between colonizer and colonized,
erroneously assumes a post-racial society, and creates an ambiguous and depoliticized
context.253 A critique of postcolonialism by Anne McClintock, in her book Imperial
Leather, is that postcolonial anti-essentialism is a paradox in itself. She argues that while
postcolonial theory imbues the deconstruction of the Manichean binaries of
center/periphery and self/other, at the same time postcolonialism by name suggests “a
single, binary opposition: colonial/postcolonial”.254 255 Ella Shohat has criticized
postcolonialism for its “a-historical and universalizing deployments’, and its ‘potentially
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depoliticizing implications’”.256 Shohat and McClintock both criticize the prefix “post” in
postcolonial based on its implication of a case closed, a finitude.
Fifth, postcolonialism delegitimizes Indigenous communities. Along with
critical studies and liberation theology, it tends to ignore Indigenous thought and praxis.
Postcolonialism is not about land, which is fundamental to Indigenous communities,
traditions, and livelihood. In many ways postcolonialism is what Eva Tuck calls the
“settler move to innocence,” or the metaphorization of decolonization that “attempts to
reconcile settler guilt and complicity, and rescue settler futurity,” at the expense of true
decolonization for Indigenous people, which equates to recovery of land.257
And sixth, in Conscripts of Modernity David Scott asserts that postcolonialism
is stuck in the old questions of colonial power and colonized resistance: they have
“uncritically taken over this Fanonian image of colonialism”.258 For Scott, one of the
problems with postcolonialism is not with its offering up of answers, but that it has coopted the questions of the past, which are wholly, in Scott’s estimate, irrelevant to the
present. Scott analyzes C.R.L. James’ revolutionary romance Black Jacobins depicting a
Haitian hero figure, and compares it to the revised edition in which James suggests that
the story to be read as a tragedy. Tragedy, for Scott, “is troubled by the hubris of
enlightenment and civilization, power and knowledge.”259 Thus,
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“the tragedy of colonial enlightenment… is not to be perceived in
terms of a flaw to be erased or to overcome, but rather in terms of a
permanent legacy that has set the conditions in which we make of
ourselves what we make and which therefore demands constant
renegotiation and readjustment.”260
There is no salvation, no romantic ending.
In summary, postcolonialism is a postmodern, poststructural, and antiessentializing response to the epistemological dominance of colonialism over the
subaltern following formal decolonization. The poststructural focus of postcolonialism on
culture and identity leaves out the real structures and institutions of capitalism and
globalization with the inflation of culture over politics; the focus on literary texts and art
forms; and its heavy reliance on ideology. Postcolonialism does not deeply consider
political and economic structures, and it does not know how to incorporate capitalism and
the globalization of neoliberalism into its folds.
Early Anti-Colonialism
Early anti-colonialism began as the resistance and revolution of European
colonies against their oppressors, taking place in the global space and time of formal
decolonization. A fervor and revolutionary spirit can be seen throughout this time period,
as nations and peoples hoped for free and idealistic futures. This attitude was exemplified
by Aimé Césaire, the Martinique poet and politician, through the co-founding of the
international Negritude movement with Léopold Sédar Senghor, a Senegalese poet and
politician; in his optimism in regards to re-creating and reimagining selves; and through
his surrealist and idealist expressions of a decolonized future. As Robin Kelley wrote of
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Césaire’s writing in the introduction to Discourse, “It is full of flares, full of anger, full of
humor.”261
The Martinique-born Frantz Fanon was a student and later colleague of Césaire.
Fanon studied psychiatry in France, and became concerned with the psychopathology of
colonization and consequences of decolonization. He was also reacting to the
revolutionary spirit of his generation, albeit in a less romanticized way. Fanon develops a
political philosophy of decolonization starting with a focus on psychological harms on
black men in Black Skin, White Masks.262 He shares the sentiments of Césaire on the
objectification (or thingification as Césaire names it) of the colonized black-skinned
person, as well as the idea that genocide of people of color was a regular colonial event
far earlier than the holocaust in Nazi Germany. While Fanon was not as idealistic as
Césaire, he also engaged revolution in a somewhat Marxist tradition (yet arguing that
race was just as important as Marx’s category of class in the process of decolonization).
Fanon was a member of the Algerian National Liberation Front during the Algerian War
of Independence from France. It was during his time in Algeria as a practicing
psychiatrist that he wrote Wretched of the Earth, his anti-colonial manifesto.263 In
Wretched he critiques the decolonization of Latin American countries as a bourgeoisie
affair and not one that benefits the masses. He also specifies the only way to avoid the
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issues of a bourgeoisie decolonization in Latin America is for a violent revolution of the
masses in Algeria. His reasoning and justification for violence relies on the assertion that
“colonialism is not a machine capable of thinking, a body endowed with reason. It is
naked violence and only gives in when confronted with greater violence.”264
Similarly, a contemporary of Césaire and Fanon, Albert Memmi expresses this
revolutionary passion in The Colonizer and the Colonized. His primary project is in the
understanding of the colonial relationship between the colonizer and colonized, an
immediate problem not only for his country but for Memmi personally as he straddles
both worlds. In his analysis he condemns the “good colonist” not for his or her good
intentions, but for the inability to agree ideologically to the kind of revolution that the
colonized desire, one that contains violence and terrorism.265 According to Memmi,
liberals only want decolonization if it is peaceful and democratic.
In their essence, Fanon, Césaire and Memmi are squarely anti-colonial,
struggling against a still-material and tangible enemy. But, as David Scott has written,
they have yet to experience the tragedy of a lost era, the failure of a revolution and the
feeling of being stranded frozen in the postrevolutionary present, particularly in the space
and time of failed revolution.266 According to Scott, the next generation of postcolonial
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writers will be situated in a different “present”. The landscape has changed since the
revolutionary fervor of Fanon, Césaire, and Memmi’s world. The nature of colonialism
has changed as well. Colonialism today is experienced not only through the continued
settler-colonial experiences of Indigenous people, but also through racism, inequality,
and global imperialism. If colonialism is generally the physical habitation, theft of land,
and exploitation of people, imperialism is the control and exploitation of a peoples and
land through globalization of a neoliberal economy. I argue that an anti-colonial critique
is still highly relevant, despite the distance from the revolutionary fervor of global
decolonization and nation-building.267
A Word on Indigenous Decolonization
Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang take anti-colonialism to be limited to recovering
“denied privileges from the metropole,” defining subversion as a reclaiming of resources
from within the framework of the colonizer and the nation-state. Instead, they attribute to
decolonization what modern writers such as Dei and Corntassel consider to be
characteristics of anti-colonialism.268 Anti-colonial theory for them focuses on
communities, land, and resurgence. According to Dei, anti-colonialism “challenges the
colonizer’s sense of reason, authority, and control…and seeks to theorize colonialism and
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dominating social relations through the lenses of Indigenous knowledges and
worldviews.”269 Yet, Tuck and Yang take the position that “the anti-colonial project
doesn’t strive to undo colonialism but rather to remake it and subvert it.”270 Alternatively,
they consider decolonization as a deeper undoing of colonialism from the Indigenous
perspective, in which only a recovery of stolen land is the foundation of recovery for
Indigenous communities. Tuck and Yang claim that the
“postcolonial pursuit of resources is fundamentally an
anthropocentric model, as land, water, air, animals and plants are
never able to become postcolonial they remain objects to be
exploited by the empowered postcolonial subject.”271
For them, decolonization is more encompassing than anti-colonial struggles.
Glenn Coulthard also uses the language of decolonization to indicate a much
deeper framework for understanding the rejection of colonialism and the resurgence of
Indigenous epistemologies and practices. He agrees with the anti-colonialist Frantz
Fanon’s ideas of recognition as colonizing, but critiques it for not “understanding
contemporary Indigenous struggles for self-determination.”272 Land is not property
according to the Indigenous worldview, but is “deeply informed by what the land as
system of reciprocal relations and obligations can teach us about living our lives in
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relation to one another and the natural world in non-dominating and nonexploitative
terms…”273
Bonita Lawrence and Enakshi Dua write in their article Decolonizing Antiracism that Indigenous people are left out of both antiracial and postcolonial theory. They
cite five ways Indigenous people have been failed by these theories: by erasing Native
existence through silence; by ignoring that racism is occurring on Native lands; that
slavery is overrepresented in the colonial stories; that decolonization politics are the same
as antiracial politics; and by stressing theories of nationalism.274 This can be illustrated by
an example by Lawrence and Dua, that “the same week President Lincoln signed the
Emancipation Proclamation, he also approved the order for the largest mass hanging in
U.S. history, of 38 Dakota men accused of participating in an uprising in Minnesota.”275
Despite the language chosen, both an anti-colonial critique and a decolonizing
praxis are necessary for challenging the colonial-racial discourse in bioethics. Anticolonialism is a discourse and praxis that is simply opposed to colonialism.
Decolonization is a part of this larger narrative. Decolonization will be different for each
site of contact. In general, Blacks and Latinx in the U.S. have been more fully colonized
based on the specific nature of their colonization, from the violent and complete
severance of Africans from their lands and cultures, to the Spanish policies of
miscegenation. The unique nature of Native Americans in a settler-colonial state is that
273

Ibid., 13.

274

Bonita Lawrence and Enakshi Dua, “Decolonizing Antiracism,” Social Justice- San Francisco 32, no. 4
(2005).
275

Ibid., 130.

119

while policies and practices of erasure have been dominant, they have not been thorough
enough to completely expunge the Indigenous worldview. Tuck and Yang’s idea of
decolonization is one of returning land to Indigenous people, a very particular response to
a particular sort of ongoing colonization.
Contemporary Anti-Colonial Theory and Praxis
Anti-colonialism need not be relegated to the revolutionary period of
postcolonial politics, nor must it be exclusive of white Americans. Anti-colonialism can
be a multivalent approach including a resistance to white supremacy, a political praxis
adept at responding to material consequences of colonialism and global imperialism,
decolonizing practices, making whiteness276 visible and exposing racism, prioritizing the
knowledge and worldviews of people other than eurochristians, and a reclaiming of
traditions, stories, histories. Where postcolonialism has been accused of having a limited
276
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focus on the “politics of identity”, anti-colonialism is more responsive to political and
economic aspects of colonialism.277 Where postcolonialism is often driven by elite
academics and Western thought, anti-colonialism is based in the knowledge of the
racialized and oppressed. And this point is the crux of a modern anti-colonial praxis: it
must center the knowledge and experience of those outside the dominant center, those
who hold the double consciousness that only persons of color can hold—a perspective
enabling them to see the dominant discourse more clearly than those within and of the
eurochristian center. Thus, the re-imagining and re-existence of those who have long
been colonized, the reclaiming of traditions, stories, histories, cannot be directed by the
eurochristian center, and not by eurochristian bioethicists. Through anti-colonial theory
and praxis the bioethicist can participate in understanding the historical trajectory of
colonialism and the implications of race, consider the profound differences between a
eurochristian and other worldviews, and actively seek to center views other than the
dominant narrative. Only then does the possibility of what Arturo Escobar calls radical
interdependence make itself available.278
Anti-Colonial Theorists
The anti-colonial response to bioethics in this project draws heavily from
Miguel De La Torre, George Tinker, Leanne Betasamosake Simpson, and Sylvia Wynter
to elucidate the failures of, respectively, “Euro-American Truth,” “euro-christian
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worldview”, “the schema of Man”, and the settler-colonial state which includes
heteropatriarchy, white supremacy, and capitalist exploitation. First, these scholars’
approaches can elicit a profound disturbance for their colonized readers, an unsettling and
persistent cognitive dissonance. This is the alterity sought to provoke the thinking of my
bioethics and health care colleagues. Tinker’s juxtaposition of a eurochristian and a
Native American worldview is essential to this end: providing a radical alternative to the
eurochristian worldview brings it into full visibility, so that one can recognize one’s own
unconsciousness to Western societal power structures. Second, all of the aforementioned
scholars prioritize local praxis and identity, from which truth emanates. One of De La
Torre’s projects has been to define ethical paradigms from lo cotidiano of Latinx
communities para joder, or by “screwing with” the dominant structures.279 De La Torre
notes that
“truth, beyond the historical experiences and the social location
where individuals act as social agents, cannot be ascertained,
whether said truth exists or not. Only through justice-based praxis,
engaged in transforming society, can individuals come closer to
understanding the spiritual and theoretical.”280
With this conceptualization of the truth I aim to place a moratorium on the age-old debate
in ethics about universality vs relativism. With the bracketing of this debate, one can
begin to appreciate how people of color in the U.S. are heaving under the weight of the
universalization of morality.
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Both De La Torre and Tinker painstakingly deconstruct the dominant
eurochristian hegemony of white scholars and institutions. Among the methods De La
Torre employs, he necessarily attempts “to deconstruct Eurocentric ethical paradigms to
demonstrate why they are both detrimental to and irreconcilable with the Hispanic social
location.”281 This critique borrows his method of ethical critique of Euro-American
scholars “from the margins,” but my framework prioritizes liberation without analyzing
biblical foundations of my arguments. Both De La Torre and Tinker also heavily critique
Western Christianity. Yet, while De La Torre “wrestles with the Almighty”282 to clarify
the concept of liberation, Tinker writes that a genuine liberation for Native Americans
“may require a firm saying “no” to Jesus and Christianity.”283 The arguments herein, like
both De La Torre and Tinker, strongly emphasize the role that Christianity (as a
sociological adjectival category) continues to play in the colonial-racial discourse as part
of the eurochristian worldview. Ultimately, this analysis will engage the works of both
scholars generously and is a testament to the profundity of their teachings on my own
scholarship.
The third anti-colonial scholar I engage is Sylvia Wynter. Her essays on the
overrepresentation of Man as Human speak both to the deconstructive and contextual
analysis of colonialism in this dissertation, as well as providing a conceptual frame to
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open up consideration for new thought schemas. The “Second Emergence” to which
Wynter refers, points to a new transcultural reality, one that breaks down barriers
between the sciences and the humanities, and one in which a middle course can be found
on irreconcilable ethical issues,284 not least to dissolve what Howard Winant named the
racial “longue durée”.285
And last, Michi Saagiig Nishnaabeg scholar, writer, and artist Leanne
Betasamosake Simpson is a voice for radical Indigenous resistance through grounded
normativity, a land- and place-based ethic based on Nishnaabeg knowledge and
intellectual practices – the “how” in living, organizing, and engaging in the world.286 Her
work provides radically different conceptualizations of living, learning, being that
challenge the fundamental core of the assumed normativity of eurochristian thought and
morality.
Elements of Critique for Modern Eurochristian Colonial Institutions
An anti-colonial critique begins with the identification of eurochristian colonial
themes within modern institutions. Those themes fall under the headings of ontological
assumptions, moral epistemology, and the socio-political. These categories will be
engaged in the following three chapters in the deconstruction of bioethics scholars, and
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again to illustrate the often radically different worldviews of anti-colonial scholars. In
comparing these three categories it will hopefully become apparent the problems that
underlie the humanitarian language of multiculturalism and cultural pluralism; and the
truth in what Wynter calls sociogeny, the fundamental differences in our moralities and
realities based on the impact our stories have on the neurochemical make-up of our
brains.
Much of one’s worldview emanates from one’s ontological positioning
including one’s creation story, the knowledge of what exists and how it is ordered, and
the metaphysical components of one’s worldview. For the eurochristian despite one’s
personal belief, our thoughts and behaviors have been shaped by the binary of sinner and
saint rooted in the creation story of Adam and Eve, of a hierarchical organization of
living beings with humans at the zenith, and of an organizational schema prioritizing time
and linear progress, one that assumes human life is always progressing often due to some
attribution of human power and intervention. Whether one’s creation story is biblical or
scientific, eurochristian thinking is organized hierarchically, linearly, and temporally. The
ontological fallout of the eurochristian worldview is the erosion of relationship with
community and nature based on human and individual centrism. Linear thinking creates
an ideal of some kind of great progress, which is in reality gratifies a relatively select few
at the expense of the majority in the frantic pursuit of fame and the fantastical. The linear
idea of Christian salvation has led to both material pursuits and the evangelical meddling
in other’s lives (white savior complex) on earth for personal salvation in heaven.
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Moral epistemology as an element of analysis builds on one’s ontological
frameworks and attempts to describe the basis of knowledge, including moral knowledge.
Epistemologies can be sociological, psychological, ontological, evolutionary,
methodological, and moral in nature.287 Moral epistemology buttresses one’s values,
morality, sense of truth, and the content of collective knowledges. Knowledge is largely
driven in the modern West by a scientific objectivity, empiricism, and pragmatism which
is theorized and taught through formal and siloed disciplinary groups. Postmodernists are
skeptical of the notion of discovering the foundations of objective knowledge, and
similarly of the project of theory coherence as justifying moral truth. Anti-colonial
scholars and activists are similarly skeptical of Western epistemologies, those that
universalize, categorize, and “civilize” while hiding the logics of oppression and
exploitation. As Walter Mignolo writes, the rhetoric of modernity including
modernization, progress, and prosperity, hide the logic of oppression.288
These truths are communicated and legitimized through written text and the
English language. The eurochristian epistemology stems from both Christian and
Enlightenment concepts of morality including human dignity, hard work, self-sufficiency,
freedom, autonomy, and individualism. At face value, these precepts of morality appear
innocuous. But they are the tools of a civilizing rhetoric and practice that continue to
uphold eurochristian values at the expense of others through blame, demoralization,
287
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delegitimization; those with communal and egalitarian values as well as those who do not
have the luxury of acute “moral agency” because of violent and negligent structural
realities. In addition, the effects of civilizing rhetoric create a legacy of historical trauma
and the internalization of self-hatred in those deemed of lesser value based on the high
bar of rationality, intelligence, high culture, and overall “achievement”.
Socio-political themes of analysis draw upon how a community organizes, how
community members relate to one another, and what forms of order are used to protect
peaceful communities. The nation-state has been the unit of political power in the West
since the colonial nation-building project began. And while some would argue that global
forms of politics have replaced the centrality of the nation-state, the U.S. political system
is still central to politics and policy.289 In the West, democracy is the supposed organizing
ideal, however weak in practice. Security is established through police and military, and
formal law assists in guiding order. While the economic drivers of capitalism are not
hidden from view, Western political institutions are ensconced in concepts of justice,
equality, and security while continuing to sustain policies that support the interests of the
wealthy and powerful at the expense of the poor. The sociopolitical concepts of
recognition, reconciliation, inclusion and diversity hide policies that encourage continued
erasure, inequality, imprisonment, and discrimination. Economic themes of analysis
include one’s view of the material forms of life. For the eurochristian, material life is
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dictated by property ownership, the accumulation of resources, and of a capitalist and
competitive view of consumption. The reigning worldview of material life is one of
scarcity, driven by fear. Colonialism and imperialism are the benchmarks of eurochristian
economics, built upon a history of conquest, land theft, resource extraction, and military
strategy and now expressing themselves through globalization, multinational
corporations, and financial markets. Massive wealth accumulation is driven by a deepseated Calvinist Protestant work ethic and the neoliberal capitalist culture. And finally,
the U.S. maintains a massive and expensive military in order to protect its material and
financial interests worldwide.290 Capitalism inherently creates inequality, and the
eurochristian salve to that inequality is charity, which creates a continued dependence
and inequality rather than structural justice.
In the analysis that follows, these three elements of eurochristian colonial
thought will be used to excavate colonial-racial themes within three textbooks that are
foundational to the discipline of bioethics. The coloniality of bioethics will be rendered
more visible. These same three elements of analysis will also be applied to the works of
anti-colonial scholars for contrast. And ultimately three bioethics case studies will be
employed to illustrate the effects a continued colonialism has on the discipline of
bioethics.
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CHAPTER 4: A WHITE GOD VS A LATINX JESUS
Of the estimated 10.7 million undocumented immigrants who live in the United
States,291 approximately 6,500 have end-stage renal disease (ESRD).292 ESRD is the latestage chronic failure of the kidneys, which is caused by conditions such as diabetes, high
blood pressure, infection, or auto-immune disease. In ESRD, the kidneys are no longer
able to function, causing a build-up of waste and fluid in the body. The standard
treatment for this disease is either thrice-weekly dialysis or kidney transplantation. Many
states in the U.S. only provide emergency dialysis in the emergency department of a
hospital once the patient is physically distressed and is approaching dangerous blood
levels of electrolytes that can cause cardiac arrythmias and arrest. A few states such as
California have decided to cover thrice-weekly dialysis and transplantation based on the
standard of care through Medi-Cal. But many states only provide suboptimal and costly
emergency care to undocumented immigrants with ESRD. On the national level,
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undocumented immigrants are excluded from the Affordable Care Act, the 1972
Medicare ESRD entitlement program, and the full Medicaid program.293
These patients are yo-yoing between death and resuscitation on a weekly basis,
being turned away from medical facilities if they are not close enough to death. Care
providers are required by state policy and hospital administration to withhold treatment
until they have elevated potassium levels, poor oxygenation due to fluid build-up in the
lungs, confusion, nausea and vomiting, and/or severe shortness of breath. Some hospitals
have attempted to send patients to their country of origin, despite the lack of treatment
availability in many of those countries, and even though the patient has lived and worked
in the U.S. for decades and has no familial support in their country of origin. For
healthcare providers and bioethicists, the issue is one of resource distribution, fairness,
and compassion. The decisions to exclude this population of patients from the standard of
care is one that stems from the political climate of a eurochristian United States. Both the
libertarian and Christian perspectives of bioethicists like Tristram Engelhardt exemplify
the eurochristian worldview, and, I will argue, affect the lives of marginalized
populations such as Latinx and other undocumented immigrants. An anti-colonial ethics
such as De La Torre’s would provide bioethics with a more just and decentered praxis.
H. Tristram Engelhardt
H. Tristram Engelhardt was trained in philosophy at the University of Texas,
and in 1974 was in the first group of philosophers, along with Tom Beauchamp who will
appear later in the dissertation, who met at a seminar at Haverford College in
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Pennsylvania to prepare philosophy faculty to teach courses in medical ethics. s In the
mid-1970s Engelhardt and Beauchamp were part of the National Commission for the
Protection of Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research who wrote the Belmont
Report, the guidelines for human subjects research.294 Later, Engelhardt attended medical
school at Tulane but never practiced medicine. Instead, he was recruited to join the
faculty at Texas Medical Branch Galveston to teach ethics to medical students, took a
Chair position at Georgetown in 1977, then joined the Program in Medical Humanities at
Houston’s Rice University in 1983.295 Over the course of his career he published six
books, edited and co-edited 25 books, and published over 300 articles and book
chapters.296 He died of cancer in 2018 while holding the positions of Professor of History
and Philosophy of Medicine at Rice University and Professor Emeritus at Baylor College
of Medicine. He was the co-founder, and from 1976 to 2018 the Senior Editor, of the
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy. The December 2018 issue was dedicated to
Engelhardt.297 He was remembered by Ana Iltis and Mark Cherry as “one of the
intellectual founders of the disciplines that would become known as bioethics and the
philosophy of medicine.”298 He was also the senior editor of the journal Christian
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Bioethics, and the editor of the book series Philosophy and Medicine. The Center for
Bioethics and Human Dignity said of Engelhardt after his recent death,
“Through his keen intellectual wit, he was an academic
provocateur par excellence, challenging the status quo, but also
challenging all of us, to test the rigor of our arguments and
assumptions.299 His readiness (and even eagerness) to challenge
the assumptions and claims of the bioethics academy and those
closer to home in Christian bioethics will be genuinely missed.”300
Engelhardt is known by some as the “enfant terrible” of bioethics due to his
irreverent and provocative thinking.301 He is known best for his critique of secular
bioethics, arguing that at best, secular bioethics could aspire to a superficial
libertarianism but never a content-full or complete morality. Interested in questions of
irresolvable moral plurality302, he theorized that bioethics can only be successful at the
procedural and content-thin realm, not at the levels of particular values and beliefs. For
Engelhardt, the loss of God and the deprofessionalization of medicine created a moral
vacuum of which secular values filled, one in which moral decisions can only be formed
through consent and permission between parties. While he is known for his libertarian
stance regarding moral plurality, in a later-career text The Foundations of Christian
Bioethics, he proposes a coherent and content-full model of morality that aims to
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transcend moral plurality through first millennium Orthodox Christianity. In this text he
argues that American morality and therefore bioethics centers human life solely within
the immanent and the rational, erroneously rejecting the metaphysical. He claims that
traditional Christianity is the one Truth that is unique, original, and unaltered, rooting
moral behaviors within one’s recognition of sin and salvation, ultimately based on the
primary goal of human life: salvation.303
Engelhardt puts forth several overarching critiques including 1) bioethics (and
the American ethos) has become an enduring and pervasive secularism which he
conflates with capitalism, 2) rational argument is not sufficient to solve moral dilemmas,
3) moral consensus can only be procedural in nature within the context of a universal
secular ethics,304 4) secular bioethics is its own “particular” that relegates certain groups
to the margins despite its claim of pluralism (including non-ecumenical religious
affiliations), and 5) Christian noetics, also shunned by secularism, should be prioritized in
moral medical decision-making. In these themes anti-colonial scholars might agree inpart, especially about the problem with the universalization of the secular-scientificcapitalist epistemologies in eurochristian thinking and the rejection of alternative
worldviews and beliefs. The similarities fade on further examination of Engelhardt’s
work. What he critiques as secularism is actually the eurochristian worldview, of which
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his thinking is a part. His polemic in the culture war is the “Christian” of eurochristian,
even as he rejects modern “secular” Christianity in favor of a first millennial orthodox
Christianity. In this chapter, Engelhardt’s The Foundations of Christian Bioethics will be
critiqued by juxtaposing the anti-colonial and liberative works of Miguel De La Torre.
The implications of theories such as Engelhardt’s on racial inequalities will be
highlighted through the current issue of providing care to Latinx undocumented
immigrants in the U.S. for ESRD.
Miguel De La Torre: An Anti-Colonial Approach
If there was ever an anti-colonial scholar who could speak back to the irreverent
Tristram Engelhardt, it would be the equally irreverent Miguel De La Torre. De La Torre
is a Cuban-American scholar-activist of social ethics and professor of religion at Iliff
School of Theology in Denver, Colorado. He evangelizes from the Baptist pulpit but with
a postmodern tongue in defense of those who are marginalized by what he calls
EuroAmerican Christian structures. He has published more than 35 books and countless
articles. He has served as a director for both the Society of Christian Ethics (SCE) and the
American Academy of Religion (AAR), President of SCE, and co-chair of the Ethics
Section at AAR. He is the recipient of a Fulbright scholarship, and has taught courses
worldwide. He serves regularly as an expert commentator on ethical issues locally,
nationally, and internationally.305
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De La Torre is both a liberation ethicist and a post-modernist. Liberation
theology is a modern phenomenon replete with paternalism and hierarchy and based in
the eurochristian biblical history of the Exodus, which De La Torre resists.306 Liberation
theology never rose above its modern and oppressive roots as a romanticized Western
Christian narrative, without separating itself from the continued oppression of the
marginalized. But the liberationist philosophy of “the preferential option for the poor”,
and its political moves to free the oppressed are foundational to De La Torre’s Latinx
liberation ethics. His religious relativism deviates from a eurochristian universalizing
religion and ethics that claims to speak for everyone. He is fully Nepantla, fluidly moving
between his identity as a Cuban and an American, owing his religious upbringing to a
hybridity of Santeria, Catholicism, and the Baptist faith.
For De La Torre’s ethics he turns to the people, those at the margins who are
politically, economically, and epistemologically oppressed. Especially for Latinx, he
encourages individuals and their communities to define their own religions and ethics.
While there is no monolithic group, Latinx often drawn together en la lucha, through the
realities of their everyday lives en lo cotidiano, and together en acompañado.307 De La
Torre rejects both the promise of the poor for salvation and the idea of hope as placating
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instruments used by the dominant white Christian narrative. Only once the marginalized
embrace hopelessness and feel they have nothing to lose will they feel free to engage in
resistance.308 In his book Latina/o Ethics he defines his ethics of joder, an ethics that can
be used by the marginalized to undermine, or “screw with”, the oppressive systems of
ethics and religion without being sanctioned or punished. Power can be too dangerous to
confront outright. In his latest book, a manifesto titled Burying White Privilege:
Resurrecting a Badass Christianity, De La Torre defines a new Christianity in the face of
the current state of fascism and religious hypocrisy ushered in by Trump, but by no
means limited to him. The oppressive colonial regimes that continue today leave the
marginalized “no other choice but to envision new paradigms for marginalized
communities, paradigms rooted within their context.”309
At first glance, some similarities between the two scholars seem to exist. Both
Engelhardt and De La Torre critique Western Christianity. For Engelhardt, modern
Western Christianity has become secular and liberal, ceding to materialism and selfinterest. For De La Torre, Western Christianity has become nationalist and political, a
tool to advance special interests.310 Both scholars have a history of “being saved” by the
Church. For Engelhardt this meant embracing the personal and transcendental union with
God and the adoption of conservative values attributed to the story of Eden—patriarchy,
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order, homophobia, salvation. For Engelhardt, belief trumps behavior. For De La Torre,
orthopraxis (correct action) takes precedence over orthodoxy (correct belief).311 He
writes, “believing in Jesus is never sufficient, for even the demons believe and tremble at
his name.”312 De La Torre’s Christianity moved him toward the biblical and theological
liberative Jesus, expressed through Christ-like value of justice for the marginalized. For
De La Torre, Jesus is anti-colonial. Salvation for Engelhardt is through personal union
with God and is deeply rooted in the Christian creation story; for De La Torre it is
through solidarity with the marginalized and rooted in the teachings of Jesus.313 To be
saved, De La Torre reminds us, “is etymologically to be liberated from sin, in other
words, the forces (individual and corporate) that bring oppression, enslavement, and
death.”314 Any common ground falls out from underneath Engelhardt’s feet with De La
Torre’s assertion that white Christians, especially evangelicals, are killing the gospel of
Christ, “with evangelicals supplying the morphine drip.”315 Ultimately Engelhardt
mistakes fundamentalists as the carriers of the truth, and the “heretics” of a post-Christian
culture. Instead one could argue fundamentalists are remnants of Christian colonial
apparatus, insiders on the fringes of the inside, thinking they are martyrs but mistaken of
the true victims. The true victims are those who are under the power of eurochristians. As
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Miguel De La Torre writes, “the privileged gaslight others into believing they are being
persecuted by the secular government and the liberal media.”316
For the discipline of bioethics to begin to address race seriously, the teaching of
anti-colonial scholars such as De La Torre are imperative. Otherwise, the dominant
discourses will continue to inculcate bioethics with the eurochristian, and by their nature
hierarchical, universalized, and racialized policies and practices, despite our best
intentions. The following critique analyzes in turn three dimensions of analysis: ontology,
epistemology, and the sociopolitical. The critique is two-fold: to illustrate the
eurochristian nature of Engelhardt’s philosophical and religious approach to bioethics and
to provide a Christian anti-colonial response based on the Latinx ethics scholarship of De
La Torre. We must keep in mind the importance of Latinx knowledge and scholarship in
a United States where the population is approximately 18% Latinx as of 2017 and
growing (not counting over 11 million undocumented immigrants and the population of
Puerto Rico).317 And finally, the critique will be applied to the current situation for those
undocumented immigrants in the U.S. who are being denied standard of care for endstage renal disease.
Engelhardt’s Ontological Assumptions: Transcendence, Eden, and Sin
The ontological basis of morality in The Foundations of Christian Bioethics is
transcendence of the immanent through union with God as the ultimate human endeavor.
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The biblical story of Eden is central to Engelhardt’s traditional Christian ethics in that “it
leads from Adam and Eve’s sin to the birth of the second Adam, Christ from the second
Eve, Mary.”318 Morality in life is secondary to the pursuit of salvation; all human
activities must lead to union with God. In Foundations, the ontological assumptions
come, in every sense, from a colonized mind: a Christian Church prioritizing one’s
personal relationship with God over human life: the story of Eden as bedrock for
justifying the hierarchy of male over female and Man over nature, the linear narrative of
salvation as the natural order of things, and the trope of the sinner who must suffer in the
quest for redemption; and the setting of moral rules for humanity as secondary to the
above.
First, the transcendent nature of the Orthodox Christian God who can be
experienced by humans is the primary ontological assumption which underlies
Foundations. The puzzle he sets out to address is “Can one break through immanence to
Truth?”319 He believes bioethics and all of secular society is stuck in an empirical world
based on human reason with no personal God who is other-worldly and authoritative.
Without transcendence in religion, humans are trapped in the failed project of
Enlightenment and reason. The end in itself is union with God over and above the moral
life, virtue, or scripture. How to access union with God? He writes, “The existence of
God is experienced as one turns from oneself, wholeheartedly to Him.”320 The Church
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itself, dating back to the first millennium, provides what he calls a metaphysical
“continuity of spirit” that ties all Orthodox Christians in community.321 In essence, he
calls for a bioethics based in the personal pursuit of relationship with a transcendent God.
And yet, his nostalgic and “heretical” ideas of noesis and mysticism does not take him
out of the hierarchical, linear, and binary ways of arranging human thought that have
driven racism throughout Western history. This will be revisited in the next section. The
remaining three ontological assumptions are grounded in the biblical story of Eden.
Second, Engelhardt justifies several major ontological assumptions of his thesis
by grounding his ethics within the Genesis story of Eden. Hierarchy, an entrenched
eurochristian paradigm, is a clear result of Eve’s sin and the tempting of Adam. Eve’s act
serves an indication that Man is to be the authority over her, hence man is the head of a
household, and Eve is the “helpmate” For Engelhardt, this justifies the hierarchy of
authority of male husbands, bishops, and priests. One of his grievances of liberal
cosmopolitans is their lack of respect for authority of “bishops over churches, husbands
over wives” in the ascetic pursuit of salvation.322 This thinking is consistent with his
concern that the individualistic and egalitarian bent of secular medicine has replaced a
professional and autonomous physician practice and has removed the authority of
physicians (read paternalism). He laments that secularism “abandons all hierarchies, not
just those of kings over their subjects, imperial powers over their colonies, and men over
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women, but also of humans over animals.”323 While this is Engelhardt’s concern, I would
argue that hierarchical structures do exist within the secular-scientific world as well,
although of a different nature. For example, ontological Christian linear hierarchical and
patriarchal thinking runs through the secular-scientific world in the form of Darwinism,
eugenics, and the justification of race as a ranking category.
Third, and also stemming from the story of the Fall, is the belief that humans
will eventually reach salvation through a personal relationship with God. This belief
follows the pattern of linearity, one that underlies most of eurochristian worldview:
Christian salvation, Darwinism, scientific progress, and the thought that humans are
somehow on a trajectory towards advancement, perfection, or everlasting life. This linear
thinking provides a semblance of order to eurochristian thinking. Order is of utmost
importance in colonial thinking, despite injustices. The need to maintain civility and
stability is a common eurochristian trope, despite those who suffer injustices within the
dominant order. For Engelhardt, ethics is the unchanging nature of the Church, of the
stability and “certainty” of the early teachings and of the experience of God. This kind of
order is misleading and often harmful. The “order” of colonialism, whether called
salvation or progress, has been a smoke screen that hides the underside of “good” laws
and actions in the civilization of sub-humans and the saving of their souls. The
unfortunate consequences of this worldview have played out through centuries of
European colonialism, and more locally through manifest destiny, the westward
expansion of Indian genocide and land theft, and the enslavement and abuse of Africans
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in the name of progress. Modern racism is a continuation of this same narrative.
Engelhardt does critique progress in the form of capitalism, yet he is blind to the nature
of his own form of Christian thinking as having influenced this very mindset.
Furthermore, the prioritization of salvation and promise of some future good does
nothing to address the suffering of real people, often at the expense of those preaching
salvation.
And fourth, the story of Eden drives Engelhardt’s morality in its depiction of the
human as sinner in need of redemption. Humans are corrupt and must pay for their sins
through suffering and death. Engelhardt describes the condition of Adam after the Fall
where “This sphere of lust, greed, and aggression becomes for him the self-evident
sphere of the natural.”324 In the practice of bioethics he places significance on sin and
redemption, devils and angels, immanence and transcendence. This ultimately serves to
blame the victims. Those who have been oppressed, those suffering the most, must be
repenting for their sins.
In Engelhardt’s ontological world, the lives of those suffering from inadequate
care of their ESRD are downplayed as mere immanence, unimportant worldly needs in
relation to the promise of salvation awaiting in the afterlife. They should not concern
themselves with medical technologies, as medicine has become a false God, and instead
turn towards union with Engelhardt’s God. We must remind ourselves; this is
Engelhardt’s ontology, not necessarily that of Latinx persons in the U.S. The Orthodox
Christian Church has remained stable and unchanged over the last two millennia, and for
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Engelhardt provides the order needed in society. This order resembles the universalizing
and civilizing tactics of the colonial missionaries, who must save the heathens from
themselves. Much like his Texan colleague Stanley Hauerwas, Engelhardt puts the
Church first, and situates it outside the purview of social justice.325 Situating the Church
in the realm of transcendence puts critical distance between one’s life of the mind and the
real suffering of those who are oppressed and racialized. In fact, Engelhardt doesn’t
address the issue of race directly, which is also problematic for an ethicist. To assume a
colorblind stance and never acknowledge the differences in social locations and beliefs is
to continue to colonial assault on people of color in an attempt to convert and save their
souls. The missionaries in what is now California had no qualms in imprisoning the
Indigenous people in encomiendas, using them as slave labor, and watching them die
early deaths, as long as they were able to add them to their list of souls saved. And
finally, with Engelhardt’s association of suffering with sin, in effect those Latinx persons
suffering a treatable disease as well as the violence and poverty they have endured, might
just be an indication of their sins and the need for repentance.
An Anti-Colonial Response: Christ, Chaos, and Liberation
An anti-colonial alternative to Engelhardt’s eurochristian approach starts with a
very different ontology. Miguel De La Torre’s ethics is centered around the immanent
life of Jesus as a representative of the marginalized and advocate of justice. Engelhardt’s
ontological preference for a personal and transcendental savior dismisses the very life of
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Christ himself, focusing only on his death. For Engelhardt, Christians can repent in
isolation, while continuing to feed the engine of epistemological and material dominance
in their lived existence and granting hope for the oppressed in death. De La Torre’s ethics
is not rooted in the universal, neither in the Christian nor secular sense. Such universal
narratives are used by the dominant eurochristian culture to dictate the rules and maintain
power. His argument is that “Eurocentric ethical theory maintains that universal moral
norms can be achieved independent of place, time, or people group.”326 Although De La
Torre recognizes, like the libertarian Engelhardt, there are different ethical paradigms
emanating from various milieus, he is also not a moral relativist. His problematizing of
the universal lies in the claiming of the white eurochristian milieu to universality over all
others. The white eurochristian dominance allows for the continued marginalization of
non-eurochristian people and their ethical paradigms. De La Torre’s ontological norm is
the historical Jesus and not a universal and transcendent truth. He writes, “Truth, beyond
the historical experiences and the social location where individuals act as social agents
cannot be ascertained, whether said truth exists or not.”327 A better ethics, for De La
Torre, is to liberate dominant moral reality, for both the oppressed and oppressor through
the preferential option for poor and led by the marginalized. In doing so De La Torre’s
ethics aligns with gospel of John who wrote that Christ “came that they may have life,
and may have it abundantly.”328
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Second, rather than embrace Engelhardt’s authoritarian and paternalistic version
of Christian ethics, one that places male fathers and pastors in positions of power, De La
Torre centers “the least of these.”329 His Christian ethics emanates from those located on
the margins instead of a white male God at the authoritative head.330 Latinx Christians,
and all marginalized Christians, read the bible from their own social locations, not from
the white heterosexual male perspective. Hispanics, specifically, “are a diverse and
growing minority group that constructs its religious perspectives from locations of
imposed marginality and disenfranchisement.”331 The paternalism of Engelhardt’s
Christianity rejects homosexuality and demotes women to handmaidens in the spirit of
claiming and attaining some higher status with God. In contrast, De La Torre writes,
“Despite the hours they spend on bended knees seeking God’s face, they fall into the
same mortal sin as their spiritual ancestors in Salem who hung independent-thinking
women for witchcraft.”332 The liberation from this kind of thinking is freedom from what
the feminist bell hooks calls the imperialist white-supremacist capitalist patriarchy.333
In contrast to Engelhardt’s linear salvation narrative that puts mankind on an
upward trajectory toward union with God, De La Torre considers this linear narrative as a
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misguided part of the eurochristian worldview. Both theological and economic paradigms
(salvation and capitalism) are wrapped up in this notion of linear progression. For De La
Torre and other anti-colonialists, time is disjointed—there is no upward progression. He
claims there is no certainty the world is moving in a positive direction, but for the
wealthy who continue to get wealthier. He notes we are only a Supreme Court decision
away from increased inequality and could face a backward slide toward Jim and Jane
Crow by events such as the election of Trump.334 In contrast to Engelhardt’s need for the
stability and unchanging order of the Church, De La Torre’s ethics is chaotic and
revolutionary. In order to bring justice to the marginalized, the dominant order must be
challenged and disrupted. Civil disobedience should be a part of a liberative ethic, from
the position of the trickster who practices what De La Torre calls para joder: to screw
with.335 The marginalized, who “stand before the vastness of neoliberalism with little
hope for radical change in their lifetimes, have few ethical alternatives.” Through
jodiendo the trickster, occupying the liminal position, can call out the oppressor’s greed,
power, and privilege, and make the repugnant traits of eurochristian thought obvious.
Engelhardt writes of Orthodox Christianity that it is the Truth, a content-full ethics that
can answer all ethical questions. De La Torre acknowledges ambiguity in the good and
evil binary, and cautions against the allure of “Eurocentric Christianity with its simplistic
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solutions for life’s complexities.”336 For the marginalized, salvation resides in the chaos,
ambiguity, and the liminal spaces around eurochristian ontological assumptions, not in
the acceptance of suffering in this life for the promise of an afterlife.
And fourth, the ontological triad of Satan, sin, and suffering are very different
between Engelhardt and De La Torre. For Engelhardt, Satan lured the first humans to sin,
setting them up for human suffering in earthly life. The sinner, all of humanity, is in need
of the redemption from the Orthodox Christian God. For De La Torre, it is the white
Jesus who is satanic, the one that “masquerades as servants of righteousness” while
turning a blind eye to human injustice and suffering.337 De La Torre notes, “Hispanics
should always be concerned when EuroAmerican ethicists tell them why their suffering,
often caused by EuroAmericans in the first place, makes them better saved Christians.”338
De La Torre’s trickster-based ethics also disrupts the binaries of good/evil, saint/sinner,
God/Satan. Through the breaking all of the rules, the trickster disrupts what the dominant
society defines as good and evil, and exposes the hypocrisies of dominant assumptions.339
For instance, the virtue of “hope seems to be mainly claimed by those with economic
privilege as a means of distancing themselves from the unsolvable disenfranchisement
most of the world’s wretched are forced to face.”340
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Living within De La Torre’s ontology, the “undocumented” persons who are
sick are walking with the Latinx Jesus, one who is concerned with justice and suffering.
Their beliefs are theirs, from their own social location, not the coerced beliefs of the
Orthodox Church. A bioethics that is responsive to their suffering is willing to push the
system’s limits, para joder, to challenge the current order and bend the scales towards
justice so that they can live life abundantly.
Engelhardt’s Moral Epistemology: Liturgy, Conscience, Coherence
The epistemology of Engelhardt’s traditional Christianity, and therefore his
bioethics, centers on the liturgy and one’s relationship to God. The foundations of
knowledge, how one knows truth, are framed in terms of the liturgy, not in discursive
reason. He frames the epistemology of a Christian bioethics through seven elements:
1) one’s heart, 2) a liturgical eucharistic assembly, 3) a liturgy that comes before
scripture, 4) a hierarchical assembly with bishops at the top to maintain integrity; 5) a
synodal or conciliar unity of bishops and people, 6) a Spirit-established office of prophets
or elders who intimately know God and His word, and 7) a theology that is not academic
but an expression of an intimate relationship with God.341 Moral rules for Engelhardt, are
only secondary to one’s pursuit of union with God. He writes,
“Moral principles are at best chapter headings and rules of thumb.
Too much attention to general principles can even divert attention
from the personal character of the communion with God to which
all theology and all bioethics should lead...Murder and abortion are
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wrong first and foremost because they lead us away from union
with God.”342
As he explains sexual moral guidelines, all sex and procreative acts are moral if
the acts “are relocated within the mutual love of husband and wife in their companionship
in loving God.”343 In other words, homosexuality, sex outside of marriage
(“fornication”), polygamy, and many forms of artificial reproduction are all outside the
marriage bed, the pairing of a man and woman within the Church and leading to holiness.
Moral guidelines, for Engelhardt, do not carry the weight of authority outside of pursuit
of Godly union. Moral decisions ultimately are made through worship and the
hierarchical assembly of one’s Church.
Second, Engelhardt’s Christian bioethics epistemology is traditional (as
opposed to post-modern) in the sense that he asserts the existence of an objective truth
and reality as transmitted through a source of knowledge, for him a transcendent God. He
argues for what he calls “a content-full ethics among moral friends that reconciles the
right and the good, universals and particulars, provides motivation to be moral, and
justifies the content of morality.”344 In other words, Orthodox Christianity can answer all
moral questions arising within the medical context. It is his wish for a grand narrative.
For Engelhardt, the post-modern represents the fracturing of Christianity and the failure
of the Enlightenment’s ability to define a universal and coherent morality. In his words,
“The babble of post-modernity besets us not simply as a de facto socio-historical
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catastrophe, but as an epistemological condition from which secular moral reason cannot
liberate us.”345 He strives for coherence in his model despite the discrediting of discursive
rationality and the recognition of transcendent experience as foundational to knowing
truth. Engelhardt uses the epistemic tools of coherentism and foundationalism (God is
self-evident) to philosophically avoid the problem of infinite regress. And yet, his
Christianity is steeped in the eurochristian worldview, not outside of it. While
recognizing the plurality of beliefs, religions, and moralities in the spirit of libertarianism,
he promotes his ahistorical Christian God and accompanying way of life, calling on
Christian physicians to evangelize and peacefully condemn others to conform. The
Church, for him, “has the marks of universality, antiquity, and consent.”346 He is matterof-fact that “fundamentalists are not open to negotiation,” and are “moralistic,
condemnatory, and divisive on fundamental matters.”347 And yet, Engelhardt rails against
the universalism of liberal cosmopolitanism, noting its “bond to humanity as a whole is
stronger than bonds to family, race, religion, culture, or citizenship.”348 The anti-colonial
scholar would agree, universalism of liberal ideal theories such as Immanuel Kant’s
transcendental rationality and Mill’s hedonistic utilitarianism are problematic. In their
universalizing they attempt to speak from an objective place of truth and to speak for all
persons and communities, ultimately defining their own epistemological positions and
hence solidifying their power and justifying the oppression of others to maintain that
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power. But Engelhardt’s resigned acceptance of a libertarian society does not hide his
own belief that his truth should be everyone’s truth. This quality of universalism is a
fundamental eurochristian colonial ontology shared by secular liberals and Orthodox
Christians alike.
Third, for Engelhardt, conscience is what allows morality and truth to be
known. He writes,
“conscience is the knowing with (i.e., conscire) that discloses
God’s law, not by learning, study, or deep analysis, but
spontaneously within us, from our nature through faith, ascesis,
and prayer. It is natural in giving us a knowledge we would have
had clearly, had there not been the Fall.”349
One’s conscience is strengthened by virtue, corrupted by passions, and mislead by
reason. And while he does not dismiss rational discourse altogether, moral content is
principally disclosed to the human heart by God. He writes, “Conscience is not just a
human faculty, but a point of union between Creator and creature.”350 But the belief that
an individual holds some kind of higher knowledge that is unavailable for outside
scrutiny is problematic. The nail in the coffin of the Christian conscience is its
partnership with evangelism. For Engelhardt, the physician is obligated to help patients
“make medical decisions conducive to salvation,” even if this involves lying, deceit,
manipulating proxy decision-maker choices, withholding medical options, and intrusion
into the lives of others.351 This type of eurochristian thinking allows the Orthodox
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Christian to justify one’s supremacy on a transcendent notion without crediting one’s
embeddedness within a sociocultural context or considering its impact on the lives of
others.
A bioethics under Engelhardt would be an evangelizing and moralizing one,
doling out the answers to all ethical issues based on the grand narrative of what
traditional Christians believe to be a coherent truth. There is a great hubris in assuming
one has a special relationship with God, and that one’s conscience and Church gives them
authority over others, which parallels the nationalistic American exceptionalism that runs
throughout eurochristian thought. This self-proclaimed authority is dangerous for Latinx
persons. It is judging, damning, and rigid in the face of the chaos that is real life for many
people. When a Latinx person, one who is labeled “undocumented” or “illegal,” shows up
at an emergency room, the journey that brought them to that moment is not singular or
simple. It isn’t because of their sins, it is not their lack of work ethic, it is not because
they are not Orthodox Christian. Often it is the political climate of their situation, one that
is embroiled with U.S. colonialism and its economic domination, the U.S. intervention in
politics in Latino countries, and the fleeing of poverty and violence, that ultimately brings
them to the dialysis center in San Diego, California or Denver, Colorado. Engelhardt’s
quest for order, coherence, and transcendence fail in the face of reality.
De La Torre’s Moral Epistemology: Orthopraxis, Post-Modernity, And Lo Cotidiano
In stark contrast to Engelhardt’s personal and liturgical ways of knowing
morality, De La Torre’s moral epistemology starts with the oppressed. His method is
cyclical and hermeneutical. The ways of knowing are many, so an ethics of the oppressed
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begins with observation of lo cotidiano of the marginalized, then proceeds through
reflection, prayer, action, reassessment, and back to observation.352 His moral
epistemology does not begin with a God-head or a grand theory, but in collaboration with
communities. In a eurochristian world, there is “no epistemological option for the
oppressed” without a deliberate centering of the margins. A double-consciousness makes
clear for those on the margins what is invisible to the eurochristian center.353 This reality
means people who must understand the cultures of two worlds, the eurochristian “center”
and their marginalized community, also have a broader and more realistic vantage point
to “see” the eurochristian worldview and its consequences over those who equate the
eurochristian worldview with the singular reality.
Second, against the backdrop of Engelhardt’s epistemological certainty, De La
Torre’s liberative approach is post-modern, rejecting a singular history, denouncing
neoliberalism, and “embracing hopelessness” for the powerless and disenfranchised.354
For him, hope is a middle-class privilege.355 The oppressed will not be liberated from the
neoliberal economic structures; there is no economic or political salvation. De La Torre’s

352

An ethics of lo cotidiano originates from daily life of a community rather than from grand theory. De La
Torre, Latina/O Social Ethics: Moving Beyond Eurocentric Moral Thinking, 70-72.
353

“It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one’s self through
the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and
pity. One ever feels his two-ness, –– an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled
strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn
asunder.” W. E. B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk, ed. Brent Hayes Edwards, Inc ebrary, and ProQuest
(Oxford [England] ; New York: Oxford England ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 8.
354

Hopelessness as desperation, not despair. Podcast: “Episode 37: A Latinx Perspective of God with
Miguel De La Torre” on Everybody is Talking About God. March 11, 2019.
355

De La Torre, Embracing Hopelessness, 5-6.

153

liberative ethics frees the oppressed from the false promises of hope of the messiah
complex and the illusion of defeating the eurochristian colonial apparatus.356 When the
truly oppressed have nothing to lose, they can aspire to radical change.357 Consistent with
post-modern thought, De La Torre is skeptical of claims of authority and universality.
Instead, his anti-colonial ethics follows a liberation theology grounded in the margins and
engaged in decolonization. For De La Torre, post-modern thought renders understanding
of oppressive social structures but does not make up a complete worldview – meaning,
some universal truths may be shared by all, although they are difficult to ascertain.358 De
La Torre recognizes that because deconstruction makes one suspicious of all
metanarratives, it can lead to the current sociopolitical situation where facts are dismissed
as fake, and everything is about agendas.359 But without some post-modern skepticism,
we are stuck in the quest for certainty in either reason or faith; which Mignolo points out,
there is no modernity without coloniality.360
And finally, to address conscience. It is unclear how one’s morality based on a
spontaneously arising truth in one’s heart from God is not colored by one’s biases and
social location. For De La Torre, social location is everything. Even among Latinx groups

356

A liberative approach to ethics, rooted in South American liberation theology from the 1960s, is
employed across race, gender, and ethnic communities in the U.S. through different religious perspectives,
and from the point of view of the powerless and disenfranchised.

357

De La Torre, Embracing Hopelessness.

358

Introducing Latino/a Theologies/Miguel A. De La Torre and Edwin David Aponte, 34.

359

Burying White Privilege: Resurrecting a Badass Christianity/Miguel A. De La Torre.

360

Mignolo, On Decoloniality: Concepts, Analytics, and Praxis/Walter D. Mignolo and Catherine E.
Walsh, 4.

154

“there exists no such thing as one unified or monolithic Latina/o theology.”361 Possessing
bias is unavoidable. Feminist epistemology is one that attempts to balance impartiality of
“truth” with the partiality favoring women and other oppressed groups. De La Torre
shares some of the feminist epistemology in his preferential option for the poor. In order
to understand when partiality is ethical, one must be able to separate good biases from
bad biases. We can, in fact, say that some personal biases are wrong, or at least suspect, if
one has personal gains involved, is fearful, angry, or desires to avoid penalties. Would
not the mere personal desire for eternal salvation or the fear of eternal damnation create
bias in a person’s ethics? Bias will also be present in growing up in a certain ontological
reality such as the Orthodox Church. Some feminists have argued the importance of
understanding how partiality can increase or decrease the chances of knowing the truth
when the truths in question concern the subordination of women to men (or any one
group to another.)362
A bioethics aligned with De La Torre’s work would start by talking to those
Latinx persons who experience the phenomenon in question, the disease, the symptoms,
the healthcare system. Bioethics would follow their lead, not try to define and dominate
the situation. This kind of bioethics would recognize its own biases, its personal gains,
risks, and privileges, and how that might be upholding the status quo. And it would
challenge the current structures in order to create movement towards radical change, not
361
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just assuage people’s suffering with promises of hope and salvation. A liberative and
anti-colonial bioethics would risk something, professional acceptance, financial
compensation, a luxurious life, failure, a job…in the service of justice.
Engelhardt’s Political and Economic Approaches to Bioethics: Rejecting Social Justice
Engelhardt’s work in bioethics has largely focused on understanding the
relationship between conflicting moralities in a globalized world. He spent much of his
career in bioethics trying to understand the intersections between plural and incompatible
bioethics and concluded no moral common ground for all moralities exists. Ultimately, he
rejects liberal cosmopolitanism, stomachs libertarianism as a better alternative to
liberalism, and argues for an Orthodox Christian bioethics, which he considers the ideal.
Germane to an anti-colonial analysis of Engelhardt’s bioethics is a distinction between
types of liberties. The words liberal, libertarian and liberation all share the same root of
liberty, or the quality or state of being free, according to the Merriam Webster dictionary.
The definition of liberty takes many forms: the power to do as one pleases, freedom from
physical restraint, freedom from arbitrary or despotic control, the positive enjoyment of
various social, political, or economic rights and privileges, the power of choice.363 The
type of freedom most relevant to political and economic liberals is the positive enjoyment
of various social, political, or economic rights and privileges. Libertarians prioritize
freedom as the power to do as one pleases with the fewest restraints on their lives. And
liberationists align most closely with freedom from physical restraint and freedom from

363

Merriam-Webster, s.v. “Liberty,” https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/liberty (accessed April
24, 2019).

156

arbitrary or despotic control. This distinction helps to provide context for Engelhardt’s
project in critiquing liberalism, framing libertarianism, and rejecting liberation.
First, Engelhardt rejects the liberal cosmopolitan approach to bioethics, both
secular and Christian, which for him are about self-fulfillment and determination in
pursuing one’s own projects rather than union with God, especially within consumer
culture. He defines the liberal cosmopolitan ethos as immanent, egalitarian, and welfarist,
critiquing it for its anti-Christian, anti-traditional, and anti-metaphysical ethos,
consumerist economy, and the inability to discover any deeper meaning in life beyond the
pursuit of liberty and equality.364 An anti-colonial practitioner would agree with some of
his critiques. Not unlike his perception of the marginalization of Christianity by
rationalism and secularism, so too are various other ontologies and epistemologies in the
U.S. such as Latinx, Native American, and Muslim-American marginalized by the
dominant narrative. The liberal idea of diversity is insincere; it only allows similar liberal
communities at the table, shunning conservative, sectarian, and metaphysical beliefs. And
while traditional Christianity is shunned by the liberal narrative, it is by the eurochristian
narrative that all other forms of marginalization happens, a eurochristian discourse that
includes Orthodox Christianity. Despite Engelhardt’s critiques of the secular, liberal,
cosmopolitan ethos as the enemy of traditional Christianity (and traditional Christianity
as the victim), both make up the two sides of the eurochristian coin. Traditional
Christianity harms others though judgment of values, defamation of identities, and
justification of oppression.
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An anti-colonial practitioner would also critique the capitalist consumer
economy, but unlike Engelhardt would not place the blame on liberal cosmopolitan
thinking as much as the underlying colonial schema of conquest and competition blessed
by 14th century Christendom. Engelhardt makes the mistake of conflating secularism and
capitalism. This capitalist thinking, mired in the ontology of linearity and progress, is
driven by the same type of thinking that drove the Popes in early Spain and Portugal to
sanctify the theft, genocide, and human abuses that was European colonialism, and later
the Calvinist work ethic and the Protestant adaption of accumulation of material goods as
a sign of God’s chosen.365 In addition, Engelhardt’s one true Christianity is supposed to
transcend the many factions created by splits in the Church, and within the eurochristian
framework this is true—his Orthodox Christianity differs from many modern ecumenical
churches. But it is similar in character to contemporary sectarian, fundamentalist, and
charismatic Christian groups. In sum, while Engelhardt engages in certain sociological
critiques of secular liberalism that a priori seem to share commonalities with anti-colonial
thinking, especially its marginalizing of non-liberal epistemologies and the capital
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economy, the similarities quickly disintegrate. What follows is an anti-colonial critique of
both the libertarian and Orthodox Christian forms of ethics, both of which fall into the
trappings of eurochristian thinking and ultimately have implications for those residing on
the margins of eurochristian society.
If a liberal cosmopolitan ethos is not the answer to moral pluralism, Engelhardt
concludes the only way to coexist is through a libertarian approach in which we must
tolerate the sometimes-repugnant values of others and reach consensus only through
permission (individual autonomy). In opposition to the many problems he cites with
liberal cosmopolitanism, Engelhardt turns to the libertarian approach as the better option
between the two, but preferring yet a third, a content-full Orthodox Christian bioethics.
As Engelhardt uses the term, libertarianism is both a moral freedom arranged on the basis
of agreement between moral strangers at the personal level, and a laissez-faire capitalism
that advocates for property rights at the societal level. Although he ultimately doesn’t
claim a libertarian bioethics as his own, this is his argument of the best possible solution
to the moral plurality problem. When addressing social inequalities, he cites their causes
as either the natural lottery (the outcomes of natural forces such as illness, trauma, or
disability) 366, or the social lottery (the outcomes of the choices of individuals and
society) which he calls “being born rich.”367 He categorizes both causes as unfortunate,
but not unfair.368 He talks about social lottery, that society is not responsible for bad
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things that happen to people. Those “injured by others” are not owed restitution by
society. “One will need an argument dependent on fairness to show others should submit
to forceable redistribution of their resources to provide HC to those injured by others”369
This argument lies on the premise that private property is sacred to the libertarian, and
may not be redistributed without the property owner’s permission. In effect, secular
moral authority doesn’t allow for taking of others things or “coercively restricting
peaceable private choice.”370 Thus, only resources held in common such as taxes can be
redistributed to those who have lost the natural and/or social lotteries.371 And so too,
those who lost the social lottery will also be without health care. Libertarianism is about
the individual’s freedom to own and control one’s property, not about liberating those
who have been marginalized. In a libertarian world, individuals have the authority to “use
their own resources in ways that collide with fashionable understanding of justice.”372
Engelhardt’s libertarian type of freedom doesn’t consider the health of impoverished—it
is freedom of property owners. What he doesn’t consider as a part of the libertarian
calculation is when the injury is done by societal structures, not solely by individuals.
Like Nozick, Engelhardt’s starting place for healthcare allocation is with the current
unequal distribution of resources secured by coercive and exploitative means and the
natural and social lotteries. Rawls: ahistorical, ideal, everyone starts equal. EQUALITY. Limits people’s
self-determination, moral community, care for each other/goals based. Freedom is but one value. Authority
is democratic state. Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement/John Rawls; Edited by Erin Kelly.
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requirement for permission to access other’s private resources.373 This he calls the
principle of Healthcare Allocation.374
Engelhardt’s discussions of libertarianism and private property lend themselves
easily to anti-colonial critique. To give one’s permission in an exchange requires a noncoercive relationship. If one is oppressed, can one be free to make unencumbered
decisions? If a physician or healthcare institution retains a preponderance of power over
patients (which is known), how can one secure healthcare according to one’s values free
of the conscription of the systemic eurochristian biases? What recourse does the
marginalized patient have in a libertarian society where permission is the only protection
for humanity? Engelhardt says little that deals with the roles of power and politics in
oppression or the historical injustices that have created the massive inequalities in the
lives and health of people of color. Liberty is more than the procedural justice of the
courts to protect the excesses in private property that continue to grow unchecked, the
freedom of individuals to accumulate as much wealth as possible despite consequences
for society. Justice is about acknowledging the fact that the majority of the wealthy in the
West have become rich through the violent slave labor of Africans, the stealing of the
territories of Native Americans, and the seizure of vital natural resources of the
Mexicans, which is now considered the southwestern U.S. The categorization of this type
of exploitation is not merely unfortunate, but is highly unfair. If, as Engelhardt states, the
unfair “constitutes a claim on the resources of others” depending on where one draws the
373
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line between unfortunate and unfair, the eurochristian colonial and postcolonial injustices
endured by racialized people for five centuries would surely meet the criteria for
unfair.375 Winning the natural or social lottery or the privilege of “being born rich” does
not constitute a fair playing field where persons can compete in the marketplace and
make “free” decisions uncoerced by the lack of basic material needs, political power or
social capital. In light of the anti-colonial perspective, it is clear that people of color
continue to have a claim on Western society and medical systems for the redistribution of
resources, even the private property of some, based on fairness and restitution. And yet,
the libertarian view is incompatible with this assertion because it prioritizes the
unapologetic freedom of wealth accumulation without interference by others despite any
unfortune or unfairness. Fairness for a libertarian is a game of competition rather than
cooperation, individual insatiability over caring for community. The libertarian approach
to bioethics gives the system the ability to exploit others based on a short-sided and onesided definition of freedom, the freedom to be left alone to do as one pleases.
A libertarian bioethics cannot be responsive to the injustices and unfairness
done to Latinx patients whose fates have been tied to Western society.376 A libertarian
bioethics would not acknowledge the violent history that has created massive wealth
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inequalities, but would only look at the present, where people’s private property is
unquestionably theirs to keep or to give away as they please. For Latinx patients, they are
at the whim of the “permission” of property owners, and without the charity they merely
lost the social lottery for not being born rich and do not get standard healthcare. In fact,
under Engelhardt’s libertarian schema, justice is merely a “fashionable” liberal notion,
and to consider changing structures to benefit people’s lives are simply trends.377
Engelhardt acknowledges problems with the libertarian approach, including the
requirement that one must suffer “many choices that they recognize as grievously wrong”
in the pluralistic project of peaceable libertarian co-existence.378 For Engelhardt
toleration for the Orthodox Christian refers to arrangements such as abortion, physicianassisted suicide, homosexuality, and euthanasia. As he would have it, Orthodox
Christianity would be the dominant bioethics, but acknowledging this unlikely event, he
would choose to preserve its practice within a libertarian framework acknowledging that
Orthodox Christianity can co-exist within a libertarian approach, but not with liberal
bioethics.379 It is in The Foundations of Christian Bioethics where he expands on his
personal approach to bioethics, one of first millennial Orthodox Christianity.
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To understand Engelhardt’s Christian bioethics is to ask as he does in The
Foundations of Christian Bioethics, “Can one break through immanence to Truth?”380
Transcending immanence is his project for bioethics. He defines the noetic experience,
the experience of God by the person of faith, as the sufficient condition for locating truth
and moral knowledge.381 In his estimation, the failure of secular bioethics lies in its
reliance on human reason and empiricism for answers that only exist within the
metaphysical realm. For Engelhardt, Orthodox Christianity can finally reconcile the right
and the good, something for which moral philosophy and secular bioethics have failed.
The secular mistake is to seek the good in immanence, in this world – and moreover to
confuse the good with the ends of moral action. For Orthodox Christians, despite the
tragedy and sacrifices one makes for the “right” on earth, eternal “goods” will be enjoyed
posthumously, and the right and the good will be fully reconciled. The devil will be a
stumbling block, a tempter for the bioethicist who must draw ethical decisions from
prayer and grace first, and never from reason alone. One’s personal relationship with God
is always sufficient, complete with “miracles, saints, angels, and devils” who “interrupt
the immanent by their presence.”382 Moral rules are secondary. They are not legalistically
and rationally derived, but instead serve as an indicator of the proper actions toward the
fulfillment of the individual’s union with God.
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The implications of this kind of thinking, minimizing the immanent, the real and
material lives on earth, for the promise of salvation in death, is dangerous for two
reasons. First, the attribution of sin as the cause of suffering places the blame on the
individual, or as De La Torre says, blaming the victim.383 While some individual
accountability for certain disease states is inevitable, the suffering of entire groups of
people based on power inequalities is not accounted for by Engelhardt. He asserts that
when Adam and Eve joined Satan in prideful separation, binding all humans in the
consequences of their sin, including suffering and death. It follows that those who suffer
greatly are more sinful related to personal choices that are evil. From an anti-colonial
perspective, this kind of thinking upholds and justifies the continued condemnation of
racially oppressed people as more evil, and somehow solely responsible for their own
poverty and poor health. This is eurochristian worldview. Whether by religious dogma or
scientific “fact”, communities of color have been scapegoated for sacrifice to white
eurochristian well-being for five centuries.
Second, while the anti-colonial practitioner might agree with Engelhardt
regarding the perils of excessive materialism in the eurochristian world, the conflation of
materialism with survival is a mistake. Engelhardt rejects social justice outright in favor
of Christian charity, one that allows Christians to do good works so that they personally
may experience eternal goods. To quote him, “Christ did not call us to use the coercive
force of the state to ensure that others will be cared for by an anonymous, secular welfare
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system.”384 For Engelhardt medicine has become an idol, distracting humanity from God.
Because the healthcare system is anti-Christian, he attempts to clear as much space as
possible for Christian bioethics by endorsing Christians to 1) withhold support for stateprovided healthcare; 2) critique all appeals to social justice; and 3) counteract any
movements that enshrine social justice.385 According to Engelhardt, only an
egalitarianism of altruism is acceptable, one that is based on appeals to the sympathy of
others, as opposed to an egalitarianism of envy, which he defines as based on someone
else being better off based on good fortune.386 In The Foundations of Christian Bioethics,
he advises Christians to concern themselves not with inequality based on good fortune,
only that some have too little for their needs. But still, this does not mean that they must
give from their surplus or possession in order to give to those in need of healthcare.387
Instead of social justice, he proposes a separate Christian healthcare system under the
name Vaticare (the Roman Catholic version), or Orthocare (the Orthodox Christian
version) that would “offer a preferential option for the poor through an internal taxing
system based in charity that would redistribute resources” while maintaining Christian
religious commitments and endorsing “civil recovery and criminal prosecution” for those
providing unacceptable services such as abortion or euthanasia within the system.388 If
Engelhardt cannot have a Christian state, he will create one within the framework of a
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libertarian state. The secular state, for Engelhardt, should not be the arbiter of public
morals.389
For the Latinx patient, their poverty and suffering indicate their inferiority for
an Orthodox Christian, intended or not. This accounting for the Latinx patient’s suffering
is evil, which also upholds many stereotypes such as “Hispanic laziness…responsible for
the economic privation [they] face in this country. After all, the idle hands are the devil’s
handiwork.”390 Also, the state should have no hand in providing health care for the
undocumented, and instead any charity should be distributed by the Church, where they
can continue to evangelize and “save” the patients that are desperate for healthcare.
Maintaining power over people through charity and religion (the most ubiquitous colonial
trope) rather than serving justice maintains oppression of Latinx persons who are
suffering.
De La Torre: Political and Economic Liberation
Engelhardt, while wishing for a content-full U.S. Christian bioethics, will still
tolerate the libertarian approach to ethics despite its basis in property rights and
unabashed freedoms. In a libertarian society, one can own animals or people if both
parties agree to it, and anyone has the right to sell their own organs for a profit.391 The
contracts between moral strangers can only be made in terms of an often unregulated
389
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exchange of services. But the negotiations of permission and agreement of moral
strangers in a libertarian society does not consider the power inequality of such “free and
autonomous” persons. As De La Torre writes, “For those who do ethics on the margins,
the issue of power becomes paramount in the development of any ethical discourse.”392 In
Doing Ethics from the Christian Margins, De La Torre spends a lot of time damning the
neoliberal profit-making venture, an extension of the eurochristian colonial trajectory of
exploitation of the poor and persons of color for production, profit, and power. The new
virtue is “maximization of wealth,” and “everything and body is reduced to a consumer
good.”393 Globally, non-governmental organizations, the World Bank, and the
International Monetary Fund have a history of imposing structural adjustments on
countries receiving aid, requiring privatization, austerity, deregulation, and free trade
while at the same time cutting of social benefits such as health, education, social
services.394 395 De La Torre, in a chapter on life and death, points out the folly in making
healthcare a profit-making venture. He questions the possibility of a coexistence of
affordable healthcare and profit-making, and writes that “complaining about the
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affordability of healthcare betrays our capitalist economic structures.”396 In terms of
capitalism and bioethics itself, De La Torre writes, “When bioethicists focus on the
ethical issues raised by scientific and technological advances, advances that may prolong
or secure a richer quality of life, little attention is given to how or why those on the
margins fail to benefit.”397
Leaving the wake of Engelhardt’s libertarian bioethics, Engelhardt’s Christian
bioethics is also problematic for persons and communities of color. Engelhardt minimizes
the immanent, attributing the suffering of people on earth to the necessary punishment of
humans related to the sins of Adam and Eve. In doing so, he blames those who suffer
most under the domination of eurochristian economic and political structures; for their
situation must be related to their own ungodly actions. Engelhardt critiques the systems
of human greed in his content-full Christian ethic, especially in his critique of the liberal
cosmopolitan ethos. He criticizes liberals for their claimed “right to be at liberty to pursue
one’s own life projects” which can necessitate abortion, physician assisted suicide, or
assisted reproduction for homosexual couples, but also seems to include “equality of
opportunity and basic welfare rights…”398 In his critique of liberal cosmopolitanism,
Engelhardt does not distinguish between the wealth-production of neoliberal materialism
with the material needs and fair playing field for survival of those who are marginalized.
He writes,
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“In the face of the moral vacuum that emerges in the absence of
functioning robust moral communities, and given the attraction of
immediate satisfaction through the market, an ethos of
guaranteeing to each person an adequate level of satisfaction and
fulfillment can become central, even including welfare claims of
an equality of opportunity in the pursuit of thisworldly, immanent
life projects.”
He does not legitimate certain life projects of jobs, children, relationships,
livelihoods that all require some level of material resources. This “immanence” that
Engelhardt skims over is the tenuous lives of many Latinx who suffer in the present, the
reality that need not be experienced by ontologically white eurochristians. He merely
accepts the suffering of others as status quo and elevates charity because of what it does
for the Christian in union with God: “Since the poor will always be with us (Matt 26:11),
the goal cannot be the abolition of poverty or its results. God can always provide for
those in need. …The focus must be on the character of the charity, the character of the
live that motivates the giver.”399 In Burying White Privilege: Resurrecting a Badass
Christianity, De La Torre anticipates three reasons calls for justice are rejected by white
Christians: 1) justice is too utopian, 2) it is the antithesis of faith (this is Engelhardt), and
3) it is a mistake made by the church in the past.400
This begs the question, why are white Christians defining justice instead of
those who are acutely experiencing the injustice?401 When the powerful in society make
the rules that their private property is inviolable and that only through charity can others

399

Ibid., 380.

400

De La Torre, Burying White Privilege: Resurrecting a Badass Christianity/Miguel A. De La Torre, 96.

401

Ibid., 78.

170

exist, this is not justice. Counter to Engelhardt’s “egalitarianism of altruism” De La Torre
would reply that “justice is not a response born out of pity or a duty based on
paternalism.”402 Love, which is the soul of justice, “is an action taken regardless of how
one feels.”403 For De La Torre’s Christian ethics, justice is following the Hispanic Christ
who is a liberator, who takes sides with “the least among us”.404 Justice is also about
challenging the dominant culture’s power and privilege, whether one is part of the
dominant culture or outside of it. A bioethics that cannot look in the mirror as a critic to
understand how it is part of the dominant culture will never serve true justice. A bioethics
that does not take the lead of Latinx people is not true justice. Real justice is
understanding the structural causes of poverty and racism, both historically and in the
present. In response to Engelhardt’s idea of charity, this is the way the wealthy get to
keep their wealth and feel good about themselves for giving some away, rather than for
those who are oppressed to receive restorative justice which rightfully corrects the harms
that have been done. Social justice is turning the scales toward the restorative rights of
the oppressed over the liberty rights of the eurochristian privileged, the freedom to one’s
moral beliefs, freedom from exploitation, and the ability to meet one’s own material
needs.
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A Badass Bioethics
De La Torre calls for a “Badass Christianity” which, among other things, is a
“survival praxis” that responds to the hopelessness of the people.405 The imminent is the
center of De La Torre’s ethics, one that centers on lo cotidiano (the everyday experiences
of the marginalized), and is contextualized in Nepantla (the in-between state of Latinx
people as Indigenous and European living as borderlanders), and la lucha (the struggles
of being on the margins of the eurochristian system.)406 A bioethicist who is not racist
defines justice with and by those suffering oppression. And justice would be restorative,
not just distributive. For the 6,500 people suffering from ESRD, a bioethicist would
consider the responsibility of a society that has acted collectively and historically to bring
Mexicans, Guatemalans, and El Salvadorians to U.S. hospitals. An anti-colonial
bioethicist or ethics center would question and challenge the economic system of
healthcare finance and decision-making, and would prioritize inequalities over expensive
technologies, or would create a way to make all highly beneficial technologies available
to everyone. An anti-colonial professor of ethics reads and teaches from the margins of
power and exposes how faith is interpreted and used by the margins in contrast with those
who study a eurochristian-centric academic ethics. If we think about how a Engelhardtian
bioethics would address the current bioethical issue of inadequate treatment of
immigrants from Latin-American countries, it does not work in their favor. It becomes
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clear on anti-colonial analysis of Engelhardt’s bioethics that the eurochristian nature and
its racist proclivities are abundant.
De La Torre’s liberative ethic provides bioethics with a much more
theologically aligned, compassionate, and just framework for patients who are excluded
from standard treatments for ESRD based on an “undocumented” status. For Christian
bioethicists, he makes the case that Jesus himself was an immigrant, poor, and understood
the suffering that is experienced by Latinx patients who have found themselves on the
margins of a world not of their own. Latinx ethics from the perspectives of various Latinx
communities “recognize Jesus’ commitment to the marginalized.”407 A De La Torrian
Christian bioethicist would not blame the patients’ suffering on their sins, nor on the
stereotypes of “laziness”, “ignorance”, or “violent”; but instead would engage in the
discourse of oppressive structures “that have intentionally created an army of low-skilled
laborers for the benefit of commerce.”408 Many secular bioethicists think of ethics as
taking a neutral stance, much like a libertarian world as described by Engelhardt. But a
bioethicist influenced by De La Torre is not neutral, and takes a formal position against
racism, not just in theory but in praxis. Praxis would include accompanying the
undocumented ESRD patients to understand their situation-- being presente- in an effort
to change the system in their favor.409 De La Torre writes, “physically engaging in
consciousness-raising praxis leads to understanding the causes of oppression, from which
407

Introducing Latino/a Theologies/Miguel A. De La Torre and Edwin David Aponte, 83.

408

Ibid., 82.

409

The U.S. Immigration Crisis: Toward an Ethics of Place/Miguel A. De La Torre (Eugene, Oregon:
Cascade Books, 2016), xx.

173

a spiritual response flows that can lead to better informed theories or doctrines.”410. For
De La Torre, praxis comes first, and helps one to form theories grounded in the realities
and experiences of undocumented patients. Political praxis might also be included, such
as taking action to provide services to cover patients through the Affordable Care Act and
the ESRD Medicare program. A bioethicist concerned with justice would do one’s
homework and ask “why they come”.411 Much of De La Torre’s work provides an answer
to this, which includes the U.S. involvement in many acts of dominance including
stealing the most resource-rich land from Mexico, signing economic treaties such as
NAFTA, and the overthrowing of many democratically elected leaders in Latino
countries in order to protect U.S. economic interests. The U.S. has had much direct
involvement in the poverty, joblessness, and corruption that cause people to cross the
imaginary border between Mexico and the U.S. De La Torre is often heard saying one
should not be surprised when Latinx people south-of-the-border follow the roads to the
U.S., the same roads that the U.S. used to steal their resources and livelihoods. The
discipline of bioethics has an opportunity to liberate itself from the eurochristian narrative
in order to fully address the deep-seated issues of race. Bioethics would do well to learn
from our colleagues of color, to move away from universalizing white eurochristian
theories, from the white Jesus and the paternalistic God, and to understand this
“undocumented patient” showing up in our renal clinic or emergency department is a
person with a story of oppression that is tied directly to U.S. actions. And that we as a
410
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country, including healthcare institutions and their leadership, health providers, and
bioethicists, owe them not only distributive, but restorative and liberative justice. A
badass bioethics calls out the system, takes action, and centers the Latinx son,
grandmother, wife, friend who the U.S. calls “undocumented”.
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CHAPTER 5: SINGER AND WYNTER:
TWO EXPRESSIONS OF LIFE, DEATH, AND HUMANITY
Sitting at a table of philosophers at the American Society of Bioethics and
Humanities conference one year, the topic of discussion turned to whether robots with
artificial intelligence and human qualities should be considered human. While an
intriguing intellectual question, does it not follow that if robots are designed to have the
emotions and ability to think like humans, in other words if we make them human, that
they enjoy the moral status of being human? This defining of whether someone is human,
what benefits derive from such a status, and what can be done with their bodies if they
are not fully human is not new. Observing the philosophers in their deliberations about
who is human and who is not is reminiscent of the defining of Native Americans as
savage animals, and enslaved Africans as degenerates, which allowed justification for
slavery and stealing of land. For bioethics, brain death is yet another one of these
thresholds. The defining of death as “the irreversible loss of all functions of the brain,
including the brainstem” has allowed physicians to unilaterally withdraw patients from
“life-sustaining” medical treatment and to procure organs for transplant.412 This chapter
proposes that the defining of humanity is a colonial endeavor, one that has historically
412
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benefitted the colonizer. What follows is a critique of Peter Singer’s book Practical
Ethics and an anti-colonial response through the works of Sylvia Wynter, using the case
of Jahi McMath to illustrate the continued colonial structures of bioethics.
The Jahi McMath Case
Jahi McMath was a 13-year-old African -American teenager who, in 2013,
underwent a tonsillectomy at Oakland’s Children’s Hospital in California. After surgery
McMath began having a large amount of bleeding, which went untreated despite her
nurses’ notifications to the physicians on service. Several hours later, McMath sustained
a cardiac arrest and hours of attempted resuscitation ensued. According to Rachel Aviv in
the New Yorker, two days later McMath was declared brain dead by physicians.413 Under
current law, all states have adopted versions of the 1981 Uniform Determination of Death
Act, which states that a diagnosis of brain death equates to actual death, allowing
physicians to unilaterally remove the patient from life support.414 And yet, McMath’s
mother Nailah Winkfield did not accept McMath’s state as death, despite the medical
team’s insistence that the ventilator needed to be discontinued. McMath’s family
consulted a personal-injury lawyer who wrote a cease and desist order to assure McMath
would not be removed from the ventilator; then filed two motions involving the hospital’s
conflict of interest in avoiding a higher liability if McMath did not “die”, and in the
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infringement of the hospital on Winkfield’s right to express her religion.415 Contrary to
medically and legally accepted practice around brain death, McMath was transported to
New Jersey, one of only a few states that allows religious exemptions to the brain death
laws. McMath remained on a ventilator for approximately four and a half years,
reportedly going through puberty, moving her hands and feet, and inconsistently
following commands from her mother. The case created contentious debates between
neurologists, bioethicists, theologians and others. McMath’s parents had single-handedly
thrown into question the “standard” definition of death. And they have lost their
daughter.
Peter Singer’s Bioethics
In his books Rethinking Life and Death and Practical Ethics, Peter Singer
addresses issues such as who counts as a person, when can persons (and animals) be
killed, and whether humans are indeed superior to other forms of life. These views have
earned Singer both praise and considerable criticism. Singer represents the secular
utilitarian view of Western ethics. A moral philosopher from Australia and the Ira W.
DeCamp Professor of Bioethics at Princeton University, Singer is a vocal proponent of
animal rights as illustrated in his books Animal Liberation, Animal Factories, and In
Defense of Animals. His non-profit organization and book of the same name, The Life
You Can Save, signify his views on, and commitment to, obligatory altruism and
alleviating world poverty. But it is his views on life and death that are most relevant for
the arguments herein.
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Singer identifies himself as a preference, rather than hedonistic, utilitarian.416
For Singer, moral decisions should be made based on “equal consideration of interests”
rather than solely for pleasure or happiness.417 Equal consideration of interests is a
minimal principle of equality, in which “we give equal weight in our moral deliberations
to the like interests of all those affected by our decisions.”418 An interest is an interest,
despite whose interest it may be, and does not require any qualifiers such as race,
intelligence, genetic predisposition, or other inherited or environmentally-influenced
attribute. His work sets out to create a “Copernican revolution” in the way society defines
life and death.419 His utilitarian views consider the traditional Christian concept of the
sanctity of human life unable to cope with the 20th century changes in healthcare,
especially under the weight of technologically-driven issues such as those caused by lifesustaining medical treatments. Singer dwells in what Engelhardt called the liberal
cosmopolitan secularist realm of Western society, the other side of the coin from
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Engelhardt’s traditional Christianity. Singer critiques Christian precepts of bioethics. But
Singer is still eurochristian in his views.
Sylvia Wynter: An Anti-Colonial Approach
Sylvia Wynter also discusses issues of life and death, what it means to be
human, and global issues affecting human life. In contrast to Singer’s humanist
eurochristian perspective, Wynter is thoroughly post-humanist and anti-colonial. Wynter
was born in Cuba and grew up in Jamaica in the 1940s during the anti-colonial protest
movements. She attended college in London at University London, Kings’ College to
study modern languages.420 After several moves, she landed back in Jamaica teaching
Spanish literature at the University of West Indies (UWI). Wynter is a prolific writer
spanning the disciplines and media of “fiction, physics, neurobiology, film, music,
economics, history, cortical theory, literature, learning practices, coloniality, ritual
narratives, and religion.”421 Wynter has put forth “more than 200 texts and presentations
which comprise dramatic plays ,translations, essays, plenaries, symposia, and creative
works.”422 After writing a full-length play Under the Sun and her novel The Hills of
Hebron, she went on to teach Spanish language and Hispanic literature at The University
of West Indies, Spanish and Third-World literature at the University of California at San
Diego, and since 1977 has been at Stanford University as professor of Spanish and
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Portuguese, and of African and Afro-American studies, and now is faculty emeritus.423
Her anti-colonial intellectual project is to dismember the Western dominant concept of
humanity and to propose a long-view of a post-humanist hybrid human as a new science
based on both biology and mythology, or as she refers to it, bios/mythoi. She builds on
Frantz Fanon and Aimé Césaire’s work. From Fanon she borrows his idea of sociogeny,
proposing a new sociogenic science that transcends mere human biology and emanates
from what she calls the Third Event. Following the coming-into-being of the universe and
the appearance of life on earth, The Third Event marks the evolution of the human brain
in gaining the capacity for language, symbolism, story-telling, and myth-making.424 She
adapts Césaire’s science of Word to propose that ultimately our origin myths determine
our nature, even on the biological and neurochemical levels. In contrast to De La Torre’s
primarily (but not solely) political anti-colonialism, Wynter’s is primarily
epistemological in nature. In this dissertation De La Torre is used to speak back to
Engelhardt’s libertarianism and Orthodox Christianity. In contrast, Wynter, in relativist
language, engages in the deconstruction of the discourse of the secular Humanities from
the Renaissance forward. Wynter is fitting in addressing the humanist eurochristian
philosophy of Singer, in providing a different perspective on both Singer’s context and
the concepts of life, death, and the human in general. The anti-colonial works of Wynter
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will provide an alternative view to Singer’s, one that accounts for the marginalized in
ways his theories do not.
Singer’s Ontological Assumptions: Evolution and Categorization
Singer is an atheist and rejects both God and human nature as foundations of
morality. He writes of the belief of heaven and hell, reward and punishment:
“To rely on such a justification, one would first have to show that
we do survive death, in some form, and secondly, that we will be
rewarded and punished in accordance with the extent to which we
have lived an ethical life. I do not know how this could be
demonstrated.”425
He challenges the Christian assumption of sanctity of life in its precepts that all human
lives are equally inviolable (and all animal lives equally violable). Where Engelhardt
credits the Church for morality, Singer turns to philosophical arguments based on
outcomes and empiricism. Where Engelhardt sees progress as salvation, Singer sees
progress as individuals seeking meaningful future projects. Where, for Engelhardt, Man
is the zenith of life on earth with direct access to God, Singer discredits human
superiority as a Christian myth originating from the Hebrew bible. Instead of
unquestionable sanctity of human life, Singer says humans have more moral worth if they
are persons who are self-aware and future-directed. Singer’s ontological assumptions are
a continuation of the eurochristian worldview through the hierarchical and linear thinking
reflected in his acceptance of a Darwinian evolutionary trajectory and his categorization
of beings by selected traits. In Singer’s intention to expand the notion of personhood to
animals and contract the notion of personhood of permanently unconscious humans, he is
425
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nonetheless engaging in a project of categorizing and defining the other, a thoroughly
colonial endeavor. In accord with a eurochristian worldview, Singer’s creation story is
evolution, and his thinking is linear and categorical. These three ontological assumptions
are reviewed in-turn.
First, Singer’s Darwinian proclivities lead him to examine the evolutionary
science behind human and animal traits, describing the likeness of apes, dolphins, and
dogs to humans. He uses many examples in Practical Ethics to illustrate the similarities of
animals and humans, such as Koko the gorilla who can use 500 signs in American sign
language, uses signs to refer to past and future events, and recognizes himself in a mirror,
illustrating self-consciousness. He quotes genetic science noting that apes share over
98.5% genetics with humans. Singer also considers at some length genetic diversity
within groups such as race and gender, looking at IQ and aggression (therefore power)
through the lenses of evolutionary genetics and environmental influences.426 And
although his ontological starting point is evolution, he cautions his readers to also engage
rational choice to ascertain whether evolved traits are still meeting the needs of human
life. He states that it would be a mistake to always follow our natural moral intuitions
which we have inherited from our ancestors or to always refrain from doing what is
unnatural, including the treating of disease and use of life-saving technologies.427 His
grounding is Darwinian and is supplemented by human reason.

426

Ibid., 95.

427

Ibid., 5.

183

Second, Singer is a reflection of Enlightenment thinking. Consistent with
Singer’s evolutionary eurochristian worldview, he thinks about progress in a linear
manner (like most in the Western world). Progress, for Singer, is a universal endeavor to
better the lives of persons globally through reproductive choices, charity, animal rights,
and allowing the deaths of certain members of the Homo sapiens species, especially
embryos, fetuses, severely affected infants, people wishing to end their lives, and those in
irreversible states of unconsciousness. He also defines progress on an individual level, as
those who have a future orientation and planned achievements. His ideas of when Homo
sapiens can be considered persons and when they can be killed (removed from life
support, participate in abortion or physician-assisted suicide) are ultimately defined by
one’s desire and capability for progression.
Enlightenment, the sibling of colonialism, has engendered a worldview of
progress. For those on the upside of progress, benefits are both created and enjoyed. But
the myth of progress is silent for the “wretched of the earth.”428 The eurochristian idea of
progress drove the land-grabbing and human brutalities of manifest destiny across Turtle
Island, now North and South America. During the Industrial Revolution, the logic of
progress undermined “the sociocultural” conditions of individual autonomy and lock[ed]
us up in an “iron cage of our own making.”429 The discourse of progress continues to
define the “Other” as lazy or ineffective (the stereotype of Mexicans taking a siesta or
Native Americans sharing their material goods freely rather than accumulating wealth).
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And the scientific, technological, and economic revolutions have similarly created
situations of disproportionate risk to the poor on a global scale including mass
inequalities, climate change, and weapons of mass destruction.430 Why must the pursuit
of progress, of personal future achievements and a universal good based on Singer’s
ontology necessarily be the defining moral pinnacle of life? What effects might this more
secular universal approach have on marginalized communities, despite Singer’s good
intentions?
Third, Singer’s ethics aims to recategorize the claim to personhood in an
attempt to extend this moral status to sentient animals, as well as to expand the life and
death choices humans can make around abortion, infants with severe disability, and
people experiencing intractable pain and suffering. His utilitarian project is ultimately
about reducing suffering and balancing the welfare of all people. He rejects the Christian
notion that humans are superior to all other living beings by examining the shared traits
of humans and animals in tool-making, language, emotions, and sentience, and future
planning. He argues against the use of self-awareness as a “human” and therefore more
valuable trait, contending that a dog may have some self-awareness and a disabled child
may have no self-awareness.431 Overall, sentience suffices to place a being within the
sphere of equal consideration of interests. Singer draws a line in prioritizing human
preferences in their ability to have a “biographical sense of their life and a stronger
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orientation towards the future.”432 The human has a personal interest in continuing to live
based on a life story “that has chapters still to be written”, and contains “hopes for
achievements to come.”433 Overall, Singer shifts the categories to prioritize the moral
status of humans with future goals, then humans and animals who are sentient and can
experience pain and joy, and at the bottom, humans and animals who have no sentience
or awareness, therefore not commanding the same moral consideration of preferences
(because they do not have conscious preferences). This author agrees with the idea that
human dignity is not ‘life at all costs’, and that animals should be cared for more
thoroughly. But his project is still one of categorization, of continuing the Enlightenment
projects taken up by the likes of Aristotle, Carl Linnaeus, Max Mueller, and Immanuel
Kant in the categorization of living beings. The problem is both that he categorizes and
how he does so from his particular social location. It is understandable that a philosopher
would attempt to find boundaries to guide the practice of medicine in its current
quandaries. But this defining of death is from Singer’s worldview, still within the same
eurochristian privileged space that takes for granted the current state of medicine which is
also eurochristian. Unfortunately, what we have is, once again, the dominant voices
making the rules for all.
Wynter and Ontology
Wynter’s ontology frames human life in broad context, one that starts with what
she calls the Third Event, the evolution of language, story-telling, and myth-making over
432
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100,000 years ago.434 The Third Event defines how humans are hybridly biological and
sociological in nature, with one’s origin stories (as opposed to one’s genetics) as the
driver for one’s beliefs and behaviors. For Wynter, reality lies in what she calls the
sociogenic principle, which underlies all human societal orders. After biological birth,
humans are reborn sociogenically from an encoded second set of instructions. In other
words, “individual subjects… are all now reborn of some origin story rather than of the
womb.”435 These codes, based on a group’s origin stories or cosmogonies, are autoinstituted and thereby “made flesh” through the social codes’ transference into
neurochemical reward-and-punishment mechanisms within the body. The Word, the
mythical and symbolic second set of instructions literally drive biology (rather than the
other way around).436 This sociogenic principle deems the human what she calls genrespecific (or culture-specific) and kin-recognizing, with members barely able to see
outside this autopoiesis that is “always already initiated as fictively eusocialized.”437 In
other words, Wynter’s ontology is based on the evolution of our species as myth- and
meaning-making beings, but beings that cannot perceive oneself as a part of this narrative
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structure because it has become ingrained in our neurological make-up.438 These
structures are cognitively closed systems, meaning they dictate our roles, morality, and
beliefs without allowing alternative systems to compete. The sociogenic codes must
remain closed to synchronize biology and myth, and to stabilize the symbolism with
neurochemical processes. Wynter asks, why did humans hybridize? Why language, storytelling, and myth-making? Her purpose is that in knowing this we can relativize the
globally hegemonic worldview that dictates life and death, truth and untruth, which
operates at the expense of the millions of marginalized. This relativist view is that each
individual has a “truth-for”, the reality within which they live derived from the
sociogenic principle. Her truth-for premise “already questions the assumption that there is
a truth-for someone who can know the truth-for everyone else.”439 Singer, coming from
the eurochristian humanist worldview, proposes his truth-for as a global truth-for. While
his Darwinian-practical theories of life, death, and the human are contrary to
Engelhardt’s, they are still globally hegemonic and eurochristian in nature. Wynter sees
both creation and evolution as eurochristian origin stories, merely two sides of the same
coin. She does not judge as to their truthfulness, but only that both are representations of
human origin, and that they have become dominant and unquestioned genre-specific
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codes that leave many at the margins of society.440 The shift between creation and
evolution began, according to Wynter, with Copernicus’ revolutionary science, with the
studia humanitatis in tow.441 With a shift from Christianity to Humanity (Man1), God
was now for man’s sake instead of humans living for God’s sake.442 For Wynter, Singer
falls into her Man2 category, Man for man’s sake, homo oeconomicus.
For Wynter, the theory of evolution is indeed part-science, but is also part-myth
in its mistaking a biocentric origin with the basis of “being human”.443 Evolution may tell
us something of the biological aspects of being human, but cannot tell us the meaning of
being human, and therefor “has been slotted into that same old place in our minds and
cultures that used to be occupied by myths...our new origin beliefs…are in fact surrogate
myths.”444
So where does this leave Singer? Singer’s evolution is part-science, part-myth.
He challenges the myths of Christian origins, and inserts his own, as evidenced by his
statement concerning Christian myth of heaven and hell, “I do not know how this could
be demonstrated.” This secular consciousness for Singer is tell-tale of his sociogenic
code, his genre-specific neurochemically induced worldview, according to Wynter.
Human reason, as held in esteem by Singer, is like evolution in that it may be a
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descriptive instrument for defining what is and what “fits”, but not why something is, nor
whether something is moral, right, or good. His mistake, according to Wynter’s
viewpoint, is basing the meaning of being human for everyone on evolutionary and
rational constructs. Wynter’s mythoi interrupts and decenters the biocentric human origin
story as one of many possible origin stories based on the sociogenic principle.
Where Singer is linear in his thinking toward the utilitarian preferences of living
beings who individually possess or do not possess future goals and life projects (whose
qualities decide when an individual can be killed or is replaceable), Wynter is not
teleological. As Katherine McKittrick puts it, Wynter’s work is “but knots of ideas and
histories and narratives,” and that Wynter’s “project mirrors the conceptual frame it
promises.”445 Singer’s teleology is toward utility (with a secondary purpose leading to
global welfare), while Wynter seeks emancipation in a non-linear fashion through
“praxis”. For Wynter, emancipation, not “balancing preferences” is most important. This
liberating focus derives from the liminal spaces, from the margins, and from “multiple
self-inscripting, auto-instituting modalities.”446 In contrast, Singer’s utilitarian approach,
while well-meaning and seemingly practical, comes from high theory. It is grounded in
ideas, not the praxis of people’s diverse lives with diverse scripts. Wynter and De La
Torre both prioritize the liminal, the gaze from below, the actual lives of (marginalized)
people as a starting place for ethics. Attempting to fit the world into one’s theory will be
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blinding to the actual consequences for the marginalized and is often a contributor to the
sustaining of marginalization, even if unintentionally.
The categorizing nature of Singer’s ideas about life and death is part of the
ontology of the Western empirical project. Many Western philosophers in the past have
attempted to classify humans and other living organisms, including Max Müller and Carl
Linnaeus. The outcomes of classifying persons from a particular (hierarchical)
perspective wreak havoc on those who do not share the dominant ideology and are
therefore relegated to the margins. One of many examples of this Western proclivity for
categorizing is with Max Müller, a philologist who is known for inventing the science of
religion through classificatory and comparative methods. His dream, as described by Arie
Molendijk, was to show that all religions have the same foundation to undermine the
problem of religion and create global peace.447 But several passages give away an
underlying affinity for Christianity as well as a hint at anti-Semitism. In his First Lecture
he states,
“Has Colebrooke, or Lassen, or Burnouf, ever suggested ‘that we
Christians, who are Aryans, may have the satisfaction of Christ has
not come to us from the Semites, and that it is the hymns of the
Veda and not the Bible that we are to look for the primordial
source of any religion…”448
Even in his best moments there are hints of an evolutionary hierarchy of
religions, with Christianity at the pinnacle, heathens and primitives as childlike, and
Judaism as a history not to be claimed by Germans. David Chidester calls into question
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Müller’s use of “classify and conquer”, although it is difficult to know what Muller
meant by “conquer”. Chidester, through a South African postcolonial lens, shows the
instability of the foundation of some of Müller’s work based on the fact that his theories
were derived from distant sources, colonizers such as Calloway and Bleek, and a number
of Christianized African informants. For Chidester, his comparative religion was based
on an accumulation of knowledge from colonized people who are no longer free from
outside bias and are submersed in a struggle for their own cultures and livelihoods. In
fact, Müller apparently never traveled to India.449 In essence, Müller was part of the
empire responsible for the oppression of Africans; and he capitalized on his access to
them through the colonial informants on the ground. He also capitalized on his position in
empire in his access to the Vedic texts. What Müller’s story shows us, is he is unable to
create world peace for two reasons: one, he cannot see outside his own sociogenic genrespecific frame of being German and Christian. And two, his theories are from colonized
distant informants and ancient texts. He ignores those in the margins, those who were
relatively untainted by the eurochristian-dominant worldview. Wynter’s work illuminates
both the dominant worldview’s power to define rational/irrational, haves/have nots,
symbolic life/death, and the grave mistake of writing from a hierarchical space rather
than being led by those residing on the margins. The views of the likes of Müller does not
consider worldviews of those who have a different classification system of the status of
different entities. Singer is also making the same mistakes. He is attempting to categorize
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human and animal lives from his sociogenic genre-specific frame using theory and logic
rather than listening to those on the margins who will be affected by his theories. In
contrast to Singer, Wynter is not trying to classify people differently—she is not trying to
replace existing categories with her own. Instead, Wynter is pointing out the theorizing of
liberal humanists is always based on sociogeny and origin stories, and just happens to be
the dominant global narrative.
Consider, also, the view of many Native Americans in which all living and nonliving things are respected and given moral status. A Native American worldview is also
cyclical in nature, not progressive over one individual’s lifetime. Some Indigenous views
are inclusive of seven generations before and seven generations after the present time. A
Native American worldview (while not homogeneous, does have shared ontologies and
epistemologies) is an example of a competing worldview that has been almost destroyed
by the eurochristian ontology and epistemology. The eurochristian worldview denies the
Native American non-linear sociogenic genres that respect all living and non-living
entities, that are relationship focused rather than achievement focused, and that views life
as cyclical and inclusive. How does Singer’s ontology affect the marginalized? It
deprives them of the gut-level consciousness of their own beliefs and values, immerses
them in a world of ideas and forced behaviors that dominate their own, and demeans their
behaviors as inferior if not based on progress, hard work, and achievement. Singer may
not intend this, but his eurochristian worldview keeps the order for the secular-humanist
eurochristian world. Sylvia Wynter’s project is to poke holes in the current fossilized
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ratiomorphic values of the West.450 For Wynter, humans frame their ontological modes of
reality, definitions of order and chaos, and their ideas of sameness and difference, on the
conception of life and death. For instance, in medieval Christendom, human life
embodied the profane and sinful, while death represented the spiritual sacred. The
Renaissance and the birth of reason shifted the idea of life and death. With the rejection
of the divine by humanism, life became dignified and “culturally civilized” through
human nature and reason. Any conception of folklorish myth, of spirit, of God were
rejected as irrational, with death eventually falling under human control. Singer is, once
again, tinkering around the margins of the accepted definitions of life and death, based on
this humanist-biological schema. For Singer, categorizing life is based on the utility and
individual achievements of a person, and death is the inability to have an individual
projection for one’s future. For someone like Winkfield, her daughter was her future.
Singer focuses on the utility and plans of the individual from the perspective of his
dominant origin story, not on the family unit or Winkfield’s origin story. His tinkering of
definitions is still ontologically a part of the eurochristian trajectory of evolution, linear
progress, and categorization.
Singer and Moral Epistemology: Utilitarianism and Universalization
Singer is a preference utilitarian, although in Practical Ethics he had become
less convinced that this theory can address all moral philosophical problems. Singer’s
450
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epistemology, like other utilitarians, rest on the acceptance of an intrinsic goodness of
either an individual’s interests and preferences, or the positive balance of enjoyment of
pleasure and welfare with avoidance of pain and suffering. The utilitarian calculation for
Singer depends on the universalization of people’s preferences globally. Possessing the
capacity for suffering and enjoyment entitles a person (and some animals) to equal
consideration of their interests. These interests are weighed impartially.
The utilitarian approach underlying Singer’s epistemology is a universal one in
that all people’s preferences should be given equal weight based on how the action
affects all those involved.451 His approach is based on the welfare of persons as weighed
in a universal cosmopolitan context. Traits such as race, species, sex, disability, and even
self-awareness, are useless in a utilitarian calculation based on interests. All sentient
beings should have basic rights and equal weight to their preferences. In effect, his theory
is an ideal one that assumes real people and institutions will make decisions based on the
balancing of interests. He falls shy of arguing ethics fully from the position of an
impartial spectator or ideal observer but does state that the universal aspect of ethics
starts with a broad utilitarian position.452 In preference utilitarianism everyone’s
preferences count. It does not bring about total equality but goes beyond justice based on
merit or effort. If not the impartial spectator, who is weighing preferences and balancing
them? The basis of his theory states “I cannot give my own preferences greater weight,
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simply because they are my own, than I give to the preferences of others.”453 Who is the
“I” that is doing the calculations? Is it possible for a eurochristian individual or institution
that still favors the white Christian male or the liberal secular demi-god to affect the
consideration of other’s preferences universally? And equality, even if based on
utilitarianism, is not necessarily the goal, if we are concerned with justice. Racism is
colonial. It is embedded in worldview and power structures. It requires more than
suggestions of consideration of other’s preferences, or in leaving justice in the hands of
the “I” who is making the decisions. Providing a theory where everyone’s interests are
considered equally does not make it so.
Second, Singer is a liberal humanist, with a philosophical model that prioritizes
the individual and their rights. He writes, “humans differ as individuals, not as races or
sexes.”454 When talking about race (or gender) and inequality, he says we must judge
people as individuals, not as averages, and that “members of different racial groups must
be treated as individuals, irrespective of their race.”455 Individuals should stand on their
own in regards to IQ, aggressiveness, and leadership potential. Singer downplays racism
as a minor issue. He says the “principle that all humans are equal is now part of the
prevailing political and ethical orthodoxy.” And while racists exist, they are less so
publicly.456 This kind of thinking is problematic. The humanistic principle that now all
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people are considered racially “generally” equal downplays the very real differences and
oppression that continues. Although it is appealing to put every individual on an equal
playing field, Singer runs into the trap of humanism and its colorblindness. An ideal
theory does not account for the actual inequalities in society based on one’s skin color,
gender, sexuality, or disability. He does not address past harms and the continued racial
oppression of certain groups. Although biological theories of race are passé and have
been replaced by socially-based theories, Singer’s utilitarianism is still willing to
entertain new biological theories on race and skips over the social aspects of power and
discrimination in the maintenance of race as a category. He wants to say race doesn’t
matter, which gives coherence to his theory but ignores reality.457 In arguing this, he
looks specifically at the “scientific” narrative of race and IQ over the last few decades.
He argues that if researchers were to prove a genetic hypothesis that different races
actually had differing IQs, that it would not give support for racism.458 But if the
purported results were true, it would only deepen stereotypes of Asians as the model
minority and Blacks as irrational or degenerate. If the results were to be different than
suspected, this also will not necessarily decrease racism. The dominant narrative will find
a way to justify eurochristian white superiority on other grounds. Racism is embedded in
the eurochristian worldview. The eurochristian worldview is a narrative that is invested in
maintaining power. Singer also argues that his theory, based on an equal consideration of
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interests, demonstrates in spades the errors in the Nazi Holocaust.459 A theory of equal
consideration of interests is not needed to do this. Nor would his theory have saved
millions of Jews, persons with disabilities, and other victims of the Holocaust. Nazis did
not subscribe to equal consideration if interests any more than they did any other moral
principle of nonmaleficence, equality, or justice. Preference utilitarianism would not have
stopped the Holocaust and will not stop racism. The flaw in preference utilitarianism is
that, like any other Western moral theory, it is embedded in a colonial history, including
the continued economic, racial, and gender oppressions. Just like an egalitarian,
communist, or democratic system, utilitarianism requires buy-in from those who hold the
power. In theory, skin color is irrelevant to the consideration of an individual’s interests.
In theory, societal rules that base decisions solely on preferences and do not allow
decisions to be made on any other grounds, including IQ, race, and disability, sounds
faultless. In reality, who is giving all person’s interests equal weight? The physician? The
insurance companies? The employer? The state? Along these same lines, Singer critiques
Rawls’ contract theory, citing that contracts cannot work based on the concept of
reciprocity; that white colonizers would not have entered into a mutually respectable
contract with enslaved Africans. But a utilitarian set of rules would not have deterred
white colonizers, Nazis, or the Spanish inquisition. The problem lies in the categorization
of people, in the justification of exploitation for economic purposes, and the inherent
worldviews of eurochristianity, not in a theory of best practices in moral decisionmaking.
459

Ibid., 188.

198

Singer also falls under the epistemological category of pragmatic naturalism.
Although his ontological starting point for morality is evolutionary fitness, he also
acknowledges the need for reason instead of relying solely on our evolutionary instincts
to achieve moral progress. In other words, humans fulfill moral functions that allow
society to adapt to new paradigms, which for Singer would be the technological
advancement of medicine, climate change, and inequality. Singer is a functionalist,
meaning morality is in part how one realizes societal functions for overall harmony. The
functions do not derive from something internally or innate, but instead are valued for
how they address societal problems. Some examples of this are Singer’s (and currently
society’s) acceptance of recovering the organs of those who are considered brain-dead or
neurologically devastated for transplantation based on the large number of potential
organ recipients on the waiting list. Singer is also Malthusian in his ideas of encouraging
the noncoercive limiting of procreation through the voluntary use of birth control and
abortion, especially if the baby is likely to lead a miserable life. He also discusses how
large family sizes impact the planet and homosexuality does not, leading to a change in
the instrumentality of old pro-family anti-gay morality.460 We could also consider the
future use of artificial persons through artificial intelligence in serving the needs of more
“quality” human life. This author has sympathy for Singer’s intentions. Patients who have
lived because of a new heart are deeply grateful and touched by the gift they have
received. Families of patients who are in a persistent vegetative state or “whole brain
death” sometimes do not think it is a “life worth living”. The weighing of the organ
460
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recipient’s good over the value of the life of someone who is brain dead is purely
functional in a utilitarian sense, and a matter of a particular kind of value which justifies
the means. Slave labor was also functional (but obviously not preference utilitarian),
leading to wealth, progress, and nation-building. The harms in coercive withdrawal of life
support and requesting organ donation are not the same in degree, but are they the same
in kind? The submission of all patients to a worldview based on functionality is
marginalizing, especially when many patients do not share the same origin stories. Who
gets to decide what is life and death, and how functional one’s choices should be?
So, what does Singer’s universal and functionalist utilitarianism say about life
and death? Singer’s book Rethinking Life and Death: The Collapse of Our Traditional
Ethics is described as such: “A new Copernican revolution is in the offing, one that
challenges the basic precepts and code of ethics that have previously governed life and
death.”461 He describes a shift from the religious sanctity of life arguments in medicine to
the post-technological age of life-sustaining technologies such as ventilators, feeding
tubes, and dialysis machines. With these advances in medical technology, a secular and
biological form of ethics has emerged. Often heard in intensive care units are the
statements “We need to convince this family to withdraw ‘person x’ from the ventilator
and let them go,” and “Why are we keeping a corpse alive?” This secular shift has no
doubt happened in many circles, with more health providers jumping off the “life is
always dignified, at all costs” ship into the sea of futility and economic concerns. Singer
is one of the most prolific proponents of this kind of thinking, one that is foremost an
461
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advocate of welfare, and one that is also secular, biological, Malthusian, and
instrumentalist in kind.
Defining Death
Singer is in search of a way to justify ending the lives of those with not only a
brain death diagnosis but all permanently unconscious beings. He discusses three levels
of questioning about brain death: “when does a human being die, when is it permissible
to stop trying to keep a human being alive, and when is it permissible to remove organs
from a human being for the purpose of transplantation into another human being?” 462 He
says the Harvard brain death committee’s work was “to avoid the nightmarish prospect of
filling our hospitals and nursing homes with living but permanently unconscious
beings.”463 464 Singer described the Harvard brain death criteria as “a concept so desirable
in its consequences that it is unthinkable to give up, and so shaky on its foundations that
it can scarcely be supported.”465 And while Singer might be opening up opportunities for
individuals and family members to choose a peaceful and quick death in more situations,
it alternately supports medical culture in forcing their own ideas of death on individuals
and families. What starts as permissible for families becomes obligatory as healthcare
462

Ibid., 55.

463

In 1968, Dr. Henry Beecher called an ad hoc committee together at Harvard consisting of eight
physicians, including 2 transplant surgeons, a professor of public health, professor of history, and professor
of social ethics from the School of Divinity. The purpose, according to the final report, was “to define
irreversible coma as a new criterion for death.” Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to
Examine the Definition of Brain Death, A Definition of Irreversible Coma: Report of the Ad Hoc
Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death (American Medical
Association, 1968).
464

Singer, Practical Ethics, 55.

465

Singer, Rethinking Life & Death: The Collapse of Our Traditional Ethics/Peter Singer, 54.

201

providers and institutions look to save money, create closure, provide organs, and
diminish moral distress of nurses and physicians. The argument here is not whether the
assistance in dying is murder, or what the legal consequences might be. It is not either a
utilitarian argument about the costs of keeping someone on life support who will never
regain consciousness. Nor is it about whether human life is sacred. These are the typical
ethics arguments. The anti-colonial arguments are: can health care providers choose to
end what others regard as continued life? What are the views of those who disagree with
the Western notion of “brain death”, and why are their worldviews not considered in
deciding whether one is alive or dead? Where were they when the Harvard committee of
experts were deciding where to draw the line? The issue taken here is not whether a
family member should be able to discontinue treatment on a loved one with severe and
intractable pain or irreversible coma or persistent vegetative state. The true problem in
the ethics of life and death is who defines death, and how the medicalized capitalist
system we operate within defines the stark realities of who the system benefits and who is
on the outside. The problem is not those who disagree or resist Western definitions of
death, it is the Janus-face of technology itself. Healthcare workers blame those with
alternative understandings of the world (and those who rightfully lack trust in the
healthcare system) rather than accepting the life-saving technologies and the drive for
progress are to blame. The problem isn’t “getting ethnic and religious families to
understand what death really is,” but to come to terms with the system we have created as
a whole, and as a continuation of the function of the human quest to control life and
death, and to realize this is society’s problem to address, not to place the blame on those
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who “don’t get it.” We all need liberation from this trap, but those of us on the abundance
side of eurochristianity, while these cases are distressing, they are not defining.
Defining Human
Making decisions regarding life and death requires the defining of the
categories of human and person. A human, as Singer puts it, is an entity with the genetics
of the species Homo sapiens. But being merely human for Singer does not give one the
moral claims that being a person does.466 A person, for Singer, is someone who has selfconsciousness, a life story, and is future-directed. As he writes, “medical practice has
become incompatible with belief in equal value of all human life.”467 Decisions to end
life, such as abortion, physician assisted suicide, and withdrawing life support when one
is irreversibly unconscious or brain dead all rely on questions about humanhood and
personhood. But when healthcare staff and families disagree about withdrawing life
support, whose definition of death reigns? When a patient is considered “brain dead”, it is
because a physician (or two) have performed a series of tests that look for higher and
lower brain functions. If none are detected, the patient is definitionally legally dead. But
the patient is still on a ventilator, with a beating heart and warm skin. Brain dead patients
have been kept “alive” for months awaiting the birth of a child. And in the case of
McMath, she was kept on life support for over 4 years. Healthcare providers (and organ
procurement specialists) are instructed to say she is deceased, and that her body is being
maintained on a ventilator. Singer points out the absurdity of this. The patient still has
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some hormonal functioning of the brain in the output of certain hormones, and often the
patient’s heart rate and blood pressure respond when the patient is cut open in surgery.
Brain death is not really death. And family members sense this. This is why nurses’ and
physicians’ language and behaviors do not reflect a belief the brain-dead patient is dead
and require coaching.468 Brain death is a convenient fiction. So, who decides how to mark
the difference between life and death? And when is it permissible to stop trying to keep a
human being alive? Singer’s solution is not in defining someone as dead, but in allowing
the taking of life in situations where the patient will never again be “person”. And the
utility of saving hospitals money and providing organs for donation justify the overriding
of deeply held marginalized family values embedded in their worldviews. In turn, the
system continues to oppress those who do not fit. In sum, Singer’s moral epistemology,
including his definitions of life, death, and human, is based on a liberal humanist
utilitarianism that focuses on practical outcomes of certain actions, determined by their
preferences and functions.
Wynter and Epistemic Disobedience469
Wynter’s work is primarily epistemic. Hers is the “Afro-Caribbean epistemic
revolution against the Eurocentric concept of ‘Man’ and its role in the construction of
racism.”470 Wynter is a critic of dominant liberal humanist epistemology. The Western
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bourgeois conception of Man, for Wynter, has been overrepresented as Human for
centuries, which she traces in her essay Unsettling the Coloniality of
Being/Power/Truth/Freedom.471 She defines man who emerged in the Renaissance as
Man1, Homo politicus, at the time Man is rejecting the theocentric conception of human
for man as a political subject of the state.472 Man2, Homo oeconomicus, marks the criteria
of man from late 18th century onward with the growth of capitalism, which she refers to
as a master of scarcity through investment and accumulation.473 Both Man1 and Man2
still exclude marginalized “Others” despite the inclusive language of the humanities and
the “impartial” invisible hand of capitalism. Singer is Wynter’s Man1 and Man2,
exposing elements of both a colorblind humanist universalizing perspective, and a
resignation to the capitalist economic structure as will be discussed later.
Both Singer and Wynter claim their works are epistemological ruptures. Singer
is drawing attention to a “new” secular utilitarian approach to death and dying of the
human in healthcare. But he is always already in the category of eurochristian, or what
Wynter calls the “neo-Liberal humanist Western-Bourgeois” Man 2, or Anglo-American
Man.474 According to Wynter, humanism was at one time the heresy, the challenging of a
stale and overgrown Christian-Latin paradigm for stabilizing order. But now, she says the
humanist-biological-economic conception of Western life has become the norm, and
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continues the Christian-Latin project of defining and excluding the “Other”. The once
and still sometimes code of Creation has been nearly replaced by evolution. Yet both are
origin stories from the same overall eurochristian worldview. The overall structure has
not changed, only the furniture has been rearranged. And the “Others”, the defined
symbolically dead, ‘degenerate’, ‘irrational’, religious Others, continue to suffer under
the weight of this worldview. Singer is moving deck chairs around on the sinking Titanic
by replacing the old eurochristian definitions of life and death with new ones. In contrast,
according to Katherine McKittrick, Wynter’s project is not to replace or occupy, but to
generally undo and unsettle, “Western conceptions of what it means to be human.”475
The problem with humanism, as portrayed by Wynter, is a general ignorance to
the fact that humanism is itself a hegemonic arrangement, one that is unable to
comprehend its part in the continued oppression of people of color. In fact, the rise of
Man would not have happened without the oppression of Africans, Indigenous, and
Asians.476 Walter Mignolo says of humanism, “decolonial thinking and living are not to
assimilate but to deny the universal pretense of humanitas.”477
Wynter asserts a new justice over the humanist is needed. Humans, since the
acquisition of language, have been relying on their origin stories for autopoiesis. The
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dark side of autopoiesis is in its creation of I and Other, us, and them, symbolic life and
death. This pattern will be repeated until what Wynter calls the “second emergence”,
which, through the “outsider” perspectives of the liminal, will inform the
unconsciousness of neo-Liberal humanist Western bourgeois “paradigms of justice” such
as human rights478. As Wynter points out, the Rastafari movement is such a “countercosmogenic”, “liminally deviant” gaze from below. Rastafarians were the poor whose
lived existence and aspirations were not served by the “world-system’s ostensibly
universally applicable” ‘paradigm of justice’ and so-called universal human rights.479
Singer, both a humanist and evolutionist, cannot separate himself from both the absence
of the liminal in his theories except as objectified groups of the world’s poor to be saved
by the eurochristian rich through development work, and to conflate material
fairness/equality with ontological and epistemological justice. He takes a colorblind
universal humanist stance, proclaiming the unimportance of race for the functioning of
his preference utilitarianism.
Counter to a universal utilitarianism, Wynter would respond with a more
relativistic view of “multiple self-inscripting, auto-instituting modalities,” or the
existence of many ethno-knowledges. There can be no impartiality from a universal
point-of-view, because that so-called “universal” point-of-view comes from one group’s
particular (dominating) autopoiesis. The current state of affairs is the inability to accept
other’s ethno-knowledges, their epistemic structures, and thereby creating binaries and
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divisions. Wynter’s new science of sociogenics is transcultural and transcendent of the
universal. The universal leaves out history, racial harms, and ignores liminal
epistemology.480 The applications of this new epistemology have yet to be imagined.
Life and Death: An Anti-Colonial Interpretation
While Singer is asking whether Jahi McMath is a corpse or a living child,
Wynter is thinking about life and death symbolically. Singer wants to “find another way
of responding to human beings who can never be conscious.”481 The reason for the
predicament to which Singer is responding is the technological big-picture. Medicine has
gotten itself into a bind, between keeping patients alive “too long” and setting up the
pressure at the back-end of life with high hospitalization costs and organ procurement
organizations. As Wynter intimates, our generation is overly defined by a purely
biological and medicalized conception of life and death, and simultaneously clings to the
symbolic binaries of life and death as perfectibility vs. degeneracy, of the rational vs.
irrational/emotional, of the scientific vs. the religious/myth-making. Recall Wynter’s
epistemic shift happens through Fanon’s sociogenesis, the origin and development of a
society through its stories and foundational myths. A human’s second birth is of fictively
instituted and their biological birth “dies”; we are reborn as symbolic life (like Christian
baptism) that is opiate rewarded and becomes living flesh. Cultures, life/death, good/evil
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are defined by these second set of instructions.482 These second set of instructions make
us human, the mythoi of Wynter’s hybrid bios/mythoi human. Humans “cannot/do not
pre-exist our cosmogonies, our representations of our origins – even though it is we
ourselves who invent those cosmogonies and then retroactively project them onto a
past.”483 Humans are always already mythically chartered. Life and death are no longer
about biological death, but about sociogenic life and death. The dark side of the
autopoiesis of humans is in its creation of symbolic life and death, in other words I and
Other, Us and Them.484 Compared with the symbolic life of Man as Breadwinner and
accumulator, the symbolically dead began as the “peripheral slave labor
‘Negros’/’Negress’ together with the semi-peripheral ‘Indian’/’Indian Squaw’ neo-serf
labor” and in contemporary times have transformed into the “now institutionalized
Welfare Mom/Ghetto ‘Black’ Others (including their Trailer Park Trash, Wigger "White"
counterparts) as the extreme expression of the category of the non-Breadwinning ‘planet
of the slums’ Jobless Poor, and at the world-systemic level, of the category of the
‘Underdeveloped’ all ostensibly as naturally dysselected Others allegedly mastered by

482

McKittrick, Sylvia Wynter: On Being Human as Praxis/Katherine Mckittrick, Ed, 34.

483

Ibid., 36.

484

In her interview with David Scott, Wynter recalls going to England and the U.S. having to confront the
stereotyping that she experienced when leaving the Caribbean. These stereotypes socialized her to think she
was not fully human, but a “nigger”. She admits that her drive for transformation of the imagination
depended on her geographical displacement in Western countries. She noted she “always felt a certain
sympathy for students at the University of the West Indies because they don’t experience that displacement.
The displacement is very jolting because from that moment you can no longer coincide with yourself.”
Scott, “The Re-Enchantment of Humanism: An Interview with Sylvia Wynter,” 132.

209

the Malthusian origin-mythic trope of “Natural Scarcity”. …”485 This pattern will be
repeated until what Wynter calls the “second emergence”, which, through the “outsider”
perspectives of the liminal, will inform the unconsciousness of neo-Liberal humanist
Western bourgeois “paradigms of justice” especially in human rights.486 From the liminal
comes concepts such as double consciousness and border epistemology, those flesh and
geography spaces where disparate sociogenies are comprehended.487 Wynter’s science of
sociogeny is most easily grasped at the borders (territorial, linguistic, subjective,
epistemic, ontological).488 Her overarching questions are how to find a ceremony to free
biological reality from order-stabilizing symbolic life/death codes? How can we finally
know our social reality outside the codes of symbolic life/death which is synchronized
with our biochemical and opiate reward/punishment system of the brain?489
Singer admits that those diagnosed with brain death have been excluded from
the moral community.490 But in utilitarian terms, there seems to be little resistance from
the healthcare community. The brain-dead patient no longer can pursue future goals, their
organs could “save” other patients, and the long-term care is expensive and wasteful. In
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our eurochristian world we have created these conditions and have decided they are true.
We have also continued to fault “Others”, those with non-secular origin stories and
therefore differing concepts of life and death, and of different familial organizational
principles, for resisting. The system is working. It keeps the symbolic life/death codes,
and with it the dominant narrative, intact. For Jahi McMath, she was doubly cursed. She
was no longer a “person” in Singer’s sense (although is still genetically human), and she
was always already symbolically dead based on the color of her skin. There was
widespread confusion and annoyance from medical and bioethics professions when her
mother resisted withdrawal of life support. In essence, she was being “ignorant”, “nonrational”, and “uncooperative”, and was potentially going to drive up unnecessary costs
(because we assume she is also poor, perhaps even on welfare) to keep McMath alive.
Why is Winkfield at fault? What she experienced likely felt like a violent act in the face
of power. Instead, what if the problem in this conflict is the dominant seculartechnological-progress-oriented system, challenging the deeply held worldviews of
persons globally?
For Wynter, to be human is to have a biographical sense of self which would
include relationships. Singer also mentions this biographical sense of self as being
human, in other words having self-consciousness and conceptualizing a future and
past.491 At first Singer seems to share a point with Wynter, that being human is
biographical, the telling of stories. Important here is to note two differences. Singer
focuses on the capacity of the individual, for instance, the person with a diagnosis of
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brain death or persistent vegetative state, who does not have future goals, and therefore
possessing only biological human status, not personhood. Singer is focusing on an
individual’s ability to tell stories and to live with the possibility of future achievements.
Wynter’s story-telling honors the communal and does not necessarily rely on the
biological criteria as does Singer’s. And two, Singer has defined the moral status for
those who share his secular liberal genre but may not resonate with the worldviews of
patients and families. His defining of human is meant to be universal, in contrast to
Wynter’s idea that people come from different worlds and therefore, they have a very
specific biographical sense of self that is not tied merely to biological life and includes
shared understandings of morality through autopoiesis. Being human for Wynter is a
verb, open to those on the margins to think about being human anew. It is relational and
ecumenical. Being human is not about the “empiricism of the unfittest”, but instead the
“realization of the living”492 While Singer talks about the biological-empirical Homo
sapiens, Wynter talks about the sociogenic-scientific Homo narrans. For Wynter, the
hybrid bios-mythoi human and the process of autopoiesis must “no longer be allowed to
function outside our awareness.”493
“Man’s history-for is therefore now put forward as if it were
transcreedal, supracultural, universal. And my point here is that if
we are able to reimagine the human in terms of a new history
whose narrative will enable us to co-identify ourselves each with
the other, whatever our local ethnos/ethnoi, we would have to
being by taking our present history, as narrated by historians, as
empirical data…”
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to understand how we got here, Man as human.494 No ethno-class, for instance Singer’s,
“can embody the truth of what Human is and means.”495 These meanings, these
sociogenic codes, affect matter. That matter is people.496
Singer and Socioeconomics: Obligation to Assist, Exceptionalism, and Democracy
One of Singer’s strongest arguments for addressing the lives of the marginalized
is his “obligation to assist.” He notes, “helping is not, as conventionally thought, a
charitable act that is praiseworthy to do but not wrong to omit. It is something that
everyone ought to do.”497 We owe because of the utilitarian principle, because people
should not be treated differently depending on their circumstances or luck. Singer is a
proponent of the affluent in Western countries donating 5% of their wealth to aid
organizations from their private funds. He is also a proponent of fair trade, the end of
agricultural subsidies that affect farmers who cannot compete with the prices, political
action, and more official government development assistance.498 He does not hold private
property sacred as do libertarians, and states utilitarians are game to override property
rights when a calculation of interests estimates its necessity. His ideas are based on
addressing the welfare of people globally. He believes it is better for children to be born
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in a developed world where they have a higher standard of living and better chances to
“lead enjoyable lives”.499 And yet, he prioritizes those in “developing” countries
(although a colonial term) for funding assistance because of their absolute poverty,
compared with the relative poverty of the U.S.500 Development organizations can help to
alleviate the immediate needs of people such as providing water, food, shelter, and
education. This is undisputable.
About capitalism, Singer assumes it cannot be challenged, that private
enterprise will never be abolished, and that black markets will always emerge. He says
“we might as well accept that financial rewards will go to those with inherited abilities,
rather than those who have the greatest needs.”501 Instead, “we should try to create a
climate of opinion that will lead to a reduction in excessive payments to senior
management and an increase in payments to those whose income barely meets their
needs”502 He also locates some ability to redistribute wealth within the taxation schemes
and through increased equity in salary (with a margin before brain drain happens).
He identifies affirmative action as the best hope for reducing long-standing
inequalities, especially in education and employment.503 He is most concerned with
reducing the inequalities “within” certain racial or ethnic groups rather than between
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racial and gender groups, which he thinks may have a more divisive effect.504 For
instance, in selecting candidates for jobs or higher education, affirmative action, for
Singer, is not “contrary to sound principle of equality and does not violate any rights of
those excluded by it.”505 In the U.S., he notes that managing admissions to achieve
diversity is permissible, but not by using racial or ethnic quotas. But if a school wanted to
increase diversity, they could do so based on potential student “interests” rather than IQ,
race, or some other criteria alone.
In a chapter called Civil Disobedience, Violence, and Terrorism, he asserts that
civil disobedience may be necessary to restore democracy. He believes the state is more
sophisticated than “tribal societies that kill with impunity.”506 And he recognizes that
democracy is not perfect, but having some kind of agreed-on procedure is “the firmest
possible basis for a peaceful method of settling disputes.”507 In contrast to civil
disobedience, violence is only justified perhaps in the cases of dealing with a murderous
dictator or protecting people from a mass killing or genocide.508 And he concludes that
terrorism is never justified. He says in general violence may have harmful long-term
effects.
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Wynter’s “We the Underdeveloped”
An anti-colonial critique of Singer’s “obligation to assist” reveals more
eurochristian assumptions, entailing harms to the marginalized. First, while absolute
poverty is not disputed, Singer minimizes the poverty in the U.S. by using the terms
“relative” and “absolute” poverty, and by citing the life expectancy in the U.S. as 78
years.509 He does not cite the inequalities of life expectancy and health within the U.S.510
Also, Singer as Homo oeconomicus takes for granted the rich/poor divide and calls for
giving 5% of one’s wealth to development organizations. Wynter would consider these
givers Malthusian jobholders and breadwinners, masters of the ill of “Natural Scarcity”
and “‘curable’ therefore, only in economic terms.”511 Development work has largely been
criticized for its cooptation of the world into the eurochristian global schema, into
neoliberal economic (and thereby already oppressive) institutions. This “help”, the
transfer of wealth from the affluent to development organizations, largely funds Western
aid organizations with eurochristian epistemic models. In addition, the helping doesn’t
address the root causes of inequality, such as a neoliberal economic system, politics,
corruption, and greed. Helping is often (but not always) a band-aid. If development
organizations are led by the marginalized from their own sociogenic schemas and
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epistemologies and are sustainable, this kind of organization would benefit from some
initial funding aimed at anti-colonial welfare. Unfortunately, Singer notes he would
encourage Western governments to withhold funding countries who restrict
contraceptives for religious or nationalistic reasons, or who disallow women from
receiving education.512 While many secular bioethicists may agree with this tactic for
utilitarian (or human rights) reasons, it is still the impression of eurochristian values on
an autonomous society. The outcome is not the point here. The “white men saving brown
women from brown men” in Gayatri Spivak’s essay Can the Subaltern Speak points to
the British as being an intruder, not a white savior, in the practice of sati for widowed
Indian women.513 Wynter would attribute this alterity experienced by the British to the
fundamentally different origin stories and socigenesis of Indians from the British.
Singer’s “obligation to help” is altruistic, but fundamentally flawed from an anti-colonial
perspective, especially in colonized and marginalized people’s ability to be autonomous
in the development of their own ontological and epistemological well-being and to
imagine their own futures uncoerced by eurochristian dominance.
But Wynter goes beyond the empirical and proposes to “get rid of the concept
of development altogether.”514 Development and economic growth “lay down the
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prescriptive behavioral pathways instituting our present world system.”515 In other words,
the idea of development itself is the eurochristian remaking of other societies. I think
Wynter would say that Singer is focused on “material redemption”, at the cost of Africa
losing its own soul, and at the same time strengthening stereotypes of Africa as
underdeveloped, backwards, and impoverished.516 Wynter writes, it is
“this ‘sense of right’ that, as the [eurochristian] ethico-behavioral
code based on a new ‘reasons-of-the-economy’ (a code that is itself
fundamentally culture-systemic rather than purely economic as it
represents itself to be), is the cause of the trap in which Africa—
and the Black world—now finds itself today.”
Singer believes living in a “developed” country is superior and wants to save who Wynter
calls “we the underdeveloped” through a Western economic scheme, namely
development organizations. Unfortunately, Singer focuses on the giving of the affluent
rather than listening to and engaging with “We the Underdeveloped”.
While a redistribution of the wealth from sources of low-lying fruit is not
disputed here, the overall thought process behind redistribution is that capitalism, the
partner of the scarcity myth, cannot be disturbed. In effect, the system that creates
inequalities persists, while a few regulations redistribute here and there. Wynter calls
Man2 the alleged “masterer of natural scarcity (investor or capital accumulator)”,
defining the “jobless, the homeless, the Poor, systemically made jobless and
criminalized—of the underdeveloped—all as the category of the economically
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damnes.”517 The “ill” of the present is natural scarcity which is also a common trope in
medicine, and can only be cured in economic terms within the current eurochristian
economic structures of capitalism and neoliberalism, through constantly increasing
economic growth and accumulation. “Capital is projected as indispensable, empirical,
and metaphysical source of all human life, thus semantically activating the
neurochemistry of our brain” and driving the desire for accumulation.518 She notes that
humans are stuck in a “teleological economic script that governs our global wellbeing/ill-being…”519 But this secular-capitalist human is not the whole of the human
species. It is Man2, it is “us”, the “Western and mimetically Westernized middle classes”,
the only means of production and needs repression of all other alternative modes of
material provisioning. The narratives of race, scarcity, and progress are not naturally
determined as eurochristians like to believe. They are systematically kept in place by a
destructive worldview.
Like Singer’s desire to redistribute wealth, healthcare and bioethics do good
within its eurochristian walls and according to its eurochristian logic, but the structures
are oppressive or only superficially helpful to many.520 A common example of the good
being done is the push for addressing the social determinants of health such as housing,
access to health care, healthy foods, safe neighborhoods. These are important resources.
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Singer wants to alleviate world poverty with altruistic monetary donations to wellmeaning non-profit and government organizations. But the level of transformation
required by many liminal groups of society transcends this kind of naïve material view of
social justice. The liberal eurochristian worldview, while seemingly more altruistic and
helpful (and does attend to the immediate physical needs of many humans worldwide), is
still steeped in not only medieval Christianity, but also the Humanism of/as Man, the
narrative of Malthusian scarcity and capital accumulation, and the continued
categorization of people hierarchically, if not always as overtly. The worldview solidifies
racial stereotypes and racial exploitation; which is why race cannot be the sole and final
category for targeting inequality. It must be colonialism and its ontological,
epistemological, economic, political, and psychosocial components.
On affirmative action, Wynter is also instructive to the attempts of liberal
humanists to improve the lives of others. Wynter notes the contradiction between
individual equality and group hierarchy in the “category structure of the representational
system ‘America’.”521 In her telling of this contradiction, she discusses David Bradley
who is a black man in the early 1980s who, based on affirmative action, is admitted into a
liberal university, which seems like a move toward equality. The illusion of his equality
as an individual within the system evaporated with the shouts of “Nigger!”, the bomb
threats, and the relegation of Blacks on campus to a dilapidated and underfunded “Black
Cultural Center” on the margins of campus. The group identity associated with black skin
is retained and contained through a process of homeostasis, that according to Wynter,
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holds Blacks in the position of Chaos to the Euro Order.522 Wynter realizes that Blacks
will always be relegated to some subjective and marginalized space in the current order
of things, despite well-meaning attempts to “help”. Wynter calls for an epistemological
break, a new heresy, to contradict the “first planetarily extended system in human
history.”523 The argument for Wynter is not whether affirmative action is helpful or
harmful, but how can the orthodoxy of the secular humanistic and still-racist paradigm be
restructured so that people of color are no longer the reflection of chaos/evil to
eurochristian order/good.
Singer puts faith in the state and law to create stability within society, for the
peaceful settling of disputes. The “sophistication” of the state provides a good minimum
level of justice and equality. But Western categories of “normally American and
normally human” do not include the racialized, impoverished, and underdeveloped.524
What we find is that Homo politicus and Homo humanitas often have overriding drives to
create security and order at the expense of those on the margins. The state and legal
systems are not tuned to serving the symbolically dead/inferior/irrational of society. Ania
Loomba echoes this pointing out “the ‘fraternity’” of the nations claims to represent them
even as it does not include them as equals. Nations were originally forged on the
inclusion of some to the exclusion of others, while the power and appeal of nationalism
and its myth of belonging still draws many under its spell. In the U.S., despite the
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autochthony of Indigenous nations, the true God-given owners of the Americas are white
settlers based on the Doctrine of Discovery, written by a handful of Popes in the 15th
century. And despite the spread of nation-building during postcolonial period, most often
the nations were still a eurochristianized racialized version of themselves because of what
Wynter calls mimesis. Singer, in taking for granted the nation (and Western nations and
law more specifically), is the bee unaware of his beehive. Then he allows for civil
disobedience as long as it is in service of national order and democracy. But he stops at
violence—this is Singer’s white privilege. While this author does not condone violence,
this luxury of avoiding violence is both racial and class privilege. Racialized situations
including Native American genocide, the stripping of Mexicans of their northern-most
territories in the 19th century, the devastating policies of overthrowing elected leaders and
neoliberalism for regular Latin-American families due to political and economic U.S.
intervention, the loss of lives and the imprisonment of Latinx children often leave people
desperate and without options. But as Loomba puts it, nations are not transhistorical, and
can be continually reimagined.525
Returning to Jahi McMath
For Peter Singer, McMath was a human, but not a person. Her continued life
had no meaning for McMath as an individual, for she was, as far as science could tell,
irreversibly non-sentient, and therefore had no possible future achievements. There is no
empirical proof of a God, so any religious beliefs would be irrelevant to the decision to
withdraw McMath from life support. Nor is there the potential for miracles. He would not
525
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have agreed with the UDDA that said she was actually dead, because for him brain death
is a legal fiction, but he might press to withdraw life support for utilitarian reasons, such
as avoiding economic burdens on the hospital or health care system, providing organs for
persons on the waiting list, and avoiding the moral distress of healthcare providers.
Winkfield would have agreed with Singer, that McMath did not look dead; her heart was
beating, she was warm, and moved her extremities on occasion. Singer does say, in
talking about babies with bleak prospects, the decision to keep a baby should be up to
family that will care for it; but that the family should also have the right to allow death if
they cannot. What this author is unsure about is whether Singer agrees with a unilateral
withdrawal of life support by physicians in situations such as brain death. But the vocal
public bioethicist Arthur Caplan, from the Division of Medical Ethics at New York
University Langone Medical Center, adamantly responded that “the legal right to stop is
on the doctors’ side,” in an interview with CNN. “We don't treat the dead. Sadly, she has
died.”526
The fact that McMath and her family are black should not theoretically be a
factor in Singer’s calculations, because each person must be taken as an individual, not as
part of a group. The situation is merely a scientific-functionalist question. The heresy in
this case by the bioethics community was the fact that someone had challenged the
“accepted” dead donor rule of brain death. This was the scandal that upset the apple cart.
Singer says nothing about implicit bias, the general poorer health and access to healthcare
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for racialized persons in the U.S., nothing about the power differentials around race in
healthcare. The likelihood that McMath may not have had all of her social determinants
of health met prior to her surgery does not enter into the discussion of whether or not she
is alive or dead, a person or a human. The inequalities in the U.S. which stem from both a
colonial history and the current capitalist and neoliberal policies are inevitable, but at
least we have a minimum level of peace and equality due to an imperfect democracy and
affirmative action, all according to Singer. And in fact, the real problem is not with
inequality in the U.S., but overseas in underdeveloped countries. So according to Singer’s
Practical Ethics, Jahi McMath was not about race at all, but merely a biologicalfunctionalist view of brain death, with empathy toward families who are the bearers of
the suffering.
Sylvia Wynter and Jahi McMath
Sylvia Wynter provides us with a different view. She moves the conversation of
inequality from a secular-liberal biological view to the conception of ontological
sovereignty: “we would have to move completely outside our present conception of what
it is to be human, and therefore outside the ground of the orthodox body of knowledge
which institutes and reproduces such a conception.”527 Wynter struggles to think outside
the limits of the biocenetric order of consciousness of homo oeconomicus. But, she
admits that Darwin pulls hard so this is difficult thinking.528 But what is obvious is that
large scale injustices are indispensable to a overrepresented narrative of homo
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oeconomicus’ s bio-origin narrative which act as if isomorphic with now emergentreferent-we “in the horizon of humanity”. In other words, Man2’s dominant narrative acts
as if it speaks for all people, but instead continues to oppress. Wynter acknowledges that
science does bring some knowledge but leaves out mythoi.529 She describes that the
1960’s was the first big eruption in Man's episteme, the same era of the birth of bioethics.
But quickly the gains were subsumed by Man in the recapturing of power. The cost, for
Wynter, is the subordination of racialized groups’ genre-specific story-telling codes of
symbolic life/death. In sum, a neoliberal society and a clinging to the old Man1’s
colorblind humanities continues to deny its own and others’ origin stories and sociogenic
truths.
In applying Wynter’s work to the case of McMath, different ways of bioethical
thinking emerge. First, bioethicists and healthcare providers would be able to
comprehend the big-picture. What led up to the trauma experienced by McMath and her
family from an anti-colonial perspective? Ontologically, what was Nailah Winkfield’s
origin story?530 What was the meaning of life and death for her? We know what
mainstream secular doctors and hospital ethicists believe. Singer and Engelhardt are two
well-known bioethicists with competing claims to morality in healthcare. After an
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analysis of both, we might be compelled to ask why their worldviews, and not the family
of Jahi McMath’s, are considered to take precedent in cases such as McMath’s. Does
some special authority exist in either Engelhardt’s religion or Singer’s philosophy?
Neither mainstream secular nor Christian ethicists have the “truth-for” everyone.
Winkfield’s hybrid bios/mythoi self is no more or less than the bios/mythoi of any
physician or bioethicist. Each group’s origin stories or cosmogonies are reality, “made
flesh,” through the social codes’ transference into neurochemical reward-and-punishment
mechanisms within their bodies. The latter just happens to dominate through the
eurochristian narrative. The discrimination the family felt was the product of a long (and
continued) history of eurochristian scientists and philosophers categorizing people by
skin color, rationality, and intelligence, defining a hierarchy of humanity. Bioethicists
and healthcare providers, like Kant, Muller, and Linnaeus, cannot see outside their (our)
own sociogenic genre-specific frame, which we mistake for the higher truth, for
everyone’s truth. Wynter’s connection of our social codes with neurochemical opiate
reward systems provides insight, as we intuit the right thing for our patients and are
indignant when someone’s choices or behaviors do not align. Our colleagues and patients
all define morality based on their origin stories.
In addition, bioethics rests on a long history from the views of privileged white
men, Man1 and Man2, from the exercise of high theory, without co-creating theories with
those on the margins, those with differing worldviews and religions. From Wynter (and
De La Torre) we can take as prescriptive that a bioethics interested in dealing with race
must genuinely center those on the margins, to listen, and be open to engaging the alterity

226

faced when one’s own worldview (and origin story) is questioned. Winkfield said, “No
one was listening to us, and I can’t prove it, but I really feel in my heart: if McMath was a
little white girl, I feel we would have gotten a little more help and attention.”531
McMath’s family should have been deferred to, without assuming ignorance,
superstition, inferiority, or resistance. This is almost blasphemous to say in the world of
medicine, where we have “standards” and legal definitions of death. But until bioethics
realizes its mainstream taken-for-granted systems are upholding racism, nothing will
change. Intellectuals, even when acting oppositional, most often maintain a eurochristian
narrative and reinscribe dominance over those who have historically been marginalized.
Wynter cautions, “the trap for us…is to choose whether your allegiance will be to the
dominant world of the “men” or to the subordinated world of the “natives”.”532 For
bioethics this will often mean acting first to reduce racism even if something feels askew,
even if it challenges one’s own neurochemical receptors.
The epistemology of Homo humanitas is one of colorblindness. The ethical and
scientific flurry of excitement by neurologists and bioethicists around McMath’s case
hardly mentioned race. Wynter is generous in pointing out that the functional rhetoric of
the Liberal Creed is beyond the limits of conscious intentionalities.533 And yet, brain
death, the holy grail of intensive care, was being questioned, as was the physician’s
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authority to make the calls. Experts were brought in to detect any signs of life, and like
Singer, some questioned the label “death” a legal fiction…that McMath, although
neurologically devastated, was not dead. Others, such as Bob Veatch, said it makes sense
to let families decide based on their own definitions of death.534 And then there is Arthur
Kaplan, who, in agreement with many others, insisted on following the legal definition:
dead is dead.535 In Aviv’s article, McMath's family claims that one of the doctors at
Oakland Children's Hospital “pounded his fist on the table, saying, ‘She’s dead, dead,
dead.’”536 But while questions arose regarding the biological-technical aspects of brain
death, mainstream bioethics ignored the elephant in the room, dismissing the patient and
family’s racial and cultural identities as unimportant. The legal and biological universal
“agreements” around brain death were being threatened.
While McMath was no longer either a person in Singer’s sense, or alive based
on mainstream bioethics and law, for Winkfield she was still very much alive and part of
the moral community and her family. Winkfield was having to contest those who said
McMath was not biologically human/alive, but also that she was never symbolically alive
in a eurochristian world. McMath was born into a world that equates black with chaos,
evil, poverty, and ignorance. For Winkfield, the world outside considered her beloved
daughter doubly dead. Winkfield said she lost all of her trust when a black physician
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attempted to empathize with her about how African-Americans lose their children at
higher rates than other groups. According to Aviv’s article, when the physician said “You
know how we are,” Winkfield said
“Who’s we? We African Americans? I felt so belittled. Yes, a lot
of black children die in Oakland and people do have funerals for
their children – but that don’t mean all of us are like that. Do you
think we’re supposed to be used to our children dying, that this is
just what black people normally go through?”537
Wynter would advise bioethics to engage in the perspectives of the liminal, those of
Jahi’s family. As described in the Aviv article, the highly respected neurologist Alan
Shewmon did just this. After years of research on brain death, he abandoned his
mainstream colleagues. He said that “dissenters from the ‘brain death’ concept are
typically dismissed condescendingly as simpletons, religious zealots or pro-life fanatics,”
and as Aviv said, “he announced that he was joining their ranks.”538 The perspectives of
those with a double consciousness, those living in the borderlands, can be instructive to
those who are still trapped in the liberal humanist “paradigms of justice” of their own
creation, without knowing what justice is to those experiencing injustice.539
Another touchpoint of brain death, and a factor in Jahi’s case, is economics.
Wynter writes of economists as the “secular priesthood” of the U.S. nation-state's
economic system, now operating at a global neoliberal level. Economics now functions as
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theology did in the past. The Christian original sin morphed into the evil of natural
scarcity, and the cure is “ever-increasing economic growth.”540 Wynter’s
“overrepresented narrative of Homo oeconomicus’ s bio-origin narrative” acts “as if
isomorphic” with now emergent-referent-we “in the horizon of humanity”. Economics
are often one of the strongest arguments against keeping people on life support in
permanent non-sentient states, although many are uncomfortable in admitting to this.
Homo oeconomicus is overrepresented, and is used in cases like Jahi’s to moralize from
the point of view of experts—the “symbolic life of Man as Breadwinner and
accumulator, making decisions for the symbolically dead Welfare Mom/Ghetto ‘Black’
Others (including their Trailer Park Trash, Wigger “White” counterparts).”541 And
economics is the reason many of the poor, undocumented, and people of color have
worse health based on poor access to health services and unmet social determinants of
health.542 Deep health disparities continue despite decades of research.543 Yolanda Wilson
points out a series of reasons for the health disparities, including lower quality healthcare
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compared with white counterparts, and a greater dissatisfaction of care they receive,
especially related to perception of racial discrimination.544 This translates to increased
anxiety and lower levels of engagement with the healthcare system. Other factors that
disproportionately affect the poor are lack of transportation, geographic distance, and
limited insurance status.545 Mistrust also runs deep since the middle passage onward,
including an ongoing string of vile experiments and medical mistreatment.546 The
assumptions of health providers regarding the poor and stereotypes of black female
welfare-seekers are closely tied to the biases, even if implicit, of eurochristian healthcare
workers and hospital administrators. Winkfield’s lawyer, Dolan, said to Rachel Aviv in
her New Yorker article, “They think she’s just some black lady sucking down social
resources.”547
Walter Mignolo recognizes one of the goals of Wynter’s decolonial scientia (a
Renaissance-style science) is to generate
“knowledge to build communities in which life (in general) has
priority over economic gains, economic growth, and economic
development. This is knowledge that will subject economic growth
to human needs rather than submit human needs to economic
growth and development.”548
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The decentering of economics and a recentering of the marginalized are vital, for Wynter,
in the reimagining of, and liberation for, the human. How this would be accomplished is
yet to be imagined. Wynter says social uprisings have tremendous links to the
transformation of knowledge.549
Stuart Hall suggests the mere continued presence of the subaltern is “a kind of
passé historical-cultural force, has constantly interrupted, limited, and disrupted
everything else”.550 Existence is important without necessarily being agents of one’s own
histories. Winkfield is still there interrupting, limiting, disrupting; colonialism did not
erase her. Perhaps Jahi set this uprising in motion on her insistence on existing, on living,
and Winkfield as the trickster, pointing out the hypocrisies within, and the mask of,
eurochristian morality within bioethics.551
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CHAPTER 6: THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RESEARCH SUBJECTS IS STILL
COLONIAL
The 2010 case Arizona Board of Regents v. Havasupai Tribe has been of great
interest to bioethicists. The Havasupai nation are a group of approximately 600
Indigenous people living in a remote part of the Grand Canyon in the state of Arizona. In
1989, researchers at Arizona State University created the Diabetes Project to study the
genetic markers for the risk of type 2 diabetes in members of the Havasupai people. In
general, Native American adults have 2-3 times the rate of diabetes than whites, and more
than any other race or ethnicity in the United States, with the Havasupai being no
exception. The researchers secured broad (general) informed consent but allegedly did
not inform the participants that the remaining blood samples might be used to study
topics such as schizophrenia, migration, and genetic homogeneity (can imply inbreeding).
In addition, the DNA was shared with the University of Arizona and subsequently used in
3-4 student dissertations, and approximately 20 publications. These research projects
were never disclosed to the tribe but stumbled upon at a lecture attended by a Havasupai
tribe member. Two lawsuits followed. The second lawsuit, reinstated by the Arizona
Court of Appeals, lead to a settlement in 2010 of $700,000, funds for a clinic and school,
and return of the DNA samples. In what follows, I will mine the foundational ethics book
Principles of Biomedical Ethics by Tom Beauchamp and James Childress for evidence of
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eurochristian colonial themes in light of the case Arizona Board of Regents v. Havasupai
Tribe in order to specify how bioethics misses the forest for the trees in relation to
communities of color. Beauchamp’s ontological assumptions, moral epistemology, and
socio-economic framing within bioethics will be explored in this chapter and will be
compared with Leanne Betasamosake Simpson’s Indigenous perspectives of the same
three categories. And finally, Simpson’s work will be used to elucidate a different
approach to thinking about the Havasupai case.
Beauchamp and Childress’ Principles of Biomedical Ethics
Tom Beauchamp’s and James Childress’ book Principles of Biomedical Ethics
has been a cornerstone of bioethics since the 1980s. The concepts within the book are
easily accessible and have practical applicability for teaching healthcare students, for
ethics consultation within healthcare institutions, and for framing both basic and clinical
research guidelines. Now in its seventh iteration, the first edition was published in 1979.
This systematic analysis has grown up alongside the nascent discipline of bioethics itself.
The authors have fastidiously addressed each proposed concept in light of the highest
praise and the most vicious critiques alike. The basis of Principles is that certain midlevel principles can, with further specification, represent a common morality for all
persons, particularly in reference to bioethics. Beauchamp has written that although
autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice are stable and deeply resistant to
change, he and Childress are not in the business of categorizing and maintaining an
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enduring list that is unchallengeable.552 The principles stand in as accessible moral
currency to the high theory of moral philosophy of which Beauchamp questions its utility
for the practice of bioethics at the bedside.553
Both Beauchamp and Childress are philosophers with training in Christian
theology, each holding a degree from Yale Divinity School. Despite their training in
religion and Childress’ role as a theologian, their approach to bioethics is flexibly secular
with practical applicability (but not necessarily sufficient) for religious healthcare
institutions as well. Both authors also serve as fellows of the Hastings Center, which is
“the oldest independent, nonpartisan, interdisciplinary research institute of its kind in the
world,” that “addresses fundamental ethical and social issues in health care, science, and
technology.”554 The influence of these two men is significant on the formation of the
discipline of bioethics. In this chapter I will focus on Tom Beauchamp, especially
because of his foundational and ongoing participation in research on human subjects
through his drafting of the Belmont Report and his work on informed consent in addition
to co-authoring Principles.555
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Beauchamp completed graduate school at Yale Divinity School and earned a
PhD in Philosophy at Johns Hopkins where he studied in depth the works of David
Hume. He is a retired Professor of Philosophy at Georgetown University and Senior
Research Scholar at the University's Kennedy Institute of Ethics where he spent the
duration of his career. In his early days at Georgetown he was appointed to the National
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral
Research to write the Belmont Report at the same time he was drafting the first edition of
Principles with Childress, in the late 1970s.556 The Belmont Report and Principles
materialized simultaneously, and as Beauchamp describes, the projects overlapped in
many ways.557 The well-known bioethics approach of Principlism was borne out of these
two works. The Belmont Report named beneficence, respect for persons, and justice as its
three guiding concepts, and Principles added nonmaleficence as the fourth. Beauchamp
reveals in his article “My Path to Bioethics” his lifelong concern with inequality, racial
segregation, and other practical public issues such as war, civil disobedience, and
affirmative action, which propelled him into the profession he chose.558 His professional
works have focused on David Hume, informed consent/research ethics, moral
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philosophy, right to die, and animal ethics. Beauchamp ultimately wanted bioethics to be
multidisciplinary and practical, neither of which philosophy was.559
While many critiques of Principles have been executed, they will not be
covered in this dissertation. This analysis does not set out to create a new theory, to settle
the universalism/relativism debate, nor to discredit the good that has come from
Beauchamp’s (or Childress’) work. The purpose of this analysis is to move beyond their
work by framing some of the fundamental concepts within in terms of anti-colonial
scholarship. Despite the passage of time and of the attempts over the last decades to
address racism, the United States continues to boast a culture of economic extremes,
material disparities, and entrenched racism. The intention of this chapter is to uncover the
insidious way the eurochristian worldview continues to influence and undermine the
efforts of bioethicists and healthcare providers from within.
In Principles, Beauchamp and Childress locate the Havasupai case under the
title of group harm. They deal with issues such as the unethical use of broad consents, the
risk of stigmatization, threat to identity and land rights, and that researchers may have
taken advantage of a vulnerable population. All of this is true. But if we, as bioethicists,
were to analyze this case from an anti-colonial perspective, this is not just a story about
harms. It is about power and privilege. The fact that genetic research is required at all on
a population with a severe disease load is, itself, due to the dispossession of the
Havasupai people from their land, bodies, and minds. The fact that the Western world
considers the tribe “vulnerable” is related to this dispossession. The system of scientific
559
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and material progress that defines the massive medical research agendas of academic
institutions is the same system that is the root of Native American health problems
including high death rates, diabetes, cardiac and renal disease, substance abuse, and high
rates of suicide and mental illness. This colonial system of progress and wealth
accumulation continues to colonize Indigenous people through land control, consumption
of natural resources, and pollution on reservation land, putting Native Americans at
increased environmental health risk. The building of massive research centers, the fueling
of those centers, and the intense competition for research grants and publications all
radiate from the eurochristian linear evolutionary trajectory while upholding underlying
harms of resource extraction, pollution, and capitalism-induced inequalities. And on
stolen Native American land. The very system that wants to “help” the Havasupai are
part of the system that continues to dispossess them. Bioethics is not outside of the
eurochristian system, nor is research ethics, despite the intent to “protect”.
Leanne Simpson
Simpson is Michi Saagiig Nishnaabeg from the area around the Great Lakes that
is now called the Northwest Territories, Canada. She is a writer, poet, song writer,
storyteller, activist, and faculty member at the Dechinta Centre for Research and
Learning in Denendeh.560 She received her PhD from the University of Manitoba and is a
member of Alderville First Nation. She has spent most of her adult life learning and
living Nishnaabeg from the Elders, breathing Nishnaabeg into revival for new
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generations. Simpson has written several books, including Dancing on Our Turtle’s Back
and As We Have Always Done. Simpson has been teaching land-based education for
twenty years. She was awarded Best Subsequent Book by the Native American and
Indigenous Studies Association for her book As We Have Always Done, and the
Outstanding Indigenous Artist at the Peterborough Arts Awards in 2018 for her song
writing and musical performance.561
Grounded normativity is the basis of an Indigenous ethic that is rooted in the
relationship with the land and all living things, is inseparable from these things. Simpson
knows the recovery of an ethic of grounded normativity is only possible through radical
resurgence which can be conceptualized through three objectives. One, it sets out to look
critically at the settler colonialism of the present including capitalism, white supremacy,
heteropatriarchy, and anti-Blackness. Second, it is an Indigenous refusal of dispossession.
And third, it is for Indigenous peoples, particularly Nishnaabeg for Simpson, to become
deeply re-embedded and enmeshed in their own grounded normativity. Her idea of
resurgence is political, not just cultural. It is a full recovery of Indigenous bodies, minds,
and land. Understanding the Havasupai case from within an Indigenous framework as
described by Simpson provides a critical lens for identifying both the deficiencies of
eurochristian research ethics and for a very different kind of ethic to emerge.
Beauchamp’s Ontology
Unlike the Christian metaphysical ontology of Engelhardt and the DarwinianMalthusian ontology of Singer, Beauchamp does not wear his ontological assumptions on
561
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his sleeve. What is Beauchamp’s origin story? His empathy toward the oppressed aligns
with a humanistic approach, while his attendance at Yale School of Divinity is a clue to a
Christian worldview. In an interview he remarked that as a graduate student he was
interested in religious studies because his understanding of ethics had come from this
discipline.562 His academic focus is on philosophical argument including conceptual
analysis, argumentation, and rational justification, but without reference to the origins of
rationality (metaphysical, human nature, a priori). The difficulty in pinpointing
Beauchamp’s worldview is an underlying point of this dissertation – that the
eurochristian worldview is anonymous and invisible for those of us within it. Whether
practicing Christians, self-proclaimed humanists, or rational pragmatists, all of these
traits are eurochristian, and seemingly normal and benign to eurochristians; but not
necessarily to others. The underlying traits of the eurochristian worldview are
fundamentally about hierarchy, progress, and temporal, rather than spatial, arrangements.
One’s orientation to the world is like breathing; we move a certain way in the world
unconsciously. While Beauchamp does not display as overt and obvious an expression of
the eurochristian worldview as Engelhardt and Singer, he is eurochristian in his
theorizing. This is demonstrated in an absence of substantive discourse in the worldviews
of others, relegating “particular” content-full ethics to the margins of Principlism. The
overriding project for Beauchamp is to prove the likenesses in people’s moralities, rather
than to dwell in the differences. His is a matter of intentional focus on shared morality
562
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rather than the incompatible and worthwhile differences in moralities based on inherent
ontological thinking.563 Principlism centralizes liberal, rational, and secular thinking over
differing ontologically driven moralities. What will become clear when it comes to
research, is that while certain issues such as adequate review boards and informed
consent promise to adjudicate and prevent many harms to research subjects, they are
framed within a fundamentally limited eurochristian worldview. From an Indigenous
perspective, these safeguards only scratch the surface when an Indigenous worldview
comes in contact with Western institutions.
Simpson’s Indigenous Ontological Grounding
The ontology from all Indigenous peoples’ origin stories cannot be represented
by one person or one nation. What is described here is Simpson’s account of
Nishnaabeg’s creation stories, which she describes as layered in kinetics, lessons
embedded in stories, and theory. In her telling, Gzhwe Manidoo is the Creator, “the one
who loves us unconditionally”.564 But many creation stories exist, from the sky, the
water, and the ground. Each story connects the past and future with the present
generations. In her telling, constellations are not only doorways where spirits are
transported between sky and earth, but they are also symbolically coded mappings that
remind one of the time for certain ceremonies and story-tellings, through which come
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enduring theories of Nishnaabeg intelligence.565 Unlike the Christian creation story in
which everything was made in seven days and handed to humans, in Nishnaabeg creation
all worlds “were created, collectively, out of struggle, and the process of creating and
creation was given to [them], not the results of that.”566 This idea of collective struggle is
the heart of Nishnaabeg origin stories. For example, as Simpson describes, the story of
what Westerners call the big dipper is one of misadventure and struggle for Ojiig the
fisher, wolverine, lynx, and otter. It is a story about their “mistakes, struggle,
mobilization, sacrifice, love, negotiation, and sharing” on their way to gain more sunlight
from the sky, and is told every year during certain constellational arrangements. This
kind of origin story, of which there are many, forms the basis of grounded normativity, or
a place-based system of thinking in which time is circular and everything is in
relationship with everything else. The land and all of its gifts, the animals and non-living
things, one’s ancestors and future generations all form a web of reality, informing one’s
ethics and knowledge systems. The system is what Tink Tinker calls an egalitariancollateral image schema, in which mutual respect and reciprocity replaces the hierarchical
structure of the eurochristian world.567 A spatial orientation replaces the eurochristian
orientation to time. This is why land is vitally important to Indigenous peoples – it is how
one orients oneself to the world in relationship and interconnectivity while providing
what is necessary for life. Land is not a resource to be owned and exploited, but to be
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respected. Simpson notes that for Indigenous people it is easier to rely on liberal Western
theories than to struggle for land. But for many Indigenous people the only true
decolonization is for a return of Indigenous land from the hands of colonizers and their
heirs.568
In reflecting on the Havasupai case, the worldview which defines their existence
relies on their relationship to their land, to a collateral egalitarian organization of the
world, and to the origin stories that have sustained them for thousands of years. In the
origin studies performed on their DNA, genetic science challenged the tribe’s identity
and ontological organization of the world as they view it. Beauchamp and Childress do
account for the harms of genetic information to a nation’s identity when they write, “to be
told that the tribe was instead of Asian origin” instead of originating in the Grand Canyon
was “disorienting and abhorrent.”569 Despite this recognition, they are still imposing a
universalizing eurochristian ontology on the Havasupai community. They do not dispute
that genetics is the final word on truth, nor do they allow for other possible origin stories
as ways of organizing truth. And yet, there are still many Indigenous communities who
continue to exist in their fullness alongside the colonial world, alongside a colonial
reality.570 Indigenous communities define their cosmogonies through their origin stories,
such as the Nishnaabeg creation stories. These stories orient individuals and communities
not only to the value of respecting all life, but are intrinsic in the way they move through
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the world. To repeat Sylvia Wynter’s quote, humans cannot pre-exist their origin stories
any more than a bee, at a purely biological level, can pre-exist its beehive.571 Even the
origin myth of evolution, according to Wynter, is “part-science, part-myth” in its
mistaking a biocentric origin with the basis of being human.572 So, ultimately, studying
only biological origins of a community serves to dehumanize and delegitimize that
community’s claim to exist how and where they do. Many traditional Native American
tribes continue to struggle to recover their traditional civilizations. And while many
participate in Western constructs, the fact remains that oral histories and origin stories are
fundamental to Indigenous ethics and a resurgence of traditional life and identity. So to
engage in the repudiation of, for instance, the Bering Strait theory, is an insistence on
disproving a merely biological ontology, which says nothing about Wynter’s sociogeny,
the relational narratives that bind human communities and define reality and morality.
The hypothesis only serves to classify Native Americans as immigrants, potentially
delegitimizing their connections to territory and furthering the justifications of
colonialism. Fundamentally, despite science, an oral history of stories that create
structure, meaning, and relevance for a community should be no more in question than a
reliance on science to do the same thing. Even so, the Bering Strait theory is heavily
disputed and is still distant from the “truth”.573
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Even though the eurochristian narrative is based on scientific fact, it cannot
explain the how and why, the meaning of life. In the end, what may be more significant is
how one’s origin stories frame one’s ethics. A eurochristian origin story based on both
science and the biblical justification of human exploitation of all living things as deep
ontology even in non-Christians, has little interest overall in the respect and protection of
all life. Instead, it is destroying the planet and maintaining racial hierarchies. Like
Wynter, Simpson talks about how human neuropathways are changed by how we live,
organize, and engage the world. The challenge of the eurochristian is to realize our
neuropathways form what is believed to be the truth, to be moral; and may differ from
other societies. An Indigenous worldview of creation as a collaborative struggle and of
learning from mistakes within a nurturing community sets up a very different kind of
morality than from a eurochristian creation story that requires us to think of ourselves as
individual sinners, and at the same time gives us, humans, the charge to subdue the earth
for our purposes. The stories we live by define who we are.
Beauchamp’s Moral Epistemology: Inclusion, Common Morality, and Protection from
Harm
In exploring Beauchamp’s epistemology, three themes will be examined:
common morality, virtue ethics, and research ethics. First, the basis of Beauchamp and
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Childress’ ethical construct begins with a common morality, defined as “a set of universal
norms shared by all persons committed to morality. It is not merely a morality, in
contrast to other moralities.”574 For Beauchamp and Childress, “the common morality is
applicable to all persons in all places, and we rightly judge all human conduct by its
standards.”575 In its essence, their common morality is universal and rests upon four
general principles: autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice. The authors
admit that little empirical data support this assertion, but a common morality is the
foundational assumption upon which they rely. They do allow for consideration of
“particular” ethics, but these cannot challenge or replace the common morality.576 The
common morality, for Beauchamp, is always in pursuit of human flourishing and to
“ameliorate or counteract the tendency for the quality of people’s lives to worsen or for
social relationships to disintegrate.”577 Beauchamp writes, ”In every well-functioning
society norms are in place to prohibit lying, breaking promises, causing bodily harm,
stealing, fraud, the taking of life, the neglect of children, and failures to keep
contracts.”578
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Beauchamp is a positivist in his assertion that all persons who are dedicated to
the objectives of morality share the same fundamental values. He proposes that with a
well-designed study this could be demonstrated. He is also a constructivist in his
recognition of the capacity of particular moralities, such as Talmudic norms, Catholic
casuistry, and professional values, to be legitimately different and still loyal to the
objectives of morality. Beauchamp is a pragmatist in his justification of common
morality. His four principles are practical in their usefulness at the bedside through
specification of their meanings. Specification is the narrowing down of a norm into the
who, when, why, and how. In other words, specification adds content to the principles.
Yet, despite agreement on the general level of principles, specification will bring about
genuine incongruities between worldviews. If particular moralities differently specify the
common morality, is it still common? Who breaks the tie? For the Havasupai research
protocol, the subjects consented to research based on an idea of beneficence for the health
of the community. The researchers may have agreed with this, but also may have defined
beneficence as something different such as to further science.
From an anti-colonial perspective, several problems arise with common
morality. First, how are the parameters of human flourishing and social order
conceptually defined? And by whom? The power to define lies in the hands of health care
institutions, beside practitioners, and bioethicists (along with law and public policy) and
to deem whether the patient, family member, or research subject does indeed have human
flourishing or societal order in mind. Second, when bioethicists talk about a wellfunctioning society, are they including everyone in that society? If the discourse is about

247

lying, breaking promises, causing bodily harm, neglecting children, and failing to keep
contracts, these are things that continue to be endured by the Indigenous peoples of Turtle
Island. How well a society is functioning depends on who you ask within that society.
Beauchamp does recognize this. He writes, “the common morality does not now, and has
never in fact, included such a provision of equal moral consideration for all individuals –
although this scope change could become part of the common morality.”579 Yet, the
problem with increasing the scope of equal consideration is the goal of subsuming all
persons under a broader common morality causes another issue. For Indigenous peoples,
inclusion is erasure. The Native American civilizing project of the last several centuries
has been an exercise in their erasure through the coercive measures of “inclusion” in
eurochristian economics, education, health care, and political systems. Civilization has
been an attempt to destroy Indigenous life. And third, social order, or as Beauchamp
defines it the norms necessary “to ameliorate or counteract the tendency for the quality of
people’s lives to worsen or for social relationships to disintegrate,” unless in an
egalitarian society, always subjugates some people at the expense of others. Without
defining who we mean by society, a norm that keeps safe some of society at the expense
of others should not be an objective of common morality.
Moral character is a second epistemological concept that is highlighted in
Principles. It is written, “all persons with normal moral capacities can cultivate the
character traits of chief importance to morality.”580 The virtues and vices spelled out by
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Aristotle and expanded upon by Thomas Aquinas are Western epistemology. Virtue
ethics are derived from Aristotle, who philosophized at length about excesses and deficits
of human virtues only a select few could cultivate.581 Aristotle knew that “happiness
obviously needs the presence of external goods as well, since it is impossible, or at least
no easy matter, to perform noble actions without resources.”582 He also notes the
condition of luck in prosperity which provides for more opportunities to be virtuous. The
healthcare professional and the bioethicist are privileged to have the luxury of creating
moral standards that are “reasonable and fair-minded,” “sufficiently advanced morally,”
and with a “renewable sense of progress and achievement.”583 And while no one would
argue against a virtuous physician or nurse, the prioritizing of “good behavior” causes a
moral hierarchy where those with resources and power uphold the very values they have
defined, while blaming those who are structurally oppressed and impoverished for their
own suffering. The problem is with the eurochristian choices of priority and focus.
Survival and morality are only attainable together by the strongest of wills.584

581

Aristotle’s teachings were to young free men of social standing. In the defining of happiness, he
distinguished between the base happiness of pleasure chosen by the “masses, the coarsest people” and the
civilized and virtuous happiness of “sophisticated people, men of action.” Roger Crisp, Aristotle:
Nicomachean Ethics (Cambridge University Press, 2014), viii and 6.
582

Ibid., 14.

583

Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (7th Edition), 19, 50, 51.

584

De La Torre writes that “the practice of virtue by an individual creates a false sense of righteousness.”
He notes, “for virtue ethicists”, “personal piety or the demonstration of virtues in equated with ethics; yet,
for Hispanics, ethics can never be reduced to individual traits , for not matter how personal we wish to
make ethics, it always has a collective dimension.” De La Torre, Latina/O Social Ethics: Moving Beyond
Eurocentric Moral Thinking, 28-29.

249

Consider the words of a Nazi concentration camp survivor, Viktor Frankl, who
wrote that those who survived the camps were not necessarily the most moral.
“On the average, only those prisoners could keep alive who, after
years of trekking from camp to camp, had lost all scruples in their
fight for existence; they were prepared to use every means, honest
and otherwise, even brutal force, theft, and betrayal of their
friends, in order to save themselves. We who have come back, by
the aid of many lucky chances or miracles – whatever one may
choose to call them—we know: the best of us did not return.”585
While this is an extreme example of the pressures upon a person’s morality, values
change depending on one’s circumstances. Virtue is easy when one has plentiful
resources and feels safe. The issues with setting up a common morality lie in its
exclusivity, its detachment from many persons’ realities, and most importantly, the
reasons for the depressed realities of many racialized and ethnic groups.
Perhaps a common morality exists, but it does not seem that appeals to virtue
confronts racism and disparity. The common morality includes both standards for action
and recognition of desired characteristics. It holds everyone equally accountable for a
eurochristian morality, while the forces of colonialism, racism, and the epistemological
erasure continue to situate groups of people in survival and resistance modes. What is
eurochristian morality to people who are racialized, impoverished, and live with the
stories of slavery and genocide passed down from their grandparents and great
grandparents? And then those victims of a racist and colonial system are called evil, lazy,
self-destructive, criminal, and irresponsible by their oppressors. Virtue ethics is not about
giving the oppressed a bar to reach. Instead, it keeps them marginalized and labeled
585
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negatively in the continuation of colonial power. This is not Beauchamp’s intention, nor
is it any of us who are eurochristian. Yet, the insidious nature of colonialism continues on
within us. My critique of Beauchamp is not that universals do not exist, but refocusing on
the particulars, the moral differences in worldviews, would be a more fruitful way to
address racism and racial inequality.
Third, research on human subjects has required a moral response by bioethics.
Research is a human endeavor. For the West it has become a site of not only hope and
cure, but of individual profit, of capitalist ventures, of competition, and of exploitation of
human subjects. Since the 1970s Beauchamp has been involved in the ethical response to
such egregious research protocols as the Tuskegee syphilis study, as well as the
awareness that research policies at the NIH were “morally and legally inadequate.”586 He
has been a strong voice for research subjects since his writing of The Belmont Report in
1978, and over the last decades his work has continued to attempt to clarify and improve
informed consent in both research and clinical practice. He has lamented the lack of
movement of informed consent toward a more autonomous and educated permission by a
patient rather than the legal and institutional policies that continue to drive a diminished
utility of the concept.
Human subjects are protected by institutional review boards, consisting of a
group of professionals who review every research proposal within their institution.
Subjects are also protected through the process of consent and required to give their
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permission to engage in the trial once they have been given adequate information
regarding the risks, benefits, and details of the trial. Special groups of potential human
subjects are considered vulnerable such as prisoners, pregnant women, children, the
cognitively impaired, and those who have situational vulnerability and are more
susceptible to undue influence or coercion. Issues of intrinsic vulnerability such as
ethnicity, income, education, literacy, housing, and legal status were all factors in the
Havasupai nation. These factors and the poorer health status of the Havasupai have
largely been caused by colonialism, past and present. Do eurochristians have special
duties to groups that are vulnerable because of colonialism? But defining the Havasupai
as vulnerable is only part of the equation. How can Native Americans be seen as
sovereign and vulnerable at the same time?
Beauchamp also deals with the ethical problems of the Havasupai case, listing it
(with Childress) under the title of group harm in Principles, and as an inappropriate use
of broad consent in his article Informed Consent: Its History, Meaning, and Present
Challenges.587 His discussions deal with some of the problems associated with the case
such as the abuse/miscommunications with broad consents, the investigation of highly
sensitive and potentially discriminatory personal and group knowledge, and that
researchers may have taken advantage of a vulnerable population. All of this is true. But
what Beauchamp and Childress do not deal with is the WHY. Why does a high rate of
diabetes exist in Native American communities? Why have the Havasupai acquired the
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status of “vulnerable”? Also, the description that they are uneducated and require
simplified consent, while well-intentioned based on the concept of true informed consent,
compares the knowledge traditions of the Havasupai with Western education. This
assumption of the Havasupai as “uneducated” harkens back to the descriptions of the
missionaries’ need to educate Native American children in boarding schools in order to
civilize and assimilate them. To illustrate this point, at a recent conference, the Lakota
activist Robert Cross refused a Western education by running away in the 6th grade from
the boarding school where he was treated poorly. He refused to lose his Indigenous
knowledge, and instead “educated the hell out of myself about you all.”588 Many
traditional Native American communities still exist, and struggle to recover their
traditional knowledges and seek self-rule and freedom from colonial constructs. Often
what is perceived as uneducated is a resistance to eurochristian epistemologies. But
Beauchamp does not identify this tension, between being “uneducated” or having
different epistemologies altogether. In sum, while Arizona State University did harm the
Havasupai in multiple ways, the bioethical framing of this case as only one of harming a
vulnerable population is limited in its view. The respect for Havasupai epistemology is
absent from the conversation. Despite Beauchamp’s sensitive review of the case, research
ethics focuses on vulnerability (which is colonial in its cause) and refrains from meeting
the Havasupai on non-stigmatized and equally valid epistemological ground. It does not
stop the cycle of oppression, erasure, and assimilation. The harm that Beauchamp left out

588

Robert Cross, speaking at the Red Skin/Tanned Hide conference at Iliff School of Theology on March
29, 2019.

253

in his analysis is the complete dispossession of Indigenous people from their sovereignty,
particularly in the handling of the research protocol. An anti-colonial perspective of
Indigenous epistemology provides a different approach to research ethics.
Nishnaabeg Epistemology: Grounded Normativity
Simpson explains the Nishnaabeg intelligence system as “a series of
interconnected and overlapping algorithms—stories, ceremonies, and the land itself are
procedures for solving the problems of life.”589 “Living is a creative act, with selfdetermined making or producing at its core.” Ethics and values are not a set of protocols
or laws or series of teachings as they are in Western thought. They are more fluid, “a
series of complex interconnected cycling processes that make up a nonlinear, overlapping
emergent and responsive network of relationships of deep reciprocity, intimate and global
interconnection and interdependence, that spirals across time and space.”590 What has
been lost is not just land, but the intelligence from which morality arises from Indigenous
grounded normativity that colonialism, including neoliberalism, land acquisition, and
settlement, has tried to eliminate. Being Nishnaabeg is not just a “quaint cultural
difference that makes one interesting”, but a different way of being in the world.591
Simpson, along with other Indigenous scholars, talk about an ethics of grounded
normativity. Glen Coulthard, in Red Skins White Masks, defines grounded normativity as
“the modalities of Indigenous land-connected practices and longstanding experiential
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knowledge that inform and structure our ethical engagements with the world and our
relationships with human and nonhuman others over time.”592 The foundation of place on
interrelated practices, knowledge, and ethics are what, for Simpson, “construct the
Nishnaabeg world”, and is the “closest thing to Coulthard’s grounded normativity”.593
She cites the seven grandmother teachings of the Seven Fires, which include “ethics of
noninterference and the practice of self-determination, the practice of consent, the art of
honesty, empathy, caring, sharing , and self-sufficiency…”594 She describes the grounded
normativity of Nishnaabeg people like this:
“our economy, fully integrated with spirituality and politics, was
intensely local within a network of Indigenous internationalism
that included plant and animal nations, the Great Lakes, the St.
Lawrence River, and nonhuman beings and other Indigenous
nations.”595
Compared to the categorical confines of common morality, Nishnaabeg values are of
profound freedom and acceptance of individual self-determination within a network of
respect. The Nishnaabeg world and knowledge system continues alongside the colonial
world, and within it there is no room for seeking the colonizer’s acknowledgement or
approval.596 Yet, the colonial world continues to work to minimize the complexity of, and
overall shrink, Indigenous knowledge systems.597 In Beauchamp’s work on common
592

Coulthard, Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition, 13.

593

Simpson, As We Have Always Done: Indigenous Freedom through Radical Resistance 23.

594

Ibid., 24.

595

Ibid.

596

Ibid., 16.

597

Ibid., 23.

255

morality, the “particulars,” often fall under the rubric of “culture”. This designation is
problematic for people and communities of color. As Simpson explains, culture is
compatible with the dominant eurochristian world; it can be subsumed within it and coopted by liberal recognition. What she, as an Indigenous scholar is interested in, is not
compatibility with, recognition by, or reconciliation with eurochristians; this would
signify continued assimilation and erasure. Nor is she interested in a replication of
eurochristian anti-queerness or anti-Blackness. What she is interested in is full political
resurgence of Indigenous communities and the recovery of land.598 A common morality,
like the notions of multiculturalism and inclusivity, tend to minimize the very real
differences in people’s values and behaviors based on fundamentally different
worldviews. Beauchamp and Childress say are looking for the most consistent truth, or
coherence.599 But what they are actually discussing are eurochristian values.
Simpson also has an Indigenous perspective on research. She tells of the story
of the first Nishnaabeg intellectual, Nanabush, as also being the first researcher.
Nanabush traveled the world twice, not to gain natural resources or to “help those less
fortunate,” but to understand Nishnaabeg’s place in the world.600 His research
methodology, which is Nishnaabeg research methodology, is “through doing or making,
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relationship, visiting, singing, dancing, storytelling, experimenting, observing, reflecting,
mentoring, ceremony, dreaming, and visioning as ways of generating knowledge.”
Nishnaabeg research ethics centers around “consent, reciprocity, respect, renewal,
relationship.”601 As she describes, Nanabush is accompanied his second trip around the
world by wolf, who brought a different lens, formed different relationships, and
experienced the world differently than Nanabush would have done alone. Their travels
demonstrate a contextual learning of internationalism through which there is sharing of
technology, stories, and relationship to the earth, not just relationship to other humans.
Their story stresses the importance of acknowledging one's presence and respect when on
another's land. Their focus is on creating relationship through reciprocity, not on gaining
academic knowledge through a minimized consent process for the appropriation of
Native American knowledge and bodies. Where in the process of IRBs are Native
Americans protected from appropriation of ideas and material possessions of people of
color by the colonizer? The appropriation of Havasupai genetic material for purposes of
research agendas and researcher advancement is one-sided appropriation. There is a
Western assumption that joining the medical and wider world of progress and
consumption is more desirable for people of color than their current situation. If “we”
could only get “them” to trust us. Native Americans and other persons of color have been
hearing empty promises from white people for centuries. Trust is the white person’s
problem, only to be earned through anti-racist and anti-colonial praxis. Where is the
relationship and reciprocity? Simpson explains how, through grounded normativity,
601

Ibid.

257

Indigenous communities can assess outside ideas, contracts, and technology from within
one’s worldview and values. She has a practice of asking a series of critical questions
before adopting an outside theory including “Where does this theory come from? What is
the context?…What is their relationship to community and the dominant power
structures?...How is it useful within the context of my own people?”602 Simpson’s
Indigenous radical resurgence includes “a rebellious transformation in how we conduct
research, whom we cite as experts, and how our thinking is framed and ultimately takes
place.”603
To perform research under the values of autonomy, justice, nonmaleficence, and
beneficence will look very different from those conducted through Nishnaabeg values of
reciprocity, respect, renewal, and relationship.604 For Native Americans, seeking some
scientific universal truth gets in the way of the more fluid Indigenous maintenance of
harmony and balance.605 For instance, in Indigenous peacemaking practices, the primary
goal is not to investigate the facts of the case and punish perpetrators of crimes; it is to
engage the wrongdoer with the community and the victim, to collectively address the
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imbalances the act created in the community.606 It is about maintaining relationship,
reciprocity, and harmony, not discovering the latest universal theory or scientific finding.
It is not up to Western bioethicists to assume a common morality for everyone.
It is up to particular communities, such as the Havasupai, to decide whether to engage
with these Western theories, by asking whether and how these theories are relevant or
helpful to one’s own practices. De La Torre instructs that
“We must reject any ethical framework or analysis that either
insists on speaking for the marginalized, while refusing to
understand our social location or, worse paternalistically believes
that its so-called universal truths or worldview construction
automatically includes us.607And for De La Torre, truth, beyond
the historical experiences and the social location where individuals
act as social agents, cannot be ascertained, whether said truth exists
or not.”608
Western research ethics arose in response to egregious studies being carried out on bodies
of color, setting out to balance the benefits and harms to individuals with future benefits
for society. It was a start.
Socioeconomics of Beauchamp: The Social Lottery and Justice as Redistribution
Within Beauchamp and Childress’ Principles, three socioeconomic
manifestations of eurochristian thinking are present: their particular framing of justice,
the trope of scarcity, and the relegation of racism to the past. First, a tendency exists in
medicine and bioethics to downplay the reason for the fundamental inequality and
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consider justice in terms of redistribution. Much of Beauchamp and Childress’ chapter on
justice focuses on the models of distributive justice, such as egalitarianism and
utilitarianism. These are models that depend on the nation-state, also a colonial
enterprise, to redistribute the resources in an unfair capitalist system against the influence
of the rich and powerful. From within this essentially hierarchical system, Beauchamp
and Childress argue for the right to health care based on collective social protection and
fair opportunity for “those with unpredictable misfortune.”609 Rearranging healthcare
resources might be helpful to a point, but it does not challenge the overall neoliberal
structure and its fundamental inequalities. This is engaging in the pragmatic heuristic of
inequality, the liberal interest in justice from the eurochristian standpoint. Well-meaning
liberals actually pull more Indigenous peoples into the nation-state. For Simpson,
Western liberal theories can only be useful if considered within grounded normativity.
The provision of welfare through social determinants of health are not bad
goals. But from an anti-colonial view, this misses the forest for the trees. For Indigenous
people especially, it is not a meager monthly check in the mail or an underfunded Indian
Health System, “gifts” from one’s genocidal colonizers, that is ultimately desired. The
current state of Native American health with the high prevalence of diabetes, drug and
alcohol addiction, and shorter life spans reflects how seriously (or not) the federal

609

Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (7th Edition), 272.

260

government is taking their fiduciary duty based on the Supreme Court trust relationship
within a colonial system.610
A second problem with Beauchamp and Childress’ ideas of justice is that they
use the language of a human lottery, and of the concepts of unfortunate and unfair in their
analysis of justice. They identify the problematic nature of these concepts, and state that
“fair opportunity without reference to welfare makes for an inadequate account of
justice.”611 But this discussion is void of the elements of power and oppression that create
the need for fair opportunity and welfare in the first place. Beauchamp and Childress
define the lotteries as both biological and social.612 One’s genetics, varying abilities and
disabilities, may be truly about chance. But the social aspects of one’s life are not a role
of the dice; they are about how society organizes itself.
Third, Beauchamp and Childress assert that justice is the most important
principle in the book.613 They mention in the chapter on justice that inequalities “are
often distributed by social institutions that can be structured to explicitly to reduce
inequalities.”614 How this is to be accomplished, especially when healthcare has become a
business, is not addressed. Unfortunately, their discussion on racial disparities accounts
for only two pages of the entire justice chapter, and the percentage of scholars of color
610
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cited in the same chapter are roughly 7% of the citations. While institutions have the
power to make decisions to prioritize the poor, it is those very institutions that have
joined the ranks of Western capitalism and succumbed to Adam Smith’s invisible
hand.615
And a finally, justice is framed by Beauchamp and Childress in Principles as
one of the four main principles of common morality. Why is the suffering of black,
brown, and red bodies and minds “balanced” with autonomy and beneficence? Why does
bioethics not hold a preferential option for the marginalized? Beauchamp and Childress
describe the tradeoffs between autonomy and the public good, asserting that autonomous
choices can be overridden by public health concerns—those that harm innocent others—
such as the dumping of toxins in the water supply or the quarantining of persons with
infectious diseases, and those that require scarce resources. Are not the health disparities
among people of color based on their history of and continued oppression considered the
harming of innocent others? Working from a position of scarcity, would not the
continued harm of people of color justify their care over expensive cancer drugs and
cardiac transplants? People of color, including Native Americans, African Americans,
615
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and Latinx find themselves clawing their way back to health against the pressures of
continued racism and the colonial project.
The idea of scarcity is also part of the worldview of eurochristian America. The
mythical “limited resources” argument undergirds the need for efficiencies, costeffectiveness, rationing, budgeting, and prioritizing. Beauchamp and Childress explain
about these constraints that “it seems unfair and unacceptable to allow forms of costeffective rationing that adversely affect or ignore levels of health among the most
disadvantaged populations, in effect worsening their condition.” If there was a scarcity,
this author would be in agreement. But, how does one confirm scarcity exists outside of
the fact that the top 10% of people in the U.S. own 72% of America’s wealth?616
Inherited wealth and the exponential accumulation of capital, in addition to what Thomas
Picketty calls “hypermeritocracy” by supermanagers who make a fortune out of high
incomes, are large contributors to the increasing inequalities in the United States. 617 The
Malthusian trope of scarcity is a myth. While many feel a scarcity, there is no real
scarcity, only a perverse economy. Rationing and efficiency measures in the face of
extreme wealth inequality is a poor strategy. As Wynter has opined, Homo economicus is
overrepresented in eurochristian society, and economists have become the “secular
priesthood”.618 In Native American worldview, the values of harmony, balance, and
616
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generosity protect communities from scarcity. Tinker highlights a Native American value
of generosity as the common community-building ceremony in which everyone gives
away their possessions to others. Compared to societies who value those with the most
material wealth, Native American communities value those who give the most away.619
But for those living on reservations such as the Havasupai, the loss of arable land and
water sources and the erasure of Indigenous knowledge for self-sufficiency through
genocide and boarding schools inhibit their ability to exist in harmony and abundance
with the living world around them.
A third example of eurochristian thinking in Principles is the relegation of
oppression and racism to the past. In a discussion concerning the moral status of persons,
Beauchamp and Childress recognize the perils of using moral status to define classes of
individuals. They also argue that without norms around moral status, practices of slavery
and human research subject exploitation would continue to thrive. Yet, they subtly locate
the substandard treatment of racial groups in the past, for instance, “…some racial groups
were treated in the United States as if they had little or no moral status by some of the
finest centers of biomedical research in the world, and by sponsors of the research.”620
The hazard with framing the “lack” of moral status of African-Americans as a thing of
the past (as if the passing of law solves for this) blinds the reader to the continued reality
that despite attaining “moral status,” people of color are not treated equally with white
counterparts. It could easily be argued that in the Havasupai studies, the research
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participants were treated as if possessing an inferior moral status by a fine center of
research. To be sure, Beauchamp and Childress are concerned with the inequalities in
healthcare today, but their language obscures the continued colonial penchant for
assigning moral status based on skin color. Beauchamp is thoroughly entangled in a
liberal eurochristian socioeconomic world, where justice is at best a limited redistribution
of resources based on a capitalist state, driven by an economics of scarcity, and unaware
of the depth of continued racism and colonialism within bioethics.
Socioeconomics of an Indigenous Community
For Simpson, Indigenous freedom is something very different than living in the
capitalistic fear-based scarcity of the eurochristian world. She explains freedom this way:
What does it mean for me, as an Nishnaabekewe , to live in
freedom? I want my great-grandchildren to be able to fall in love
with every piece of our territory. I want their bodies to carry with
them every story, every song, ever piece of poetry hidden in our
Nishnaabeg language. I want them to be able to dance through
their lives with joy. I want them to live without fear because they
know respect, because the know in their bones what respect feels
like. I want them to live without fear because they have a pristine
environment with clean waterways that will provide them with the
physical and emotional sustenance to uphold their responsibilities
to the land, their families, their communities, and their nations. I
want them to be valued, heard, and cherished by our
communities.621
As Simpson tells it, her people were travelers. Their system of government was
intermittent and changing, like “breathing – a rhythm of contract and release.”622 Leaders
chosen by the people would be appointed for a period of time or an important decision,
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and then would disengage when finished. Children were full citizens, and everyone’s
self-determination was respected. For her, the prime minister (or president) and the
nation-state are inconsequential to the full life of Nishnaabeg people.623 No matter
whether the government is democratic or republican, for Indigenous people it is still an
oppressive settler-colonial nation-state. Justice for many Indigenous peoples is about
sovereignty and freedom from colonial oppression.
Capitalism is a driving force for this oppression. The history of America is one
of the removal of Native Americans from their land, resource extractivism, and
accumulation of capital. The dispossession of Indigenous peoples was necessary for
colonizers to profit and the Americas to thrive. This dispossession is described by
Simpson as the removal of bodies from the land, yes. But also the destruction of their
ethics of grounded normativity, and with that followed the current state of poverty,
murder, addiction, mental illness, and Christianization of Indigenous spirits. But this is
not about gaining land back for resource extraction or profit. She describes that “the
opposite of dispossession is not possession, it is deep, reciprocal, consensual
attachment.”624 She explains how her ancestors “accumulated networks of meaningful,
deep, fluid, intimate collective and individual relationships of trust,” not capital.
Resources were shared. Everyone was cared for through these relationships and through
gift giving and regular redistribution. In fact, excess, greed, private property, and
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disproportionate profits were considered mistakes in this economy.625 Capitalism and
global “neoliberalism provide just enough ill-conceived programming and “funding” to
keep us in a constant state of crisis, which inevitably they market as our fault.”626 She
notes that Canada would like to put aside the past and “start a new relationship on
Canada's unchallenged jurisdiction over the land.”627 She worries that if Indigenous
peoples do not claim and revitalize their own intelligence systems and grounded
normativity, they will continue to be victimized by dispossession of the state. From an
Indigenous perspective, Beauchamp and Childress’ chapter on justice outlining state-led
distributive justice within the confines of a capitalistic healthcare system will not affect
the dispossession of Indigenous peoples overall. It is a band-aid on a gaping wound.
In comparison to the eurochristian trope of scarcity, Indigenous worlds focus on
abundance. Considering the vast wealth in the Americas, it makes one question this fearbased thinking. Simpson explains how “Our knowledge system, the education system, the
economic system, and the political system of the Mihi Saagiig Nishnaabeg were designed
to promote more life…to generate life of all living things.”628 Besides an abundance of
life, the idea of abundance is reflected in “the idea that the earth gives and sustains all
life, that “natural resources” are not “natural resources” at all, but gifts from Aki, the
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land.”629 If one respects the earth, it will reciprocate with abundance. Rules of economy
can be seen in the guidelines of the Honorable Harvest as explained by Robin Wall
Kimmerer in Braiding Sweetgrass: “Never take the first. Never take the last. Take only
what you need. Take only that which is given. Never take more than half. Leave some for
others. Harvest in a way that minimizes harm. Use it respectfully. Never waste what you
have taken. Share.”630
The downplay of racism in the present by eurochristians, Beauchamp included,
probably affects Indigenous peoples most acutely. But as Simpson points out, it is
dispossession more than discrimination alone that has attempted to destroy Indigenous
communities. The goal of colonialism has always been their erasure, whether through
genocide or assimilation. The Western myth is that the colonizers were successful. But as
Audra Simpson said in Mohawk Interruptus, the fact that colonialism still survives in
settler-colonial form indicates it “fails at what it is supposed to do: eliminate Indigenous
people; take all their land; absorb them into a white, property-owning body politic.”631
Many Westerners believe Wounded Knee was the final downfall of Native Americans.
But in The Heartbeat of Wounded Knee: Native America from 1890 to the Present, David
Treuer outlines the rich and resilient histories of the Native Americans since the
Massacre of Wounded Knee. This resilience can be seen in Simpson’s methodology
which she calls “kwe”, which is to be unapologetically herself, including her refusal of
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colonial domination, heteropatriarchy, and pressure to be tamed by whiteness in the
academy; in essence, a refusal to disappear.632
An Indigenous Approach to the Havasupai Research Case
When viewed through the lens of Leanne Simpson, the deficiencies of research
ethics stand out. The Havasupai trusted a research center and its faculty, and the “treaty”
was broken yet again.633 The ethics system broke down. But even so, the system at its
best only requires a signed consent form, and, in theory, a certain level of understanding
by research subjects. What if the Indigenous ontologies, epistemologies, and
socioeconomic factors had all been accounted for when entering into the contract? What
if an Indigenous research methodology had been used? What if the research was carried
out with reciprocity, respect, renewal, and relationship? Most eurochristian researchers
would find this painful, to build relationships over time and to do research the Indigenous
way, in part because of their Western ontological orientation to time rather than place and
relationship. Eurochristians tend to be rushed, goal-oriented, and impatient because of
this frantic pursuit of progress and profit. As for reciprocity, how can the assault of
colonialism be redeemed through an Indigenous research ethics? Should the research
centers have given more back than they took? Despite the errors made by the Institutional
Review Board and the lax use of a broad consent form, had the researchers slowed down,
formed relationships with the Havasupai, and partnered with them, the errors would
likely have never been made.
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Research institutes are largely unfamiliar with Indigenous research
methodologies such as those in Decolonizing Methodologies by Linda Tuhiwai Smith,
and are driven by largely eurochristian Western-educated people and institutions.634 For
research ethics to cease being colonial and racist, it must start with reading and learning
from the epistemologies of different communities. What would bioethics look like if it
were about reciprocity, balance, and gratitude, not just for humans, but for all living
beings?
As for Beauchamp, he is on the liberal side of eurochristian thought. This
thought is still limited to a certain construct that continues to discriminate against people
of color and dispossess Native Americans through a hierarchical and linear ontology, a
universalizing epistemology, and a capitalist and extractivist economy. The relegation of
an Indigenous worldview to a “particular” or a “culture” serves to subsume them under a
eurochristian banner that means inclusion and “multiculturalism” instead of sovereignty
and respect for self-determination. The idea of sovereignty is difficult to shore up with
the Havasupai as “ignorant and uneducated” for Westerners. The idea of vulnerabilities,
while true in some sense, is a product of colonialism; but this accountability is rarely
acknowledged.
A different approach for research ethics would be to either stop using Native
American and other groups for research altogether, or to drastically change one’s
thinking. This change would require collaborative struggles with study subjects, of
forming relationships, and of offering significant reciprocity in the form of land. It would
634
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be turning the mirror back on oneself to recognize complicity with the eurochristian
system and its continued oppressions, and perhaps changing fundamentally one’s
methodology for living and working in this world. It would be an acknowledgement that
science does not address the stories that frame communal organization and ethics. And it
would be to stop trying to fit Indigenous peoples into Western conceptions of justice,
virtue, beneficence, and non-maleficence. Instead, bioethics must listen to Indigenous
descriptions of human flourishing and social order.
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CHAPTER 7: BIOETHICS INTERRUPTED
In this dissertation I interrogate eurochristian bioethics through anti-colonial
critique and the engagement of anti-colonial scholars and activists who provide rich,
contextual, historical, and practical ethical counter-perspectives. I emphasize that, in
general, we, as bioethicists (and medical practitioners), take for granted the paradigms of
Western morality without questioning the deeper impressions of the unconscious but
ubiquitous eurochristian worldview, including racism. My project opens up the
discussion between mainstream bioethicists and anti-colonial scholars and activists in
order to envision robust anti-colonial bioethics practice, scholarship, and policy. This
marriage between bioethics and anti-colonialism is imperative if bioethicists, as agents of
medical morality, take issues of race, justice, and equity seriously. How bioethicists
grapple with the eurochristian tropes of scarcity, inequity, and the pursuit of progress and
profit both conceptually and practically will require fundamental challenges to deeply
held “truths,” to the centers of authority, and to business as usual. Partnering with, and
often taking the lead from, anti-colonial scholars and activists, would fuel a joint
enterprise in imagining a bioethics that prioritizes abundance, collective struggle,
reciprocity, life, emancipatory praxis, and self-determination.
The ontological assumptions, the moral epistemology, and the socioeconomic
conventions that make up the eurochristian worldview permeate Engelhardt’s, Singer’s,
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and Beauchamp’s bioethics. While their writings are neither as overtly violent as Kant’s
description of how to whip a slave, or as obviously complicit in colonialism as was Mill
in his job as an administrator for the East India Company, they do share the traits of a
Christian or secular exceptionalism, a disregard of their own positionality within their
works (with the exception of Engelhardt), an idealistic view of ethics that may consider
race only peripherally, and ultimately an active participation in the economic and power
privileges that comes with being middle-class white male scholars (this includes myself,
minus the male gender). Rather than a personal attack, this assertion means they hold a
particular point of view that is attached to a long history of racism, genocide, and
exploitation. To revisit Foucault, the errors of some of the first bioethicists are not merely
conceptual or theoretical. The effects of these errors imprint onto the bodies and minds of
humans, such as Jahi McMath and her family, 6,500 undocumented Latinx immigrants
with ESRD, and the Havasupai Nation. Engelhardt, Singer, and Beauchamp, like their
precursors Kant, Mill, Rauschenbusch, Niebuhr, and Fletcher, are also highly influential
in continuing the colonial-racial discourse despite the quality of their scholarship and the
moral fibers of their beings.
For bioethicists with a eurochristian worldview (which is most of us), the
concepts of virtue, reason, universalization, utility, and social justice are seductive. They
conform to embedded worldviews and confirm one’s identity. They can serve to either
solidify one’s Christian roots, or appeal to one’s secular proclivities. Who can argue
against Hippocrates’ “First do no harm?” What kind of person would feel no compassion
for Omran Daqneesh, the five-year-old boy pulled from the airstrike rubble in Syria, and
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whose picture went viral on social media? Who would be against fighting for the
economic justice in and of “developing nations?” But underlying eurochristian morality
is an insidious worldview that directs the Western world unconsciously and insidiously,
even in the ostensibly most moral of places. My work demonstrates a method for
unpacking colonial concepts such as Aristotelian virtue, Rawlsian fairness, Kant’s reason,
Mill’s utilitarianism, and Beauchamp and Childress’ universal Principlism using anticolonial scholarship and activism. Examining the categories of ontological assumptions,
moral epistemology, and socioeconomic factors of the foundational text books of three
influential bioethics scholars has put into relief the eurochristian nature of this
scholarship. The main eurochristian/colonial themes exposed include the ontological
assumptions of biblical and Darwinian origin stories including linear thinking, a temporal
orientation, pursuit of progress, and the impulse to categorize living things along a
hierarchy; the moral epistemologies of science, rationality, modernity, universalization,
utility, and humanism; and the socioeconomic organization of society including a scarcity
mentality, justice only as redistribution, charity, capitalism, state-centered
exceptionalism, and libertarianism. The worldviews and works of anti-colonial scholars
provide contrast to, and put into perspective, the eurochristian colonial themes of Western
bioethics. Great harms underlying the mask of eurochristian morality is the continued
marginalization of communities of color, ethnicities, genders, sexual orientations, and
socioeconomic backgrounds.
On the margins of mainstream academic bioethics scholarship and public ethics
is a growing and diversified body of ethics of difference, resistance, counternarrative, and
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sometimes solidarity. This body of Latinx, Indigenous, Black diaspora, and other
communities’ knowledges, including that of Miguel De La Torre, Sylvia Wynter, and
Leanne Simpson, recognizes the limits to classical Western ethics through many lenses
including postcolonialism, anti-colonialism, feminism, womanism, queer ethics,
liberative ethics, anti-capitalism, and anti-globalism. My dissertation underscores the
significance of their works for bioethics and healthcare in general, especially in
addressing the dearth of praxis and scholarship on the continued issues of racism and
racial inequality in healthcare. Bioethics as a discipline is stuck in its own colonial-racial
discourse, and this dissertation provides a transformative way forward. I have exposed
the discipline to the concept of anti-colonialism and to three specific anti-colonial
scholars of color as the infrastructure for envisioning a just bioethics.
From De La Torre, Wynter, and Simpson, I have proposed new ways of
perceiving and approaching recent bioethics issues including inadequate care for
undocumented patients with ESRD, the resistance of Jahi McMath’s mother to the
diagnosis of brain death, and the harm caused to the Havasupai from a research protocol.
First, from De La Torre’s scholarship, my research reveals a future bioethics that rejects
universals and starts any theorizing with individuals and communities embedded in their
social locations, especially those who are on the margins. Imagine the impact of this kind
of bioethics for the Latinx undocumented ESRD patients whose health varies from
discomfort to near death on a weekly basis. A good example of this is a study by
Cervantes, Fischer, Verlinger, Zabalaga, Camacho, Linas, and Ortega called “The Illness
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Experience of Undocumented Immigrants with End-Stage Renal Disease.”635 This article
clearly demonstrates the suffering of undocumented immigrants who receive less than
standard of care for their ESRD, the disabling symptom load, and the argument for better
access for these patients. My analysis is explicit about how the U.S. healthcare system,
according to Foucault’s “technologies of power,” cause suffering and early death of
Latinx bodies. These technologies of power, such as state Medicaid policies, the
Affordable Care Act, hospital budgets, healthcare provider acceptance, and lack of
bioethics scholarship, fueled by overt and covert racism, a belief in the scarcity myth, and
the colonial mindset of “protecting the nation-state from bad people” all work to keep
suffering Latinx persons from access to the standard of care. The praxis of De La Torre’s
liberative ethics is also informative to bioethics. Accompanying those who are
marginalized, asking them why they come to the U.S., partnering with them, and getting
involved in relational and participatory political action is at the heart of justice.636 Justice
is not pity or charity; it is an actual placing of one’s white body in the spaces of those
who have come to the U.S. seeking a better life. A De La Torrian-influenced bioethics
would also denounce neoliberalism and would challenge the commodification of
medicine, including how bioethicists, as individuals, can begin to seek out ways to divest
ourselves from the dominant economic system. This is difficult; almost no one can escape
it completely. De La Torre’s work would be particularly instructive for both bioethicists,
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healthcare leaders, and healthcare workers who are caring for people who are
marginalized, which includes those in the public realm and in hospitals. This would
require political work, for bioethicists to take a stand, rather than to continue to foster
“neutrality,” another myth of the eurochristian colonial mindset. To echo De La Torre,
“no ethical perspective is value-free.”637 His work is also instructive for providing a
deeper understanding and context of Latinx histories, ethics, and current experiences.
Only through relationship, a deep and meaningful solidarity with Latinx en la lucha, can
bioethicists be taken seriously. I would suggest that embedding De La Torre’s work in
ethics and medical education would benefit the disciplines by debunking the myth of
neutrality, promoting understanding of one’s complicity in the continued marginalization
of Latinx people, and requiring the social, academic, and political work that supports
Latinx liberation, including those who are undocumented.
In my analysis of Wynter’s work and its impact on patients like Jahi McMath, I
consider many possible contributions to the discourse of an anti-colonial bioethics.
Wynter’s attention to the “schema of Man” would instruct the discourse of bioethics to
challenge its own narrative, its “truth-for”, that defines its worldviews – there is no
impartial point-of-view. Her rejection of Man as representative of Human is instructive
for understanding how the eurochristian worldview is only one of a number of potential
ontologies/epistemologies possible in our encounters with each other within a diverse
population. Her history of race through the last millennium provides the long-view of
racism and the depth to which it is entrenched in eurochristian worldview. For families
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such as McMath’s, Wynter instills the need to respect the neurologically grounded
fundamental truths of others’ definitions of life and death based on their own worldviews
and origin stories. The violence imparted on the black bodies of Winkfield and McMath
to withdraw McMath from the ventilator was yet another imposition of the eurochristian
worldview. This insistence of following “the rules” within bioethics and medicine is
another example of how the Foucauldian technologies of power, the power that is built
into the structures of eurochristian institutions, continue to work in favor of maintaining
the dominant system. The technologies that marginalized the Black bodies of McMath
and Winkfield include the brain death laws created by an ad hoc Harvard committee,
mostly white male physicians and scholars in 1968, and then by the President’s
Commission for the study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and
Behavioral Research, the latter with a few women involved. These discussions were
fueled by the utilitarian-economic pressures to account for the cost of life support and for
the accumulating number of potential organ recipients, at the expense of what Wynter
would call the sociogenic reality of McMath’s family, one that still sees her as a member
of their family, as human, and as alive. Wynter teaches that the utilitarian-economic
schema of efficiency has been prioritized over the respect of non-eurochristian
worldviews and ontologies, and the transparency of care providers in helping patients
understand the dilemmas (which builds trust), rather than selling people like Winkfield
on the legal fiction of brain death while she watches McMath’s heart beat on the screen
and holds her warm pink hand. Like De La Torre, Wynter also prioritizes the “gaze from
below”, those on the margins, those who will ultimately define the “second emergence,”
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a new paradigm for Human that is richer and more just because of their ability to live in
two worlds at once, straddling two worlds. In healthcare, eurochristians find themselves
straddling worldviews regularly, but can default to the eurochristian “rules” rather than
being required to feel the tension of living in a world in constant negotiation, tolerance,
and humility. This, I argue, is ontological and epistemological privilege. As bioethicists
we have the choice to defer to the rules when negotiation gets difficult. In a bioethics
following the lead of Wynter, a border bioethics would emerge from a relational and
ecumenical Homo narrans, one that respects the physical manifestation of individual and
communal stories; the ontologies and epistemologies become living flesh. Wynter’s work
is also persuasive for raising awareness of the racism imparted by the eurochristian
worldview through her discourse on symbolic life and death. She argues the liminal, such
as people of color and the socioeconomically disadvantaged, are continually defined as
the negative pole of binaries such as rational/irrational, productive/lazy, good/evil,
Christian/heathen, symbolic life/death. The binary structure remains through time; only
the words change. The Black diaspora continue to be relegated to an inferior space both
physically and in the Western imagination despite individual good intentions, because it
is the systemic worldview that creates racial harms. Finally, Wynter, like De La Torre,
notes how the economics of capitalism defines the whole of humanity as a master of
scarcity through investment and accumulation. Our behavioral codes are primarily
“reasons of the economy” that drive eurochristian ethics. More important than honoring
Winkfield’s wishes, it was important not to waste money in keeping McMath’s body
alive—for the hospital, for society, for potential organ recipients, and even for
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Winkfield’s own good. This is not to say economics is irrelevant to decision-making in
medicine, but it has become the final word. Again, my analysis uncovers how the trope of
scarcity and the priority of progress and profit in the West both contribute to the
overemphasis of economics over respecting people’s relational values. Towards an anticolonial bioethics, my dissertation demonstrates how Wynter’s work would be especially
helpful in framing bioethics, healthcare worker, and healthcare administration education
in reframing values differences as ontological/epistemological and in challenging
economic models and their supremacy.
In my analysis of Simpson’s work I demonstrate how Simpson would move
bioethics into the realm of Indigenous values, including the values that are being lost to
progress. The philosopher Jacques Ellul wrote in 1963, “the fact is that, viewed
objectively, technological progress produces values of unimpeachable merit, while
simultaneously destroying values no less important.”638 Simpson reasserts the values of
respect, renewal, relationship, and reciprocity. These values have the potential to
transform research ethics. Such a transformation would be disruptive to the pace of
“progress,” but I project they are necessary to salvage the values important to planetary
well-being and the future of human life. When applying Simpson’s work to the
Havasupai case, it becomes clear that if these values had been intact as part of research
ethics, the breaching of issues of consent and the harms done to the study subjects would
have been unlikely. Consent falls short if not embedded in real respect of the study
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subjects, in a commitment to renewal of community, and of a deep and reciprocal
relationship between study subjects and researchers. Like Wynter’s Homo narrans,
Simpson also values the origin stories and oral histories of individuals and communities
as a fundamental trait of human life, not as a “particular” that can be tossed to the side of
biological and theoretical universalism. The grounded normativity of Indigenous life
prioritizes the relationship of humans with the earth and all living things, placing
communities in a collective struggle to maintain balance and to maximize all life. The
Indigenous life is a content-full ethics, as Engelhardt would call it, much like his
Orthodox Christian ethics, and like many other ethnic and religiously derived ethics.
Towards an anti-colonial bioethics, Indigenous scholars bring attention to the mutual
respect of self-determining and content-full communities toward each other, despite
disagreement. The prioritizing of Indigenous self-determination (as Indigenous nations
have granted one another for millennia) is also instructive for those who evangelize their
own morality. Simpson also provides a clear description of a worldview that is a contrast
to the eurochristian worldview, enabling Westerners to envision radically different
paradigms for moving in the world and relating to others. My dissertation demonstrates
how Simpson’s views, and those of other Indigenous scholars, have the power to
transform research, health policy, and the provision of care in ways that recover lifesustaining values.
The works of De La Torre, Wynter, and Simpson are paradigmatic examples of
a rich discourse happening outside mainstream bioethics. Anti-colonial voices such as
theirs matter to racialized communities and their interactions with the healthcare system.
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They also matter to those unaware they are imprisoned by the eurochristian worldview, of
which ignorance not only affects social justice, but the health of the planet. The
scholarship and praxis of anti-colonial scholars unearth the racial harms hidden in
eurochristian structures, including the discipline of bioethics. Anti-colonial scholarship is
also explicit that, while eurochristian allies may have a role in anti-colonial praxis, it is
primarily the work of communities of color who have been marginalized and their
counterparts in academia, politics, and healthcare practice who have the fundamental task
of resisting eurochristian structures and reimagining and reclaiming their ontologies,
epistemologies, and socioeconomic models that have been nearly (but not wholly) lost
through appropriation, land theft, the slave trade, and genocide. This resurgence is not the
work of eurochristians but can be supported through the challenging of eurochristian
structures of capitalism, evangelism, racism, and blind pursuit of progress. Bioethics can
be engaged through the literal joining of people in la lucha, the fight of those on the
underside of colonialism against the systems that oppresses. Anti-colonialism is not about
charity, assimilation, multiculturalism, or inclusion. It is about radical diversity,
difference, and self-determination. I am proposing the bioethical prioritization of issues
of race by transforming its education, practice, and policies through the use of anticolonial scholarship and praxis.
In sum, I contend that an anti-colonial bioethics questions the aims and
outcomes of bioethics in general. It takes the lead to address issues of racism, inequality,
and oppression in healthcare. An anti-colonial bioethics must be led by those at the
margins of bioethics, not those at the center. An anti-colonial bioethics focuses on
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differences, not similarities. It demands the co-existence of multiple epistemologies; the
differences that come from people’s core truths. Anti-colonial bioethicists do the difficult
and ongoing internal work of staying epistemologically open to an individual’s or
community’s ethical self-determination and sovereignty. Future pursuits in this area
might include a study to assess the state of bioethics education on race; introducing anticolonial concepts and scholars in ethics education; building deeper relationships with
communities who are marginalized by bioethics/healthcare systems to understand diverse
worldviews and moral epistemologies; and to partner with both anti-colonial scholars and
communities to challenge eurochristian colonial-racial structures.
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